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Foreword 
 
This work is the outcome of three and a half years of research in the DFG priority 
program SPP 1689 ÒClimate Engineering Ð Risks, Challenges, Opportunities?Ó as part 
of the project C-E-thics. The main objectives of C-E-thics was to sort, scrutinize and 
evaluate the main moral arguments about climate engineering. While my colleagues 
worked, among others, on the trade-off argument, the lesser evil argument, and the 
argument from political economy, I myself was concerned with the buying time 
argument Ð an argument in favor of potential climate engineering deployment. It was a 
challenging argument in many ways: Firstly, it was challenging to reconstruct a 
reasonable version of this argument, that adds to and clarifies the current discussion 
about a potential buying time deployment of climate engineering. Secondly, it 
challenged my own point of view about climate engineering. While intuitively, I would 
headlong reject any use of climate engineering, analyzing the buying time argument 
made me concede that there might be forms of deployment that actually could be 
beneficial and morally sound, albeit in very strict boundary-conditions. However, those 
very clear-cut and limited deployment schemes are only morally acceptable when 
embedded in a comprehensive climate portfolio including fast and far reaching emission 
cuts. In the end, the need for immediate and drastic mitigation cannot be reduced by the 
possibility of future climate engineering deployment, nor be postponed. 
This thesis has been made possible by numerous people that supported and encouraged 
me in numerous ways. I would like to thank them, though I cannot possibly mention all 
of them here. 
I thank my doctoral advisor, Gregor Betz, for giving me the opportunity to work in this 
fascinating project and to deepen research in my main areas of interests: climate, ethics 
and argumentation theory. He gave this thesis the main direction and the right ÔdriveÕ. I 
also thank him for being very supportive and understanding of my family situation, 
always knowing the importance of putting first things first.  
I wish to thank my research group, the members of the shared research group 
LOBSTER and the members of the SPP, especially Christian Baatz for supporting me in 
all respects from discussing my ideas to conference organization to online paper 
research. 
I wish to thank my family for their amazing support. Foremost, I thank my husband, 
Gregor Neuber. He is a wonderful husband and father, a loving man and an insightful 
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partner in discussing my work. This thesis would not have been possible without his 
constant encouragement, his constant belief in me and his constant and selfless help in 
letting me work long hours on the weekends. 
I thank my father, Konrad Ott. He gave valuable insights to my thesis, greatly widening 
my viewpoints, and was always available for late-night near-breakdown phone calls. I 
thank my mother, Veronika Surau-Ott. Not only did she always show a keen interest in 
my research and discussed the thesis with me from a fresh and neutral standpoint, she 
also supported me and my family at home, allowing me to continue writing. I thank my 
brother, Immanuel Ott, for being a fierce critic and for teaching me to be an even fiercer 
advocate. I thank my mother in law, Irina Neuber, for being there in the last week of my 
writing, essentially enabling me to finish my thesis.  
Last, but never least, I wish to thank my children, for being understanding, for always 
cheering me up when I come home, just for being the cutest and most awesome kids in 
the world, and for constantly reminding me of what is really important in life. I would 
dedicate this work to them. ButÉ One result of my thesis is the rather bleak prospect, 
that future generations might have no choice but to engage in climate engineering 
strategies. We may find ourselves in a situation, in which the policy options we propose 
violate our own normative standards. This prospect is nothing I would wish to dedicate 
to anyone.  
This thesis is written with a deep love for nature; a love for every single being and for 
everything there is. It is written with the hope and faith that the current and future 
generations will be able, against all difficulties, to stabilize temperature rise, to turn the 
wheel around and to stop polluting and exploiting our planet. I hope to teach my 
children to be conscious about nature, to be aware of the limits we live within and to be 
content Ð virtues that are so dearly needed in the anthropocene. I hope to show them the 
beauty of nature, the wondrous creatures and the mesmerizing places, from the smallest 
ant to the highest heights of the mountains Ð this is what I dedicate to my children.  
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Abbreviations and Metrics 
BECCS Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
BT-argument Buying Time argument 
CDR Carbon Dioxide Removal 
CE Climate Engineering 
EJ  Exajoule, measuring unit to indicate energy consumption  
GHG Greenhouse Gases 
Gt CO2/yr Annual emission of gigatonnes of Carbon Dioxide  
Mt SO2/yr Annual emission of megatonnes of Sulfur Dioxide  
NET Negative Emission Technology 
ppm parts per million 
RCP Representative Concentration Pathway 
SRM Solar Radiation Management 
SAI Sulfate Aerosol Injection 
W/m
2
 Watt per square meter 
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Summary of the argument and main results 
 
Can climate engineering help provide more time for an ambitious mitigation 
program? And if so, is a buying time deployment of climate engineering morally 
acceptable? The work at hand means to thoroughly scrutinize this specific argument 
of the climate engineering discourse Ð the buying time argument (BT-argument). The 
point of departure of this research is the notion that climate engineering (CE) is not 
inherently morally wrong. The guiding question is: Is there a possible buying time 
deployment of a climate engineering technology absent any general moral 
constraints?  
The discussion enfolds in three parts: The first part (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) is of 
introductory character and sets the stage for the debate. The second part (Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 5) constitutes the focus of the investigation. Here, the buying time argument 
is translated into a deductively valid premise-conclusion-structure and a strong 
buying time principle is developed. In particular, this principle implies that 
deployment of CE is to be finite and should not interfere with mitigation efforts. The 
BT-argument is discussed in light of four specific climate engineering deployment 
scenarios, two including sulfate aerosol injection (SAI) and two including bioenergy 
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). In one of the scenario pairs it is assumed 
that CO2 emissions to remain within the two-degree budget; in the other an overshoot 
is assumed. The third part (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) stresses the moral dimension of 
the depicted deployment scenarios and gives an outlook for further research into 
policy choices.  
A close reading of the current literature encompassing the buying time idea enables 
the distillation of the underlying implicit assumptions. Those assumptions of the BT-
argument shape the formulation of an elaborated argument principle: 
 
Buying Time Principle (BT-Principle) 
If: i. Climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and is 
beneficial in so doing, iii. option O only reckons with finite CE deployment, iv. 
CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O without CE, 
v. there is no option OÕ which is maximally finite and which leads to G and which 
is better than O, vi. there are no general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
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From this an argument
1
 can be formulated. 
 
Buying Time Argument (BT-Argument) 
1.  
 
If: i. Climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and 
is beneficial in so doing so, iii. option O only reckons with finite CE 
deployment, iv. CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to 
mitigation in O without CE, v. there is no option OÕ which is maximally 
finite and which leads to G and which is better than O, vi. there are no 
general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
2. Climate goal G is desirable (desirability thesis). 
3. Option O leads to the desirable climate goal G (effectiveness thesis). 
4. Option O only allows for finite CE deployment (finitude thesis). 
5. CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O 
without CE (no-impediment thesis). 
6. There is no option OÕ which is finite and which leads to G and which is 
better than O (no-better-option thesis). 
7. There are no general moral constraints on option O (morality thesis). 
8.  THUS: Option O should be adopted. 
 
I introduce two placeholders for the buying time argument: Climate goal G and 
policy option O. The discourse on CE as a means to buy time incorporates at least 
four different climate goals G: Two that aim at preventing dangerous climate 
impacts and two that relate to minimizing the social and economic costs of the 
inevitable transition towards a carbon-free economy. Those four goals are 
discussed in light of four policy options O, two for SAI and two for BECCS.  
 
Climate Goal G 
Climate Goal 1 Avoiding temperature-dependent tipping points. 
Climate Goal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
Climate Goal 3 Reducing adaptation pressure. 
Climate Goal 4 Reducing mitigation pressure. 
 
Climate Policy Option O 
Climate Policy Option a  SAI + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1 An argument with placeholders is called an argument scheme, since its premises are not truth-
apt. For the sake of brevity, I will use the term ÔargumentÕ instead of Ôargument schemeÕ.  
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Climate Policy Option A SAI + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget). 
Climate Policy Option b BECCS+ CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
Climate Policy Option B BECCS + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget). 
 
The lower case letters a and b indicate that emissions remain within the two-
degree budget; the upper case letters A and B signify an overshoot scenario. 
Climate goal G and policy option O are then plotted against each other, which 
yields a matrix of sixteen instantiations of the BT-argument.  
 
 
Of those sixteen versions, only two generate plausible premises (arguments a2 and 
a3). A further six instances can be shown to be implausible. Most notably, the 
sub-cases assuming an overshoot of CO2 emissions yield either implausible or at 
least indecisive arguments. I believe I can demonstrate that the BT-argument has 
plausible premises only if emissions are assumed to remain within the two-degree 
budget. The remaining eight versions of the BT-argument are undecided in that I 
cannot pronounce on their plausibility. Scientific findings to validate the 
respective premises are inaccessible to me. There are two special cases, however, 
that pose quite a challenge for the BT-argument: Arguments B1 and B4. Those 
Climate Goal G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Option O 
Preventing climate tipping 
points 
Reducing pressure 
Avoiding 
temperature
- dependent 
tipping 
points 
Avoiding 
rate-
dependent 
tipping 
points  
Reducing 
adaptation 
pressure 
Reducing 
mitigation 
pressure 
1 2 3 4 
S
A
I 
 
 
CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
a a1 a2 a3 a4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
A A1 A2 A3 A4 
B
E
C
C
S
 
CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
b b1 b2 b3 b4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
B B1 B2 B3 B4 
Table 1. Argument matrix. The rows depict climate goals G; the columns depict portfolio options 
O. Each entry represents a version of the BT-argument. 
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cases assume BECCS deployment in an overshoot scenario, in which BECCS is 
used to realize the two-degree target and to reduce mitigation pressure. However, 
those instantiations violate at least two requirements of the BT-argument. If one 
still wants to hold on to this scenario as being a buying time instantiation, the 
respective BT-requirements may need to be attenuated. In particular, the request 
not to interfere with CO2 emission cuts may turn out to be absurd for BECCS. If 
some premises of the initial BT-argument are weakened, the argument 
instantiations involving BECCS in an overshoot scenario may make for a 
plausible BT-deployment.  
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AND MAIN RESULTS  
!!"
 
 Preventing climate tipping points Reducing pressure 
Avoiding temperature dependent 
tipping points 
Avoiding rate-dependent 
tipping points. 
Reducing adaptation pressure Reducing mitigation pressure. 
1 2 3 4 
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a No-better-option thesis. 
This climate goal amounts to the two-
degree target. If CO2 emissions 
remain within the two-degree budget, 
SAI deployment is superfluous in 
reaching the two-degree target. 
SAI might be able to prevent 
rate depended tipping points, 
while mitigation efforts serve 
to realize the two-degree 
target. 
SAI might be able to reduce 
the pressure of adaptation, if it 
lessens the rate of temperature 
change which could generate 
more time for ecosystems and 
human systems to adapt.   
Since mitigation is assumed to be 
ambitious in this case, it is 
unclear, in how far a lessening of 
the rate of temperature change 
might influence mitigation costs. 
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A No-impediment thesis  
If carbon emissions exceed the two-degree budget, SAI would be used in order to stabilize temperature. It would then be used as a substitute for 
mitigation, impeding mitigation efforts.  
Finitude thesis. 
Because SAI would function as a substitute for mitigation efforts, it would have to be used continuously in order to stabilize temperature. Under the 
assumption of exceeding carbon emissions, SAI would not be finite.   
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b No-better-option thesis. 
This climate goal amounts to the two-
degree target. If CO2 emissions 
remain within the two-degree budget, 
BECCS deployment is superfluous in 
reaching the two-degree target. 
Whether BECCCS can 
influence the rate of 
temperature change, cannot 
be decided within the scope 
of this work.  
If additional BECCS can 
influence the rate of change, it 
might also reduce adaptation 
pressure.   
While emission would remain 
within the two-degree budget, 
BECCS could be used to further 
reduce the time pressure for 
mitigation. Research for BECCS 
together with sufficient mitigation 
has not been reviewed for this 
research thesis.  
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B The special case of BECCS.  
BECCS in light of insufficient 
mitigation might be used to stabilize 
temperature change. It might however 
violate several BT-requirements. A 
weak version of the BT-argument 
could incorporate this case.  
 
Especially in light of 
insufficient mitigation, it 
cannot be decided here, 
whether BECCCS can 
influence the rate of 
temperature change. 
Especially in light of 
insufficient mitigation, it is 
unclear, whether BECCS can 
reduce adaptation pressure.   
The special case of BECCS.  
BECCS in light of insufficient 
mitigation might be used to 
reduce mitigation pressure as it 
enhances the emission budget. It 
might however violate several 
BT-requirements. A weak version 
of the BT-argument could 
incorporate this case.  
Table 2. Full table of instantiation of the BT-argument. The colors indicate the status of the argument (plausible, implausible, undecided and the 
special case of BECCS). In each field, the discussion of the argument is shortly summarized and the implausible premises, if any, are indicated.!
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AND MAIN RESULTS  
! !"
Plausible Versions (green) 
Two plausible versions of the BT-argument are been identified: Arguments a2 and 
a3. In those cases, SAI is deemed to be finite, beneficial and effective, reducing 
pressure for adaptation while not interfering with mitigation efforts. This form of 
moderate and strictly purpose-bound SAI may realize the BT-requirements. 
This result is somewhat surprising, because SAI especially has been criticized 
frequently on moral grounds. Nevertheless, a beneficial buying time deployment of 
SAI might be conceivable within the given boundaries. It is to be noted that the 
plausibility of this version prominently depends on the effectiveness of mitigation 
efforts. Only if emissions remain within the two-degree budget, a plausible SAI 
deployment is possible. Thus, in addition to the moral obligation to mitigate, it can be 
shown that CE deployment in a BT-framing is only plausible with sufficient 
mitigation.  
 
Implausible Versions (red) 
Five additional SAI-instantiations and one BECCS-instantiation can be shown to be 
implausible. When relating to goal 1, both SAI and BECCS turn out to be 
superfluous in the respective policy option a and b (argument a1 and b1). All other 
SAI-scenarios which assume emissions to exceed the two-degree budget, become 
implausible (arguments A1, A2, A3 and A4) Ð they violate both the finitude- and as 
the no-impediment requirement. If this result holds true, it may influence the decision 
making-process as to warn against a supposed Ôbuying time deploymentÕ of SAI in 
light of insufficient mitigation.  
 
Undecided Versions (light blue) 
For several scenarios, I cannot provide further scientific back-up. Those BT-versions 
must remain undecided in the current discussion. Out of six undecided scenarios, five 
belong to BECCS scenarios (arguments b2, B2, b3, B3 and b4). This might indicate 
that there is much more uncertainty regarding BECCS than there is regarding SAI, 
and highlights the need for comprehensive research on BECCS, before it is mutually 
assumed as a potential future negative emission technology. 
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The special case of BECCS (dark blue) 
A BECCS deployment to artificially enhance the emission budget (argument B1 and 
B4) turns out to violate at least two requirements of the BT-argument: The finitude- 
and the no-impediment requirement, and it may very well also violate the morality 
requirement. Exactly this case, though, is the raison d'tre for the contemplation and 
research of BECCS deployment scenarios. Discussion in Chapter 5 adheres to the 
strong BT-requirements, which lead to a rejection of BECCS in light of insufficient 
mitigation efforts. Chapter 6 traces another route by asking whether the BT-
requirements might be too strong for the special case of BECCS.  
 
Nevertheless, I argue for a strong version of the BT-argument. I do so by stressing 
one of the initial assumptions of the BT-framing Ð the inevitable decarbonization of 
society. I mean to show that while there might be morally acceptable and even 
necessary BECCS deployment scenarios, those are no instantiations of the BT-
argument. Finally, I wish to discuss general moral concerns that address the plausible 
BT-instantiations and give an outlook for further research. 
To summarize, the main objectives and the main results of my research are given in 
bullet points: 
 
Main objectives 
¥ Introduction of the moral controversy about climate engineering; 
¥ Introduction of two central CE technologies: SAI and BECCS; 
¥ Close analysis of the buying time framing; 
¥ Reconstruction of the buying time argument and discussion of its premises;  
¥ Discussion of SAI and BECCS instantiations of the BT-argument; 
¥ Critique of the BT-argument with two general moral arguments; 
¥ Demonstration of how argument reconstruction helps to structure and evolve a 
complex debate. 
 
Main results 
¥ Ambitious mitigation is necessary for the BT-argument to be plausible. 
SAI can only serve as means to buy time, if CO2 emissions remain within the 
two-degree budget. Not only is drastic mitigation morally obligatory, but also 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AND MAIN RESULTS  
! !"
necessary in order to render the SAI-instantiation of the BT-argument 
plausible.  
¥ BT-deployment needs to be finite. If any CE technology is anticipated to be 
deployed for a potentially infinite or uncontrollably long period of time, it 
cannot be called to be in line with the BT-framing.  
¥ The plausible BT-instantiations are not rebutted by general moral 
arguments. Cases that meet the strong BT-requirements do not fall prey to at 
least two general moral constraints: The hubris-argument and the techno-fix-
argument.  
¥ Case-specific arguments are imperative in evaluating the moral scope of 
CE deployment. Each technology should be evaluated as part of a 
comprehensive climate portfolio, where both the extent of its planned 
deployment as well as the additional climatic options are taken into account. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives the framework for the research thesis at hand. First, the 
significance of climate engineering (CE) will be illustrated in the context of urgent 
climate policies. Climate engineering is a risky technology that comes with an array 
of problems - technical, political and moral. The way CE deployment is framed 
influences the judgment of those problems. Especially if CE is seen only as a 
temporary stopgap measure that serves to Ôbuy timeÕ until efficient mitigation politics 
take hold, CE deployment is likely to be positively assessed (Section 1.1).  
The critical examination of the buying time framing in favor of CE deployment 
constitutes the core of this research thesis. The buying time framing is embedded in a 
complex political, socio-economic and moral discourse, with many 
interdependencies to other fields of research. Additionally, research on CE deals with 
great uncertainties. In particular research on climate engineering has been conducted 
to a large extend with argumentative analysis contributing to the so-called 
Ôargumentative turnÕ in policy analysis (Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn 2016a). 
Argument reconstruction proofs to be a viable tool for certain kinds of political 
debates that are faced with deep uncertainty. It allows for the assessment of complex 
decisions absent any clear probabilities or results (Section 1.2). By means of 
argument reconstruction, the buying time argument (BT-argument) will be 
formulated and assessed for validity. The set-up and main results of the research 
thesis at hand will be outlined in Section 1.3. 
 
1.1  The debate on climate engineering in context of climate change 
In November 2015, the most recent major climate conference took place in Paris. It 
was the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. All 197 participating states mutually agreed on the 
danger and urgency of climate change being the foremost threat to human society. 
The final Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2016) aims at reducing global warming to 
Òwell below 2¡C above pre-industrial levelsÓ (UNFCCC 2016, p. 3). In order to reach 
this goal, global GHG emissions should reach net zero by the end of the twenty-first 
century, asking for drastic emission cuts in the next decades for both developed and 
developing countries. The nationally determined contribution (NDC), which each 
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country formulates individually, is a nationÕs share to realizing the climate goal. The 
NDCs are expected to amplify every five years and the nations are expected 
eventually to abandon the use of fossil fuels (UNFCCC 2016, p. 3). At the time of 
writing (July 2017), 153 out of 197 parties have ratified the commitment Ð with the 
astounding exception of the U.S.A, which withdrew from the Paris Agreement in 
June 2017. 
The Paris Agreement marks the preliminary end of the long discussion on 
anthropogenic climate change. For decades now, but at the latest with the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the need to cut emissions in order to stabilize 
temperature at 2¡C above pre-industrial level has been present to policy makers and 
the public alike.  
However, existing pledges are not sufficient to reach the two-degree target, but rather 
would allow for a 2.8¡C warming (CAT 2017). The progression of the pledges is 
intended, but meeting the climate goals keeps getting harder if the pledges continue 
to range at the lowest possible formulation. Moreover, the mechanism to implement 
the NDCs is argued to be feeble, and the power of the treaty is supposed to rely 
mainly on a countryÕs good reputation (Jacquet and Jamieson 2016). 
A grand, large-scale and global effort to reduce CO2 emission
2
 is needed in order to 
meet the commonly agreed climate targets. The first signs of climate change are 
already visible (IPCC 2014b), some of which are irreversible (Solomon 2009) and 
both human and natural systems suffer from the impacts. The threat of a Ôclimate 
emergencyÕ looms behind current climate predictions, while scientists repeatedly 
correct their predictions to ever more dire scenarios (e.g. Hansen et al. 2016). 
It is in this situation that the idea of climate engineering (also known as geo-
engineering, climate manipulation or climate intervention
3
, hereafter referred to as 
CE) has gained interest. Paul Crutzen has opened up the discussion with his 2006 
editorial remark, urging for Òactive scientific researchÓ (Crutzen 2006, p. 217) on 
stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) Ð a technology that could possibly reduce 
radiative forcing by injecting sulfur particles into the stratosphere. Climate 
engineering has since been defined as the Òdeliberate large-scale manipulation of the 
planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate changeÓ (Royal Society 
2009, p. 77). Deployment of climate engineering technologies might avert dangerous 
######################################## ####################
2 There are several other Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) that contribute to global warming. Because the 
main driver of global warming is CO2 I will focus on CO2 solely. 
3 Even the wording of the technology is subject of discussion, see also Section 2.5. 
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climate change in face of insufficient mitigation. And with the latest 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeÕs (IPCC) report having included CE as 
an (admittedly theoretical) option to lessen climate change impacts, CE has been 
hoisted into the realm of acceptable climate policy options (IPCC 2013). 
Climate policy options (or portfolios) contain different strategies on how to cope 
with climate change. They include options to reduce emission (mitigation), adjust to 
climate impacts (adaptation) and, as of late, technically averting climate effects (CE).  
 
"
Figure 1. Three possible strategies in a climate policy portfolio: mitigation, adaptation and climate 
engineering. For the latter some areas of research are indicated (Source: Kiel Earth Institute 2015).  
 
However, the endeavor of climate engineering comes with an array of problems Ð 
technologically, politically and morally. With research on CE still being in its 
infancy, the scope and effectiveness of CE is but a possibility. There are grave, 
maybe even insurmountable uncertainties about side effects of CE deployment, since 
both the technologies as well as the climate system are still not sufficiently 
understood. Social impacts of developing and advertising CE technologies are 
unclear and there is no viable political framework that could enable a global 
governance of CE technologies with respect to liability or compensation. The debate 
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about CE is faced with incomplete and uncertain information impeding robust 
decision-making.  
On a more general note, many philosophers have argued that the enterprise of 
technically counteracting climate change is as such morally wrong (Robock 2008, 
Gardiner 2010, Gardiner 2013). Those authors argue, for instance, that pursuing 
drastic emission cuts is the foremost priority of developed nations, and CE might 
divert from this obligation. CE then appears to show a hubristic stance towards 
nature and our place in it, as it offers a cheap techno-fix for our failed emission cuts.  
Between the support of large-scale CE as a strategy to realize climate goals in the 
face of insufficient mitigation on the one hand, and the devaluation of CE from a 
moral point of view on the other hand, an apparent middle ground has been sought. 
In this view, CE deployment should not amount to an alternative to mitigation 
efforts. Rather, CE presents itself as a stopgap measure that allows for more time, 
while in the interim period an ambitious mitigation program will be underway in 
order to push the decarbonization of society. The deployment of CE could help 
developed nations to buy time for initiating a successful climate policy. This way, CE 
might act as a bridge-technology that could be ramped down as soon as mitigation 
efforts show sufficient effect. This line of thinking amounts to the buying time 
framing of climate engineering. 
The research question of the thesis at hand is this: Are there possible time buying 
deployments absent any general moral constraints? This question assumes that CE is 
not inherently morally wrong Ð if that were the case, CE deployment would have to 
be rejected no matter the mode of deployment. In contrast, the BT-argument is 
consequentialist; hence, it assesses the deployment of CE on grounds of its results.
4
  
The BT-framing now advocates a limited CE deployment in both its intensity as well 
as its duration. If the relevant requirements are met, a decent CE deployment seems 
imaginable. This shows that the framing of CE as a means to buy time makes a 
positive evaluation more likely. I will follow that thought, while critically examining 
the underlying assumptions. I will translate the vague buying time framing into an 
argument Ð the buying time argument (BT-argument) Ð and discuss the possibility of 
######################################## ####################
4  The evaluation of the BT-argument has significant intersections to the field of technology 
assessment. Grunwald (2008, 2009) gives a comprehensive introduction to the method and scope of 
technology assessment (TA). The thesis at hand, however, uses the method of argument reconstruction 
and evaluates the premises of the BT-argument thusly. 
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morally acceptable CE deployment in light of this argument. In doing so, I adhere to 
what has been called the Ôargumentative turnÕ in policymaking: Debates that are 
faced with incomplete and uncertain information can be substantiated with the help 
of argument analysis.  
Evaluation of the moral status of a certain technology, however, remains incomplete, 
if it is not embedded within a comprehensive policy mix that also accounts for a 
mitigation pathway. Therefor, the thesis at hand uses climate portfolios as 
instantiations for the BT-argument.  
 
1.2  Method  
In both our daily life and politics, many decision problems are characterized by great 
(or deep) uncertainty: The lack of probabilistic foresight, the lack of information 
about relevant consequences and the lack of a clear ranking of our values
5
. Climate 
change and climate engineering are paradigmatic cases for decisions under great 
uncertainty.  
 
Ò(É) climate change is associated with conditions of deep uncertainty, where decision- 
makers do not know or cannot agree on: (i) the system models, (ii) the prior probability 
distributions for inputs to the system model(s) and their interdependencies, and/or (iii) 
the value system(s) used to rank alternatives.Ó  
(Lempert et al. 2004, p. 2) 
 
Traditional decision theories (like cost-benefit-analysis) cannot deal very well with 
great, or deep, uncertainty, because they rely on a concrete value of their input 
variables. But in political context, there may be Ôhard choicesÕ that cannot be 
resolved unambiguously, having to be made nevertheless.  
A way of addressing issues inflicted with great uncertainty lies in argument analysis. 
Argument analysis is a diverse field of philosophical research that can help clarifying 
a complex and uncertain situation by making the arguments pro and contra a certain 
decision explicit. Especially normative principles that underlie certain assumptions 
are made visible by argument reconstruction. This is obtained by analytical thinking 
in the best sense: Creating transparency, avoiding ambiguity, and highlighting 
######################################## ####################
5 This is not intended to be a definition of Ôdeep uncertaintyÕ, rather a colloquial understanding of 
what it amounts to. 
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inferential relations. While there is no final result to be gained from this approach, 
decision makers might see more clearly what the arguments are about, how to 
evaluate them in light of their own values and what would follow from them. The 
argumentative turn has been characterized by Hansson:  
 
ÒThis is a Ôwidened rationality approachÕ that scrutinizes inferences from what is known 
and what is unknown for the decision at hand. It recognizes and includes the normative 
components and makes them explicit. This is what we mean by the argumentative turn in 
decision support and uncertainty analysis.Ò  
(Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn 2016b, p. 29) 
 
Betz has exemplified this methodological approach to the problem of CE in his 2012 
paper on the arming-the-future argument (AF-argument) (Betz 2012a). Betz analyses 
this prominent argument in favor of CE research and discusses its the premises as 
well as the objections to it, thereby pinpointing the critical issues at stake. 
Furthermore, Betz indicates what a proponent of the AF-argument needs to ensure if 
her argument is to remain plausible (e.g. installing mechanisms that prevent 
automatic CE deployment).  
Elliott has described climate engineering as the ãposter childÒ of argumentative 
research (Elliot 2016, p. 305), not least because Betz and Cacean (2012) have 
brought forward a comprehensive argument map on the moral controversy about CE. 
Their study is a textbook example for how valuable the method of argument analysis 
can be for the discourse on climate engineering. The many different uncertainties 
surrounding the research and deployment of CE may be taken hold of by means of 
presenting them as arguments which themselves assume certain normative principles. 
That way, the discussion may shift from the empirical question of how to reduce 
uncertainty to the normative question of how to rationally deal with this uncertainty. 
Elliot stresses that especially in the case of CE, the ethical discussion precedes the 
natural scientific one.   
 
ãSince there are such pervasive uncertainties associated with climate geoengineering, it is 
a foolÕs errand to try to quantify the likely costs and benefits associated with various 
climate geoengineering schemes with precision in an effort to determine a rational choice. 
(É) Many of the foundational documents discussing climate geoengineering highlight the 
necessity of thinking through its ethical ramificationsÓ. (Elliot 2016, p. 313) 
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For the BT-argument, argument analysis proves to offer a tool for evaluating 
different deployment scenarios under an ethical perspective. Certain implicit 
assumptions, like the inevitable decarbonization by the end of the century (Section 
3.1), can thus be problematized and discussed.  
An essential part of argument analysis is argument reconstruction. Argument 
reconstruction aims at translating different claims of a debate into deductively valid 
arguments and picturing their dialectical inferences. While a debate consists of two 
features Ð the dynamic process of giving and taking arguments on the one side, and 
the static Ôfreeze frameÕ of the arguments and their interrelations Ð argument 
reconstruction focuses on the latter aspect of the debate (Betz 2010). #
Argument reconstruction can either focus on the reconstruction of single arguments, 
or on the reconstruction of the whole debate. Single argument reconstruction takes 
the semantic-syntactical inferences of sentences as theses into account and translates 
them into premise-conclusion-structures (i.e. arguments); debate reconstruction 
highlights dialectical relations like support and attack between single arguments and 
theses. Those two tasks are intertwined when considering argumentative texts.  
The practice of argument reconstruction is a hermeneutic process of analyzing 
scientific texts, whose results are deductively valid
6
, semi-formal premise-
conclusion-structures, which make their dialectical interrelation visible. Argument 
reconstruction is also an interpretative task, since the text under investigation usually 
does not present arguments in a formal manner. Mostly, arguments in texts are found 
in the form of ÔenthymemesÕ Ð arguments that are incomplete in that Ò(É) a premise 
or the conclusion has been Ôleft implicitÕ Ó (Betz and Brun 2016, p. 50). Additionally, 
many arguments found in scientific texts cannot be assessed directly, for they contain 
vague or ambiguous wording. It is the chore of argument reconstruction to transform 
those incomplete arguments into structures with clear and truth-apt premises. 
Betz and Brun summarize the practice of argument reconstruction as follows:   
 
ÒA reconstruction of an individual argument takes an argumentative text as its input and 
aims at delivering an inference as its output. The guiding principles are the hermeneutic 
######################################## ####################
6 Every inductive argument can be transformed into a deductive argument via premise inclusion (Betz 
2010). 
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maxims of accuracy and charity as well as the ideal of clarity with its aspects of 
explicitness, precision, and transparency.Ó  
(Betz and Brun 2016, p. 47) 
 
An argument resulting from argument reconstruction should be explicit, precise and 
transparent: All relevant premises should be made explicit and they should consist in 
complete, truth-apt sentences. The argument should also be precise, i.e. it should not 
contain any ambiguous wording or ill-defined concepts, whereby the decision on 
what concepts need further explication is given by the scope of interpretation and the 
current context of the debate. On the other hand, certain concepts may be left 
undefined as to serve as a placeholder. In the reconstruction of the BT-argument, two 
placeholders are used: Climate goal G and policy option O. 
Some concepts are essential to the argument itself, so that one does not understand 
the argument without understanding those concepts. In such cases, vague or 
ambiguous wording needs to be as concrete as possible in order to make the 
argument as strong as possible. In the work at hand, the vague notion of Ôbuying 
timeÕ is replaced by the presumably more tangible concept of Ôreducing mitigation 
pressureÕ.  
Finally, the internal structure of the argument needs to be made transparent. The 
benefit of argument analysis arguably lies in the presentation of a comprehensive and 
transparent structure of the argument, facilitating a well-founded evaluation and 
judgment. If the argument itself was opaque in that one could not understand its 
meaning or its logical structure, the goal of clarity of argument reconstruction might 
not be achieved.  
Arguments relate to other arguments in a debate Ð they support or attack each other. 
Those interdependencies can be called Ôdialectical relationsÕ and can be defined 
accordingly
7
: 
 
Support: Argument A supports argument B, if the conclusion of argument A is 
equivalent to one premise in argument B. 
 
######################################## ####################
7 A normal-language definition of the following concepts is given which have been laid out in detail 
in Betz 2009, Betz 2010 and Betz 2012b. 
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Attack: Argument A attacks argument B, if the conclusion of argument A is in 
contradiction to one premise in argument B. 
 
Independence: If argument A and B neither attack nor support each other, argument 
A and argument B are independent. 
 
Argument reconstruction gives a preliminary viewpoint of a given debate. A debate 
is defined as a structure, consisting of theses and arguments with the respective 
dialectical relations between them. It can be denoted by the Greek letter !.  
In the work at hand, the method of argument reconstruction and analysis serves the 
following purposes:  
 
¥ Structuring the debate surrounding the BT-argument and ultimately structuring the 
work itself;  
¥ Formulation of a comprehensive BT-argument and the discussion of its premises; 
¥ Elucidating the thought process behind the formulation of the BT-argument and 
accounting for some premise variation; 
¥ Evaluation of the BT-argument by means of exemplary deployment scenarios; 
¥ Discussion of possible objections to the BT-argument. 
 
The result of this work will not consist in a definite decision about which deployment 
scenario of a given CE technology is morally acceptable Ð this is not what can be 
gained through argument reconstruction. Rather, I wish to shed some light on what 
kind of considerations are at stake (economic, social, etc.) and what kind of 
assumptions are to be made (substitution, fairness, etc.), if CE deployment is 
accepted as being a morally acceptable option. Finally, argument analysis allows for 
formulating two versions of the BT-argument, a weak and a strong one which might 
be the basis for further political decision making.  
 
1.3  Outline and set-up of this work 
This thesis means to thoroughly discuss one specific argument of the climate 
engineering discourse Ð the buying time argument. But of course, no argument stands 
for itself, each argument belongs to a universe of discourse and relates to and draws 
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from other arguments. Taking this into account, Chapter 2 serves to introduce the 
debate on climate engineering. irst, establishing the canonical distinction of solar 
radiation management RM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) further deepens the 
concept of CE. If CE is to be deployed, it will be embedded in a complex policy mix 
consisting in mitigation, adaptation and (possibly) CE. Thus, CE is discussed as a 
possible part of a comprehensive climate policy portfoli ection 2.1). 
aving introduced a broad definition of CE, the next section sets the basic corner 
stones for the moral controversy on CE. In climate ethics, the pivotal moral 
obligation of the current generation is the obligation to pursue drastic emission cuts 
(mitigation obligation) ection 2.2). This obligation is the moral epicenter around 
which the further debate revolves. In light of this obligation, the moral controversy 
on CE is further portrayed ection 2.3). ollowing Betz and Cacean (2012), the 
main theses and arguments pro and contra research and deployment of CE are given. 
The BT-argument, however, does not figure prominently in this early exposition, 
indicating that the BT-argument has only recently played a major role.  
The argument reconstruction of Betz and Cacean (2012) uses the placeholder T for a 
specific CE technology. The authors reason that some arguments only apply to a 
certain technology or a group of technologies. Arguments about CE in general 
usually fall short, since the diverse features of individual technologies might not be 
addressed by a generalizing argument. ence, the placeholder T ought to be specified 
when evaluating the arguments. This resonates with the objection that not even the 
broad categories of CDR and RM do justice to the technology assessment. In 
discussing arguments that clearly do not apply to certain (groups of) technologies, I 
will make a case for a technology- and even portfolio-specific evaluation of the BT-
argument ( ection 2.4). Consequently, the following investigation will focus on two 
specific technologies. The subsequent sections will introduce sulfate aerosol injection 
AI) ection  and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BE ) 
ecti .  
Chapter 3 to form the centerpiece of the thesis. irst, the current discourse is 
recapitulated on the basis of a selected corpus of literature representing the buying 
time idea ( ection 3.1). rom those quotes, several implicit assumptions of the 
buying time argument are derived. Two kinds of implicit assumption can be 
distinguished: Assumptions that relate to a desirable climate goal, and assumptions 
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that refer to future political and social development. Those assumptions shape the 
formulation of the BT-argument. 
The buying time argument is then translated into a deductively valid premise-
conclusion-structure (Section 3.2). The central principle (buying time principle) is 
designed so as to capture the different implicit assumptions identified in the previous 
section.  
The BT-principle works with two placeholders Ð climate goal G and policy option O. 
I identify two overarching climate goals that are associated with the buying time 
idea: Avoiding dangerous climate impacts and reducing pressure. Those goals are 
further specified with two respective sub-cases, resulting in four instantiations for 
climate goal G, the desirability of which is also established in Section 3.3.  
In order to evaluate any version of the BT-argument, both placeholders need to be 
replaced. In Chapter 4, four specific climate engineering scenarios are introduced as 
instances of policy option O: Two for sulfate aerosol injection (SAI) and two for 
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), with one scenario of each 
assuming CO2 emissions to remain within the two-degree budget, and one assuming 
an overshoot. The scenarios have been chosen so as to resonate with the buying time 
idea, and to discuss whether the different climate goals associated with the BT-
argument might be realized through option O. The first scenarios depict a moderate 
SAI deployment in order to lessen the rate of temperature change (Section 4.1). The 
latter scenarios are BECCS scenarios that technically increase the two-degree 
emission budget (Section 4.2). The results from Chapter 3 and 4 are connected, and 
an argument matrix of sixteen fields is established by plotting the four instantiations 
each of placeholders O and G against each other (Section 4.3). Those constitute the 
sixteen versions of the BT-argument that are checked for plausibility in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 then evaluates the different versions of the BT-argument. Surprisingly, 
only two arguments can instantly be called plausible (Section 5.1): Moderate SAI 
plus sufficient mitigation could help avoid rate-dependent tipping points as well as 
help reduce adaptation pressure (argument a2 and a3
8
).  
Other combinations of G and O yield at least one implausible premise, which quite 
easily can be detected (Section 5.2). The remaining versions are neither obviously 
plausible nor obviously implausible (Section 5.3). On the one hand, the evaluation of 
######################################## ####################
8 For the numbering of the arguments see Summary or Section 4.3. 
CHAPTER 1 ÐINTRODUCTION 
! "#
at least six arguments is impossible in the scope of this work, since they rely on 
scientific findings that are inaccessible to me. 
On the other hand, I identify two versions of the BT-argument (B1 and B4, of which 
only B4 is discussed), whose status is unclear, because the design of the BT-
argument itself may be questionable. Both argument versions adopt the prominently 
discussed case of BECCS as a means to buy time in face of less than sufficient 
mitigation which turns out to be at odds with at least two buying time requirements: 
The finitude requirement and the no-impediment requirement. This scenario, 
however, may be necessary from a practical point of view. The BT-requirements 
might turn out to be too rigid for this case, hinting at a possible revision of the BT-
argument.  
The next chapter will try to reformulate the BT-argument so as to capture the BECCS 
scenario in question (Section 6.1). Especially the possibility of acceptable 
substitution will be further examined. But, as the discussion will show, a weak 
version of the BT-argument which does not include a finitude requirement and 
reckons with acceptable substitution is no buying time argument at all. That is not to 
say, however that the respective deployment scenario is morally wrong Ð only that it 
is no buying time deployment.  
Finally and lastly, the research thesis at hand scrutinizes general moral constraints on 
CE deployment. This will be discussed by means of the two plausible SAI-
instantiations (argument a2 and a3). The question is: If each of the strong BT-
requirements is plausibly met, could CE deployment still be morally wrong? I will 
focus on two general moral objections to CE deployment Ð the hubris- and the 
techno-fix argument. 
In the last chapter (Chapter 7), the numerous questions that still remain unresolved 
are resumed and an outlook on possible areas of further research is given. Those 
include argumentation theory, virtue ethics and degrowth.  
#
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Chapter 2 The Climate Engineering Controversy 
 
This chapter serves to set the scene for the following research. First, establishing the 
canonical distinction of solar radiation management (S ) and carbon dioxide 
removal (CD further deepens the concept of CE. If CE is to be deployed, it will be 
embedded in a complex policy mix consisting in mitigation, adaptation and 
(possibly) CE. Thus, CE is discussed as a possible part of a comprehensive climate 
policy portfolio (Section 2.1). 
aving introduced a broad definition of CE, the next section sets the basic corner 
stones for the moral controversy on CE. In climate ethics, the pivotal moral 
obligation of the current generation is the obligation to pursue drastic emission cuts 
(mitigation obligation) (Section 2.2). In light of this obligation, the moral controversy 
on CE is further portrayed (Section 2.3). Following Betz and Cacean (2012), the 
main theses and arguments pro and contra research and deployment of CE are given.  
The argument reconstruction of Betz and Cacean (2012) uses the placeholder T for a 
CE technology. The authors reason that some arguments only apply to a certain 
technology or a group of technologies. Arguments about CE in general usually fall 
short, since the diverse features of individual technologies might not even be touched 
by the argument at stake. ence, the placeholder T ought to be specified when 
evaluating the arguments. This resonates with the ob ection that not even the broad 
categories of CD and S  do the technology assessment ustice. In discussing 
arguments that clearly do not apply to certain (groups of) technologies, I will make a 
case for a technology- and even portfolio-specific evaluation of the BT-argument 
(Secti  
Conse ntly, only two technologies will be of focus in the following investigation. 
The subse nt sections will introduce sulfate aerosol in ection (SAI) (Section 2.5) 
and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (Section 2.6).  
 
2.1  Climate engineering and policy responses to climate change  
Ever since climate change was recognized a global problem, responses to this 
problem were categorized as being either part of a mitigation or of an adaptation 
strategy. The Assessment port of the International anel on Climate Change 
CC) knows only those climate strategies, as well, and states that Òsocieties can 
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respond to climate change by adapting to its impacts and by reducing GHG emissions 
(mitigation)Ó (IPCC 2007, p. 56). Mitigation efforts can be determined in 
resemblance to the four Representative Emission Pathways (RCPs) that have been 
modeled to illustrate emission trajectories and corresponding effects (van Vuuren 
2011). RCP2.6, for example, is deemed to be coherent with limiting global 
temperature rise to two degree Celsius above preindustrial level. But both recent 
political development as well as natural inertia (many effects of past emissions 
cannot be reversed (Solomon 2009)) give rise to the belief that limiting global 
warming by political and social means only is out of reach.  
 
ÒEven if an aggressive global mitigation program is undertaken, substantial reductions 
in greenhouse gas levels would not be realized for several decades, and the halting or 
reversing of some of the detrimental effects already built into the climate system (e.g., 
ocean warming, ocean acidification, polar ice melting, sea level rise) would not follow 
for many decades or even centuries beyond that.Ó  
(McNutt et al. 2015a, p. 18) 
 
Consequently, the need for other, additional solutions is voiced. One set of 
technologies to battle global warming is known as climate engineering (CE). Paul 
Crutzen has openly discussed CE as a third option besides mitigation and adaptation 
(Crutzen 2006). It has since been advocated as part of a reasonable climate policy 
portfolio (e.g. Keith 2013, Long 2016).  
Climate engineering itself is defined as the Òdeliberate large-scale manipulation of 
the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate changeÓ (Royal 
Society 2009, p. 77). It aims at delaying or even offsetting climate change impacts 
technically by either manipulating the global mean temperature directly or by 
removing CO2 from the atmosphere. According to those two approaches, one can 
distinguish two kinds of CE-technologies: 1. solar radiation management (SRM) and 
2. carbon dioxide removal (CDR). 
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Figure 2. Different climate engineering technologies, sorted by SRM and CDR approaches (source: Kiel 
Earth Insitute 2011). 
 
1. SRM. In order to control and stabilize the global mean temperature, Solar 
Radiation Management (SRM)-technologies influence the energy balance of the earth 
by reflecting the incoming sunlight and thus influence the radiative forcing. 
Reflecting SRM schemes might be situated in the atmosphere (reflective aerosols) or 
even in outer space (space mirrors). While the idea of space mirrors would actually 
amount to reflective particles orbiting earth, this idea is not very prominently 
discussed due to technical and financial difficulties. Some more promising strategies 
include the enhancement of cloud formation (cloud seeding), which shield a 
significant amount of sunlight. However, the physics behind cloud formation is still 
very little understood which may lead to great uncertainty regarding the side effects 
of this set of technologies (Royal Society 2009).  
Injection of reflective aerosols, mostly sulfate aerosol (sulfate aerosol injection, 
SAI), has been researched into at large. There is quite a corpus of literature that 
focuses on different aspects of this technology, ranging from the technical and 
physical aspects to moral issues and governmental challenges. The latest 
comprehensive overview on the different aspects of this technology can be found in 
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the National Academy of ScienceÕs 2016 study (McNutt et al. 2015a and McNutt et 
al. 2015b). It summarizes the state of the art on SAI research and is used as the main 
resource for the thesis at hand.  
The common aspect of Solar Radiation Management strategies is their ability to 
influence the global mean temperature directly. SRM technologies are deemed to be 
quick and effective (see Section 2.3), but they donÕt address the root cause of climate 
change Ð the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. This is also reason for a mostly 
negative stance towards SRM technologies, since a symptomatic approach towards 
climate change is associated with the reprehensive attitude of Ôtechno-fixingÕ climate 
change (see also Section 2.3 and Section 6.2).  
 
2. CDR. The second group of climate engineering strategies aims at directly 
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (Carbon Dioxide Removal, CDR). 
This may happen through mechanical or technical carbon air capture, for example 
via artificial trees or biochar, or by enhancing natural CO2 sinks, such as ocean 
fertilization, enhancement of oceans alkalinity, and afforestation. A combination of 
those approaches is the technology bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS). Biomass is harvested and combusted for energy production, while the 
resulting CO2 emission is captured and stored underground. BECCS is seen as a very 
promising approach in climate policies, and is the second technology that this thesis 
focuses on.  
Even though CDR-technologies treat the root cause of climate change, i.e. the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, they too have great influence on 
natural cycles. It is not clear, for example, how the enhancement of the oceanÕs 
alkalinity affects the ecosystem. Afforestation struggles with problems like land use 
conflicts, influences on wildlife habitat or a trade-off with the earthÕs albedo (Rickels 
et al. 2011, Royal Society 2009). Besides these problems, CDR technologies are 
generally more expensive than SRM schemes, and take much longer to show effect. 
As such they might not be able to prevent a sudden and catastrophic change in 
climate. 
The best way to manage climate change is arguably a portfolio of different strategies. 
CE could be part of a climate policy portfolio, adding to mitigation and adaptation 
(Wagner and Zeckhauser 2012, Rayner et al. 2013, Morrow 2014). However, the 
portfolio approach to climate politics might oversimplify the problems at stake. Since 
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CE and mitigation might have interdependencies, and CE might inflict a reduction in 
mitigation efforts, a purely additive concept of a portfolio might be myopic (Gardiner 
2013, Morrow The difficulties with the portfolio approach will be further 
addressed in context of allowed substitution (Section 2.2, 3.2, and 6.1). For now, 
it suffices to take CE as another option in a potential climate policy mix. #
 
2.2  Mitigation obligation  
The fundamental believe in climate ethics is that future generations have the same 
moral rights as the current generation. In particular, future generations have the right 
to have access to an array of lifestyle options e al to (or at least comparable to) our 
current choices.  
One influential model, which argues for e al options for future generations, is the 
Ôe ty modelÕ of Edith Weiss (Weiss 1 Weiss ). She coined this model as 
opposed to the opulence model, in which the current generation raises its standard of 
living and accumulates maximum wealth by consuming as much natural capital as 
possible. According to Weiss, the opulence model has serious shortcomings, since it 
overlooks the long-term effect of nature degradation. The e ty model, on the other 
hand, states that future generations should have at least the choice to pursue the same 
standard of living as the current one by the same means. For the current 
generation, this implies a moral obligation to preserve such choices, 
especially with respect to natural capital. 
egarding climate change, irreversible climate impacts, occurring at so-called 
climate tipping points, would limit the options of future generations inadmissibly. 
Tipping points are climatic situations that tilt the sensitive balance of the climate 
system beyond recovery, with possibly disastrous conse nces. Tipping points are 
characterized by the fact that the initial state cannot be restored, even if the initial 
parameters were to re-emerge. There is a number of climate tipping points, such as 
the Amazon rainforest dieback, the loss of the olar ice packs and melting of the 
Antarctic ice sheets (Lenton et al.  
Since tipping points may limit the options of future generations and possibly impair 
their standard of living, they ought to be avoided. If, on the other hand, the two-
degree target is realized, there is the chance of avoiding most (if not all) of those 
tipping points. In this sense, the two-degree target is the ntitative measure to 
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realize the equity model of climate ethics. It also is the commonly agreed upon 
climate goal in global climate politics. The Paris Agreement (see Section 1.1) even 
speaks about stabilizing global warming at Òwell below 2¡CÓ. As of July 2017, 153 
out of 197 Parties have ratified the commitment.
9
#
At the same time, mitigation Ð the drastic reduction in GHG emissions Ð has been the 
preferred option for realizing the two-degree target. Since its emergence, the IPCC 
report has highlighted the importance of emission reduction. The Kyoto Protocol, 
which was launched in 1992, has committed its parties to the reduction of GHG 
emissions (UNFCCC 1998). National declarations such as the WBGU Guidelines 
(WBGU 2014) declare mitigation to be the priority in climate protection.
10
 
The central position of mitigation to achieve the two-degree goal, however, is 
wavering when other options reach the same goal. While in the 1980s and 1990s 
discussion on CE was an academic niche, the 2006 article by Paul Crutzen (Crutzen 
2006) introduced CE and in particular SAI to the discussion about the best climate 
policy. 
The moral obligation to mitigate is therefore no longer absolute, but must be assessed 
relative to all other options that achieve the same goal. The obligation to reduce 
emissions must be defended against SAI and other CE options. This shall be done at 
this point, thus establishing a prima facie obligation for mitigation as opposed to CE.  
Whether the mitigation obligation still holds in face of other measures, which also 
reach the two-degree target, depends on whether these measures can replace 
mitigation. Can SRM and CDR be regarded a substitute for mitigation? 
Baatz and Ott (Baatz and Ott 2016) define a substitute as follows: 
 
ãY is a substitute for X if Y achieves the same aim as X. (...) Strategy Y is a perfect 
substitute for mitigation if it avoids all negative climatic effects resulting from GHG 
emissions, without thereby creating other harms or risks.Ò  
(Baatz and Ott 2016, p. 99f) 
######################################## ####################
9 In June 2017, President Trump has declined to ratify the Paris Agreement. The consequences of his 
choice may prove devastating for global climate protection. On the other hand, in July 2017 at the G20 
summit in Hamburg (Germany), all other 19 states have agreed to further pursue the Paris Agreement, 
isolating the US climate policy. What effect this development has for potential CE deployment is 
unclear.  
10 Other obligations constituted by climate ethics transgress the mitigation obligation, like the 
obligation to help developing countries to adapt, or to obligation to compensate for current climate 
damages. Those obligations are connected with the mitigation obligation, but cannot be further 
addressed in the scope of this work.  
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The authors argue that SRM and CDR are no substitutes for mitigation, since they 
either do not eliminate all negative effects of climate change (e.g. ocean 
acidification), or generate additional risks. In the case of CDR measures, this 
conclusion may be weakened and the authors admit that some small-scale, moderate 
CDR may very well be a perfect substitute for mitigation. However, due to the cost 
intensity and the land use restrictions for these measures (see Section 2.6), large-
scale CDRs cannot be considered a perfect substitute. Since CE measures, if they 
were to be applied, would not substitute mitigation efforts, the moral obligation to 
mitigate still holds. 
Even an optimal portfolio mix cannot relieve the current generation from the basic 
obligation to drastically mitigate. From this the authors conclude that mitigation is 
the primary obligation. Adaptation, SRM and CDR are secondary obligations that 
result from the inadequate realization of the primary commitment. They follow from 
the primary obligation; they do not make it obsolete. 
Baatz (2016) provides another strong argument as to why mitigation is preferable to 
CE. He further advances the dilemma-argument (Ott 2012) and argues that, in 
particular, SAI can lead to a dilemma for future generations, if it is carried out 
without parallel aggressive mitigation measures. According to Baatz, future 
generations could find themselves between scylla and charyptis: They would either 
have to continue to operate SAI and would have to bear the possible negative 
consequences of its deployment, or they would have to end SAI abruptly and thus 
would have to experience accelerated climate change. Baatz argues that, the more 
mitigation is pushed, the lower is the probability for future generations to face this 
dilemma will be. If the dilemma-argument holds, mitigation is not only a prima facie 
obligation, but is compulsory especially in face of SAI deployment.  
Gardiner (2013) has argued in a more fundamental fashion against deploying CE 
headlong. He has elaborated on the moral ÔschizophreniaÕ which is present in 
demanding CE to be a moral obligation, promoting it as a viable or single alternative 
to mitigation, while ignoring the primary obligation to mitigate first. In his view, this 
moral schizophrenia is reason not to pursue CE development and deployment, but 
rather focus strongly on the mitigation obligation.  
All in all, the mitigation obligation is can be established as an all things considered 
obligation, that holds even in face of possible CE. The reasons for this strong 
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obligation are the imperfect substitutability between CE and mitigation, the possible 
unmanageable side effects of CE and the dilemma generated by certain forms of CE, 
like SAI. From an existential moral point of view, the suspension of the mitigation 
obligation shows signs of moral corruption, and even schizophrenia (Gardiner 2013). 
However, this does not define the extent of mitigation. In an ideal world, the two-
degree target should be achieved with mitigation alone (if this is still possible
11
). The 
mitigation obligation could then be defined quantitatively, e.g. as a certain emission 
trajectory like the RCP 2.6 (van Vuuren 2011), or as a carbon emission budget 
(Schellnhuber 2009).  In a non-ideal world there are manifold trade-offs to other 
legitimate political objectives (e.g. economic security, infrastructure development, 
social order, etc.). So, at this point, only a qualitative determination of the mitigation 
obligation is adopted. Some qualifiers are used synonymously in the work at hand: 
fast and far reaching (Baatz and Ott 2016), aggressive, ambitious, drastic, sufficient 
mitigation, decarbonization, change in modes of production and consumption, and so 
on.  
A determination regarding the timespan of mitigation can be incorporated 
nevertheless: Mitigation and decarbonization respectively, is a task of the near future 
and cannot be postponed (passed down) indefinitely. However drastic mitigation may 
look like, it ought to be realized within the next few decades.  
For the continuation of this work, the mitigation obligation is defined as follows: 
 
(Mitigation Obligation) The current generation has the moral obligation to 
drastically reduce their CO2 emissions within the coming decades.  
 
This broad definition is the moral starting point of the following investigation. The 
moral obligation to mitigate is an independent obligation that ought to be met 
regardless of possible CE deployment.  
 
2.3  Main theses and arguments in the moral debate 
The first comprehensive argument-analysis on the moral controversy about CE has 
been conducted by Betz and Cacean (Betz and Cacean 2012, also Rickels et al. 
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11 Baatz seems to think that the two-degree target can still be realized with mitigation efforts alone 
(Baatz 2016).  
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2011)
12
. In their landmark report they map the normative issues surrounding CE. 
They distinguish arguments regarding the deployment and those regarding the 
research of CE technologies. Moreover, they use the placeholder T for any specific 
CE technology. They reason that some arguments only apply to a certain technology 
or a group of technologies. Arguments about CE in general usually fall short, since 
the diverse features of individual technologies might not be addressed by overarching 
arguments that necessarily homogenize different technologies. Hence, placeholder T 
ought to be specified when evaluating the arguments. #
The central thesis of the argument map is the claim that CE should be researched into 
immediately. This claim is backed by three theses: Readiness for deployment is 
desirable; side effects of research and development are negligible; and there is no 
alternative to immediate research. 
First of all, one major driver behind researching into a new technology is the prospect 
to deploy it. The desirability of deployment of any CE technology is the necessary 
condition for its research. In other words: If the deployment was morally wrong or 
not wanted for other reasons, then why research at all? Consequently, the majority of 
the moral arguments about CE address the desirability of CE deployment.  
Secondly, research on CE should only be carried out, if the side effects of this 
research are deemed to be negligible. Lastly, it is assumed that in order to have a 
certain technology ready Ôin timeÕ research ought to be carried out immediately.  
 
On CE deployment 
A number of arguments support the possibility of deploying CE
13
. One of them is the 
lesser evil argument, also known as the arm-the-future argument (Betz 2012a). The 
lesser evil argument assumes that there might be a future point in time where we 
would have to choose between dangerous, unabated climate change on the one hand, 
and the deployment of CE on the other. In this case, CE would clearly be the lesser 
evil. The deployment of CE then would indeed be desirable (if not unavoidable). 
Because of this prospect, one should start researching into CE technologies now, in 
######################################## ####################
12 Unless indicated otherwise, the following chapter is a direct synopsis of Betz and Cacean 2012 and 
all quotes are from there.  
13 Note, that there is no literature arguing in for immediate CE deployment. The possible need for 
deployment and the possible benefits of CE are highlighted in current literature. Still, scientists argue 
very carefully, only suggesting that CE might eventually be part of a policy mix, if certain criteria are 
met.  
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order to have them ready in time and grant future decision makers an additional 
option to their climate portfolio (arm the future). 
This line of reasoning, which is among the most prominent in favor of CE, can be 
attacked in various ways: For one, it is not obvious that CE will really be the lesser 
evil. Taking into account the many unclear side effects, it is debatable what is seen as 
ÔlessÕ or ÔevilÕ (Betz 2012a). Additionally, as Gardiner (2010) argues, there are 
choices that may be tarnished in each case. Intentional climate manipulation might be 
one of those choices.  
The lesser evil argument is akin to the emergency argument. In a climate emergency, 
where global climate impacts happen fast and intense, CE might serve as a back-up 
plan, an insurance that serves as a shield against this kind of catastrophe (Betz 2012a, 
Hamilton 2013, Keith 2013, Uther 2013). Lately, the emergency framing of climate 
change has been challenged. Invoking an emergency situation in order to justify the 
deployment of a risk technology might lead to problematic political and social 
implications (Horton 2015, Sillmann et al. 2015). First of all, it is not clear what 
would count as an emergency situation and who has the power to define it. If an 
emergency state was to be declared, power might concentrate in the hands of a few, 
with the associated risk of abuse (Horton 2015). The legal status and political 
background of an emergency situation might threaten deliberative, democratic 
structures. Additionally, as Gardiner (2010) has prominently pointed out, there is no 
moral obligation to prepare for an emergency situation that we still have the capacity 
to avoid (or at least reduce).  
The rebuttal of the emergency framing also gives rise to the argument central for the 
thesis at hand: the buying time argument. Instead of preparing for an emergency 
scenario that we could arguably still avoid, CE could be used as a stopgap measure to 
buy time until climate politics show effect. This argument will be developed in detail 
in the following chapters. 
Another argument in favor of CE deployment relates to the two-degree target. As 
said before, political and social efforts may not be enough to stabilize temperature at 
this level. Hence, the deployment of CE seems necessary. This argument relies on 
assumptions about the future development of international climate politics, which 
might be pessimistic. Assuming the necessity of CE because of insufficient 
mitigation efforts could also turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy and enhance a 
trade-off with mitigation.  
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A third line of reasoning pro potential CE deployment calls to the monetary benefits 
of CE in comparison to fast and far reaching mitigation. CE is deemed to be quicker 
and easier than drastic mitigation; hence deploying it would be economically rational 
Those kinds of arguments are easily rebutted, for ease and effectiveness are by no 
means the only issues when considering CE deployment. Negative side effects of CE 
might seriously outweigh the benefits of quick and easy deployment. 
The largest group of arguments against CE deployment consequently relates to 
potential side effects of deployment. Critics of CE fear unseen and uncontrollable 
effects on the environment (Robock 2008). Hence, they oppose the deployment and 
consequently the research of CE technologies. For advocates of research precisely 
this uncertainty is reason to deepen the research. 
Additionally, the deployment of CE might lead to great injustice. Especially with 
SAI, studies indicate that the ecological impacts will be distributed unequally, 
potentially harming the worldÕs vulnerable more than the already benefitted. 
Especially native peoples that contribute the least to global warming might be 
affected substantially by artificial climate modification. The question of consent 
becomes essential in such cases (Whyte 2012).  
There is also a discrepancy between local and global effect of CE. While globally, a 
CE technology might turn out to be beneficial, local side effects such as dangers 
associated with underground storage of CO2, or the change in regional precipitation 
patterns might prove to be harmful for the affected areas. This inequality is morally 
relevant, if it cannot be compensated for. This again might give reason not to deploy 
CE.  
Taking the numerous side effects into account, CE has been criticized on a general 
note. CE is seen as a new form of human hubris that aims at controlling nature 
regardless the consequences. Such arguments claim that CE shows the failure of a 
people that cannot live on a given environment without destroying it (Òfouling the 
nestÒ) (Fleming 2010, Gardiner 2012). Lastly, religious considerations speak against 
the deployment of CE, for it is seen as a violation of a God-given order.  
 
On CE research and development 
The most prominent argument against research is the so-called moral hazard 
argument (which can also applies to the possible deployment of CE). In short, it 
states that the prospect of CE deployment will diminish the efforts to mitigate. From 
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the moment that CE deployment becomes a real option, mitigation will seem 
unattractive. In comparison to Ôeasy and effectiveÕ CE, mitigation seems expensive, 
time consuming and tedious. But since mitigation efforts are arguably the priority in 
tackling climate change, CE should not be offered as a cheap solution (Corner and 
Pidgeon 2010, Hale 2012, Lin 2013, Morrow 2014). 
Advocates of CE meet this concern by pointing out that CE and mitigation are no 
alternatives, but rather equal parts of a comprehensive climate policy portfolio. Many 
arguments in favor of CE assume that any CE deployment will be accompanied by 
serious mitigation efforts
14
. Under this perspective, the assessment of CE depends on 
the supporting climate strategies like mitigation and adaptation. This is also the 
reason, why the investigation at hand evaluates the BT-argument in light of 
comprehensive deployment scenarios, and not with respect to CE alone. 
However, as stated before, there are many uncertainties tied to CE deployment. 
Advocates of CE research argue that those uncertainties can only be resolved through 
further research. In order to enable a robust political decision about future climate 
actions, decision makers must be provided with all relevant information. In 
researching different options for tackling climate change, current and future decision 
makers would then have more choices of action (arm-the-future argument, see 
above). A global ÔmoratoriumÕ on climate engineering research could help enable an 
informed, consensual decision. On the other hand, there might be irreducible 
uncertainties associated with CE deployment, which even further research cannot 
eliminate (Section 6.2.1). 
 
2.4  Challenging the canonical distinction  
So far, CE has been discussed as an umbrella concept, with only distinguishing 
between the two broad categories of CDR and SRM (Section 2.1). But as stated in 
the previous section, arguments about CE in general are usually shortsighted, and 
may not be applied to individual technologies. Instead, I propose that arguments 
about the deployment of CE need to be technology-specific and must account for an 
at least broadly sketched climate portfolio. This is due to two reasons:  
 
1. The terminology about CE might be insufficient and biased.  
######################################## ####################
14 For an overview on this literature see Baatz (2016). 
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2. Some arguments do not apply to some (groups of) technologies.  
 
1. Terminology insufficient. CE technologies have been introduced as another 
strategy to tackle climate change as opposed to mitigation or adaptation. But, as 
mentioned in Section 1.1, at least CDR technologies are related to mitigation 
strategies, as they too aim at reducing the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere.  
Over-simplifying the group of CE and CDR technologies in particular, might hinder 
progress in ethical as well as legal discussion. The definition of a technology 
influences the legal framework, under which its deployment might be regulated. 
While mitigation technologies might be regulated domestically, CDR technologies 
might fall under strict international agreements about nature conservation (Reynolds 
2014, Reynolds 2015, Armeni and Redgwell 2015). Hence, it is crucial to define 
what mitigation strategies amount to as opposed to CDR technologies.  
The objective of mitigation is to reduce, limit and stabilize climate change at a 
certain level. The IPCC defines Mitigation:  
 
ÒMitigation is a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases.Ó  
(IPCC 2014a, p. 4)  
 
The above quote mentions two aspects of mitigation: reduce the sources and enhance 
the sinks of GHGs. Both parts do not rule out that CDR measures can be seen as part 
of mitigation. Especially BECCS aims at capturing CO2 before it enters the 
atmosphere, and hence can be said to reduce the source of emission. Additionally, 
biomass acts as a natural sink for CO2. 
So, it seems crude to frame mitigation and CE (including CDR) as two clearly 
distinct strategies. They overlap Ð moreover, depending on the definition, are equal. 
Another, more promising categorization comes from Clare Heyward (Heyward 
2013). She urges to abandon the dichotomy between Mitigation and CE strategies, 
since the attributes for this distinction are insufficient, too broad and too vague. 
Heyward especially finds the often-cited Royal SocietyÕs definition of CE as 
Òdeliberate, large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment in order to 
counteract anthropogenic climate changeÓ (Royal Society 2009, p. 77) unhelpful 
when discussing the special ethical issues associated with climate responses.  
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Her proposal is to distinguish the strategies according to the point at which they 
occur in the Òprocess between emitting GHGs and the loss of human wellbeingÓ 
(Heyward 2013, p. 25).  
 
Aim Avoiding climate change Avoiding 
ÒdangerousÓ 
climate 
change 
Responding to 
dangerous 
climate change 
Avoiding a given level of 
atmospheric GHG 
concentration. 
Avoiding 
global average 
temperature 
increases. 
Ensuring that 
rising 
temperatures 
do not impact 
upon core 
interests. 
Providing 
redress for 
injuries to core 
interests. 
Strategy Mitigation 
Reducing 
GHG 
emissions. 
CDR 
Drawing 
GHGs out of 
the 
atmosphere. 
SRM 
Increasing 
Albedo. 
Adaptation 
Improved 
irrigation, 
flood 
defences, 
protection 
against 
disease. 
Rectification 
Financial 
compensation, 
symbolic 
reparation. 
Table 3. Categorization of CE technologies according to Heyward 2013. 
  
In this categorization, mitigation and CDR are distinctly separated, as the former 
aims at reducing CO2 output in the first place, and the latter at minimizing the 
present CO2 concentration ex post.  
Another set of CE definitions has been developed independently, but in close 
resemblance to HeywardÕs proposal. The authors (Boucher et al. 2014) argue that an 
unclear definition of CE technologies might obscure and even prevent political 
decision-making. They propose a different terminology, in which CDR measures no 
longer count as mitigation measures, but rather constitute a separate form of climate 
interventions, and SRM technologies might even fall under adaptation measures. 
Most notably, they present a separate category of domestic CO2 removal, which 
enables the distinction between local and global CDR.  
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Proposed Name 
and Acronym 
Short definition Examples 
Anthropogenic 
emissions 
reductions (AER) 
Initiatives and measures 
to reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions 
of warming agents into 
the atmosphere. 
 
Improved energy efficiency, 
reduction in production and or 
consumption of goods and services, 
introduction of renewable energies, 
nuclear energy, fossil fuel energy 
with CCS, reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, 
emission reductions of BC and ozone 
precursors. 
Territorial or 
domestic removal 
of atmospheric 
CO2 and other 
long-lived 
greenhouse gases 
( -GGR) 
Removal of CO2 and 
long-lived 
greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere operating 
within national 
jurisdictions and little 
consequences outside. 
 
Reforestation, biochar and other 
means of increasing storage of C in 
soils, small-scale afforestation, 
BECCS, CO2 air capture and storage 
in territorial (geological) reservoirs, 
enhanced weathering (without input 
of by-products into rivers or the 
oceans). 
 
Trans-territorial 
or trans-boundary 
removal of 
atmospheric CO2 
and other long-
lived greenhouse 
gases (T-GGR) 
Removal of atmospheric 
CO2 and long-lived 
greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere operating or 
having consequences 
partly or fully across or 
beyond national 
jurisdictions. 
 
arge-scale afforestation, ocean 
alkalinity, enhanced weathering (with 
input of by-products into rivers or the 
oceans), iron fertilization, injection 
of CO2 into the ocean. 
 
Regional to 
planetary 
targeted climate 
or environmental 
modification 
(TCM) 
Intentional modification 
of the EarthÕs energy 
fluxes in order to offset 
climate change at the 
regional to global scale. 
 
Injection of stratospheric aerosols, 
marine cloud brightening, cirrus 
suppression, desert brightening on a 
large scale, ocean heat mixing, 
modification to Arctic sea ice. 
 
Climate 
change 
adaptation 
measures 
including local 
targeted 
climate or 
environmental 
modification 
(CCAM). 
Initiatives and measures 
to reduce the vulnerability 
of natural and human 
systems to the effects of 
climate change. ocal risk 
management. 
 
Relocating urban or rural settlements, 
building dykes, air conditioning, 
agricultural crop choices, reflective 
crops, whitening of human 
settlements on a small scale, 
irrigation. 
 
Table 4. Incomplete Table according to Boucher et al. 201 . Only the definition and examples are 
reprinted, while the original table of Boucher at al. also includes: Mapping onto existing terminology, 
Scale of Action, Scale of Impact, Impact on the global Commons, Trans-Boundary or Trans- ational 
Side Effect and Permanence of the Effect. 
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Following this terminology, there is a clear distinction between measures that remove 
CO2 from the atmosphere and measures that reduce its initial output. This allows to 
frame negative emission technologies like BECCS as R measures -GGR in 
terms of Boucher et al. as opposed to mitigation strategies (AER). hile I will 
not exactly share the nomenclature of the presented terminology, for my purpose it is 
important to note that BECCS is not a mitigation approach, but generally counts as a 
CE technology.  
The results so far suggest that a general discussion of CE technologies falls short, 
since it is not at all clear, what Õ technologies are. hile there are evaluation 
patterns that apply to CE in general or to some technology groups, there might be 
nevertheless single features that are obscured by a generalization. This finding 
correlates with the decision to use the placeholder T in the argument map introduced 
above. Betz and Cacean (2012) suggest that the moral arguments about CE can only 
be fully evaluated, when the placeholder T is substituted with a concrete technology. 
This goes even beyond a redefined terminology, but instead asks for a technology-
specific evaluation of the arguments.  
 
2. Technology-specific arguments. General arguments about CE might obscure 
certain aspects of a technology or of its envisaged deployment. This is true not only 
of the technologies themselves, but also of the portfolios in which they are 
embedded. Each technology should be evaluated in a comprehensive climate 
portfolio, where both the extent of its planned deployment as well as the additional 
climate options like mitigation is taken into account. To illustrate this, I will briefly 
discuss some arguments which are not applicable to certain technologies, or, even if 
they are technology-specific, do not apply to all possible deployment scenarios.  
 
Emergency-Argument  
Some authors see CE as a kind of emergency insurance, in case climate change is 
faster and more severe than expected (Section 2.3). CE could then help to stabilize 
temperature and to avert the worst effects. The insurance metaphor is therefore 
closely linked to the emergency-argument. hile we should put all our efforts into 
preventing a climate catastrophe, the damage could be so immense that we should be 
prepared for its occurrence. 
CHA TER 2 ÐTHE C IMATE EN INEERIN  CONTROVERS  
!!"#
An insurance measure should quickly and effectively balance out the catastrophe 
against which it is made, and compensate for its damage. Hence, the focus of authors 
adopting this emergency-metaphor lies on the controllability and economic 
rationality of CE measures uokkanen et al.  This might be the case especially 
for SAI, since it is deemed to be easy to apply, cheap in its maintenance costs and 
rather effective in cooling the earth.  
The emergency framing loses its impact when used for CDR measures. Due to the 
physical inertia of the atmosphere, effectiveness of CDRs is only visible after years 
or even decades. While during an abrupt temperature rise with potentially irreversible 
effects, SAI could be used quickly and effectively to stabilize temperature artificially, 
CDR can only stabilize temperature in the long term. Emergency considerations do 
not apply to CDR technologies. 
 
Termination problem  
If SAI is used as a substitute for fast and far reaching mitigation, CO2 concentration 
will continue to rise. Only the effect of high CO2 concentration, namely the 
temperature rise, will be artificially influenced and stabilized. An abrupt termination 
of SAI (for example, due to social and political upheavals) would lead to an 
accelerated heating enforced by the large volume of atmospheric CO2 (Royal Society 
Robock ). This might be disastrous for the climate and the biosphere. 
Additionally, this situation could put future generations in a dilemmatic situation: 
Either they would have to decide to continue to operate SAI, with possibly fatal side 
effects, or they would have to accept accelerated climate change (Ott see 
Section 2.2). 
The termination problem is obviously coined for a specific case: SAI deployment 
without adequate mitigation. It is easy to see that SAI does not lead to a termination 
problem when it is accompanied with drastic mitigation cuts Ð for example in a 
buying time scenario.  
Furthermore, the termination problem does not apply to any types of CDR measures 
Ð for they do address the root cause of climate change by reducing the CO2 content in 
the atmosphere. Even if CDR measures were used as an alternative to and a substitute 
for CO2 emission reduction, and were to be discontinued, there would be no rapid 
temperature rise as in the illustrated SAI case.  
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Dual use  
A very special problem is connected to SRM technologies. Due to their influencing 
the radiative balance, they can manipulate local weather patterns with potential 
negative side effects. For example, local floods or droughts can be triggered by SAI. 
This makes SAI and other SRM technologies potential weapons of warfare (Corner 
and Pidgeon 2010, Goodell 2010). In fact, the idea of weather manipulation as an 
instrument of warfare goes back a least to the middle of the last century and much of 
the research on SAI and other SRM technologies is based on military research of 
similar schemes (Fleming 2010). Weather modification for the purpose of warfare is 
prohibited by international convention, and the ÔrearmamentÕ of these technologies 
could already be read as a violation of the convention (Corner and Pidgeon 2010). 
Obviously, however, this specific risk is only present for SRM or SAI. It is difficult 
to conceive a weapon of mass destruction being derived from long-term CDR 
measures. That being said, some specific forms of CDR, like ocean fertilization, 
might very well be used as a form of large-scale pollution with hostile intentions. 
 
Some arguments, on the other hand, apply to all CE technologies, albeit specified to 
the technology at hand. Consideration of procedural and distributional justice, for 
example, should be addressed for all CE technologies. But the examination of those 
issues too is case-different. And while for one technology a fair distribution of its 
side effects might be found, other technologies might not allow for an equitable 
solution. Here, too, technology- and portfolio-specific arguments ought to be made. 
Taking all this into consideration, I will focus on two specific climate engineering 
technologies: sulfate aerosol injection (SAI) and bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS). Also, according to the results of the previous sections, in 
evaluating the BT-argument, I will concentrate on two different deployment 
scenarios Ð or policy mixes Ð for each technology. Accompanying climate options 
like mitigation influence the intensity and time frame of the technology-deployment 
and hence shape its evaluation. Especially, I will make a case-discrimination with 
respect to mitigation efforts. Before those deployment scenarios will be discussed, 
the physical background of the technologies is delineated. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 draw 
substantially from McNutt et al. (2015a) and Rickels et al. (2011). If not indicated 
otherwise, the depiction of the technologies is a direct synopsis of McNutt et al. 
(2015a); this also goes for the indication of further literature. 
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2.5  Sulfate aerosol injection 
Scientists have pursued the idea to intentionally manipulate the weather at least since 
the middle of the 19
th
 century (Fleming 2010). The Ôpromethean dreamÕ to control 
the climate has a long history that is partially connected to the military use of 
Ôweather controlÕ (Hamilton 2013). It was the observation of temperature declining 
after the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991 that gave the idea of climate intervention 
as a way to tackle climate change broader support and eventually led to further 
research on sulfate aerosol injection (SAI) (Crutzen 2006). Small particles of sulfur 
in the stratosphere are thought to reflect some amount of incoming sunlight, thereby 
reducing the radiative forcing and thus stabilizing the ambient air temperature at a 
certain degree. SAI currently is the most prominently discussed SRM-technology, for 
it is deemed to be cheap and effective. Many scientists think of it as a ÔPlan BÕ; an 
insurance if all other efforts to combat climate change fail (see Section 2.3)  
Many studies attest SAI the ability to stabilize temperature (McNutt et al. 2015a, 
Rickels et al. 2011, Royal Society 2009, Wigley 2006, Robock et al. 2009). 
However, temperature is by no means the only problem of climate change. First of 
all, since SAI does not change the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere, it 
cannot address problems caused by it, e.g. the acidification of the oceans (Robock 
2008). It will most likely affect global precipitation patterns, thus potentially 
enhancing droughts or floods in countries already affected by climate change. It is 
also not clear who will regulate the development, let alone the deployment. Last but 
not least, precisely because of its ability to serve as a Plan B and a last resort for 
catastrophic climate change, the danger of lessening mitigation efforts might turn out 
to be a problem (Section 2.3). For a better understanding of the issues surrounding 
SAI, the scientific background will now be sketched. 
 
Atmospheric-chemical background15 
Sulfate aerosol injection (SAI) relies on the role that aerosols play in atmospheric 
chemistry. Aerosoles are particles with tiny diameter that reside in the atmosphere. 
Depending on the height, they remain in the atmosphere for days or up to years. They 
######################################## ####################
15 The following depiction is a summary of McNutt et al. 2015a, p 66ff, if not indicated otherwise.  
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interact with the earthÕs energy balance by either reflecting sunlight or by absorbing 
it. Both reflecting and absorbing particles have a cooling effect on the earthÕs 
climate. Aerosols may occur naturally (dust, soil, bacteria) or may be of 
anthropogenic origin. Despite their suggested benefit on the earthÕs energy balance, 
artificial sulfur aerosols also have health and environmental impacts.  
Sulfur aerosols are formed when (natural or anthropogenic) gases containing sulfur 
are transported into the higher altitudes, namely the stratosphere. They may also be 
injected directly, e.g. by volcanic eruption or artificially by means of balloon or 
aircraft. There, sulfur atoms react with oxygen (e.g. from water vapor) to form larger 
particles (so-called nucleation). Those newly formed aerosols either proceed to 
ascend and evaporate or they are being transported to the polar regions. 
 
#
Figure 3. SAI scheme injected by balloons (source: wikicommons). 
 
Benefits and idealized deployment scenarios  
Sulfate aerosols can reduce the radiative forcing due to their ability to reflect 
insolation. Assuming a doubling of the current CO2 concentration over the next 
decades, the resulting radiative forcing induced by CO2 would be about 4 W/m
2
. 
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Some models assume this amount as the baseline scenario for their setup (Kravitz et 
al. 2012, Rasch et al. 2008, Robock et al. 2008). Here, a large research gap is evident 
and models diverge quite greatly depending on their setup. Some models have found, 
that under the assumption of a doubling of atmospheric CO2, an injection of 5 
MtSO2/yr would reduce temperature about 0.3¡C to 0.4¡C (Robock et al. 2008). 
Another study that used more advanced microphysical assumptions calculated a 
decline in temperature that is twice as big for similar injection rates (Jones et al. 
2010). Yet other authors who include a more nuanced view on the chemical 
processes, suggest that in order to reach a Ôsulfur burdenÕ reaching a radiative forcing 
of 4 W/m
2
, sulfur injection of 10 Mt/yr is needed (Kravitz et al. 2012, Rasch et al. 
2008). The differences in the result indicate that the effectiveness of the technology 
depends on several as of yet unclear factors, including the means of injection, 
diffusion and declining of the particles, atmospheric physical and chemical reactions 
of the aerosols. 
The envisioned medium of SAI is either a gas-mix of water vapor and sulfate or 
crude SO2 particles, which influence the lifespan of the aerosols. The most cost-
efficient way to inject SAI into the stratosphere is presumably by means of aircraft, 
but the technical details of emitting those particles at 25 km height are not to be 
ignored (Rickels et al. 2011). Generally, injection into the stratosphere (20-25km 
above sea level) is assumed; the site of injection changes for different model studies. 
While injection at the tropical stratosphere is proposed by some authors, others 
suggest a broad global injection at an even higher latitude. Stratospheric sulfate 
aerosols have different local and global effects. Since they both scatter and absorb 
sunlight, they are responsible for net global cooling, but may result in local heating. 
The system of aerosol formation is characterized by small changes having a large 
effect. Thus, recent research suggests that adequate models are not yet in reach. The 
same holds for the technical methods of sulfur injection.  
It is important to note the status of the scenario assumptions, such as those given 
above. Some studies assume full-blown SAI as an alternative to mitigation efforts 
(e.g. Tjiputra et al. 2016), others design their studies against varying RCPs (e.g. 
Kravitz et al. 2015) with varying deployment rates, others adapt a doubling of the 
CO2 concentration (see above). Such assumptions are naught but baselines, against 
which the effectiveness of certain SAI approaches is measured. It does not mean that 
the authors of the studies necessarily believe their assumptions to happen or to be the 
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most realistic prognoses about future development in climate politics. Especially do 
those authors by no means propose using solely SAI to counteract global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. While one could presuppose certain self-enhancing 
processes in technology development, which could make the deployment of a newly 
researched technology inevitable (see Section 2.3), the status of the scenario 
assumptions does not suggest as much. Another type of SAI scenario employs the 
idea of using SAI in order to reduce the warming rate, rather than stabilizing 
temperature. This scenario is discussed in Chapter 4 and serves as a case study for 
the further investigtion, because, unlike the temperature-stabilizing scenarios, the 
moderate SAI scenario resonates best with the buying time idea.  
 
Effects on the environment 
SAI is associated with many environmental effects. I will briefly discuss some of 
them exemplarily: 
Ozone Depletion. SAI deployment offsetting a doubling in CO2 concentration is 
estimated to delay the recovery of the ozone layer. However, this effect is thought to 
be fairly small, significantly smaller than the ozone depletion measured between 
1980 and 2000 (McNutt et al. 2015, p. 86f). 
Photosynthesis. Since the atmospheric CO2 concentration would not be reduced by 
SAI, but in fact would continue to rise due to anthropogenic emissions (in the 
aforementioned scenarios), certain plants might profit. Excess CO2 might serve as a 
ÔfertilizerÕ to plants, increasing their productivity. Moreover, the light diffusing 
quality of sulfate aerosols would result in a light spectrum more beneficial to most 
land plants (Rickels et al. 2011). !
Precipitation. A decline in global precipitation is seen as one essential side effect of 
SAI deployment. Due to a higher saturation of the upper atmosphere with water 
vapor, less water might reach the earthÕs surface. As a result, rainfall as well as soil 
moisture might decline in some regions. However, these impacts might be smaller 
than the impacts experienced under unabated climate change. (McNutt et al. 2015, p. 
95f). 
Acid Rain. Since sulfur will eventually be removed from the atmosphere via rainfall, 
the acidity of the soil and the ocean might be affected (Ôacid rainÕ). The contribution 
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of SAI to acid rain, however, as compared to current man-made pollution is thought 
to be negligible (Kravitz 2009).  
Ocean Acidification. The oceanÕs ability to store CO2 is largely responsible for its 
acidification. Acidification means that the pH level of the ocean decreases, thereby 
influencing the ecosystem and its inhabitants (Raven et al. 2005). While ocean 
acidification is a result of continued anthropogenic carbon emission, and not of the 
use of SAI itself, it is still associated with this technology. Since ocean acidification 
might pose a serious ecologic problem, a technology that does not address this 
problem, might not represent a viable option.  
Public Health. When the aerosols are washed out of the atmosphere, e.g. by rainfall, 
humans and animals alike might be exposed to them. In how far those particles inflict 
the respiratory system is still unclear. While some authors suggest that a certain 
impact is to be expected (Effiong and Neitzel 2016), others deem those impacts to be 
way below the recommended maximum exposure (Jones et al. 2016).  
 
2.6  Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that aims at minimizing CO2 
emissions from large emitters, such as fossil fuel power plants, by preventing CO2 
exhaust to reach the atmosphere. If carbon capture and storage is coupled with 
biomass production and power generation, this technology is referred to as bioenergy 
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). BECCS is dealt with as a promising clean 
(ÔgreenÕ) energy technology which would supply energy demands as well as realize 
net negative CO2 emission (McNutt et al. 2015b). 
The classification of this technology is not clear-cut. While BECCS has been 
considered a mitigation technology (Keith 2000, Lin 2009, Royal Society 2009), 
other authors include BECCS into the climate engineering canon, being a CDR 
technology (Harrison and Hester 2014, Zhanga et al. 2015). BECCS can be seen as a 
hybrid between mitigation and climate engineering technologies: Biomass on the one 
hand can serve as a renewable energy, encouraging the detachment from fossil fuels. 
CCS, on the other hand, is a potential risk technology that, applied at large scale, can 
be framed as a CE technology. Especially under the impression of the Paris 
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Agreement, BECCS Ð seen as a technical solution to the Ôemission gapÕ (see Section 
Ð has been framed as a CE approach: 
 
ÒBECCS which stands for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, is one example of a 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technology. (É) ike all geoengineering techniques, 
BECCS is controversial, and its feasibility and potential scale are still uncertain.Ó 
(Shepherd 2016) 
 
I discuss BECCS as a climate engineering technology for two reasons: Firstly, 
according to the definition of Heyward (2013) and Boucher (2014) (Section 2.4), any 
measure to technically remove CO2 from the atmosphere may count as (a version of) 
a CDR approach. And secondly, the scale, the aim and the technical uncertainties 
associated with BECCS raise similar moral issues and concerns as is the case with 
other CE technologies.  
In essence, the actual nomenclature is secondary. What strikes me as important, 
though, is the acknowledgment of large-scale BECCS as a risky technology with 
potential planetary impacts and side effects. A deepened discussion of the potential 
scale of deployment will follow in Sections 4.2, 5.4 and 6.1. The framing of BECCS 
as a CE technology can highlight other issues and moral problems than would be 
present when the ÔlensÕ of mitigation is applied. The following paragraphs sketch the 
scientific background of BECCS and draw substantially from McNutt et al. (2015b). 
 
Scientific background, benefits and idealized deployment scenarios  
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is an approach that combines 
renewable energy from biomass with technical (i.e. chemical) CO2 removal. While 
During its maturation, biomass assimilates (stores) CO2 from the ambient air via 
photosynthesis. During the conversion of biomass for energy use (such as heat, 
electricity, or fuel), CO2 is released. The resulting CO2 exhaust, present as a stream 
of highly dense CO2, can be captured at point source (via chemical or technical 
absorption) and then be stored in underground caverns. So, in theory, BECCS is a 
carbon negative energy source.  
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Figure 4. Schematic BECCS cycle (source: Canadell and Schulze 201 ). 
 
Energy Potential BECCS could contribute substantially to the worlds energy supply. 
Theoretically, the estimated maximum energy potential lies between 50 to E yr. 
To put this number into perspective, the energy demand of Germany in 2016 was at 
E  (BMWE . By end of the 21st century, the theoretical maximum 
contribution of BECCS could reach up to E yr, but is highly limited by the 
availability of arable land. This makes biomass plantations and food production 
direct competitors for land. Studies reporting high numbers of BECCS energy 
potential assume a radical shift in dietary choices away from meat which would free 
up arable land for energy production (Edmonds et al. 2013). owever, there is little 
indication that changes in food choices will occur in the near term future. On the 
contrary, global consumption of meat and diary products is continuously rising 
enchion . Given these limits, BECCS might only play an auxiliary role in 
global energy security. 
Mitigation Potential Since the practical effectiveness of BECCS is severely 
restricted, the cost-optimal level would reside at a level of 12 to Gt CO2 yr. 
Beyond this amount, the cost of each Gt CO2 captured by BECCS would rise steeply 
due to land limitations. This is but a fraction of the estimated future global fossil fuel 
emission of 31Gt CO2 yr. If BECCS were to be used as the single factor to ensure 
2.6 in light of currently pro ected emission tra ectories, the estimated land-use of 
food-production and biomass-production combined would rise to up to 2.1 billion 
CHAPTER 2 ÐTHE CLIMATE ENGINEERING CONTROVERSY 
! !"#
hectares in 2100. To put this number into perspective, todayÕs global cropland 
amounts to 1.6 billion hectare. 
The effectiveness of BECCS is also limited by the potential to process biomass as 
well as the readiness of effective storing mechanisms. One study suggests a carbon 
loss of about 50% during the BECCS carbon flow (Smith and Torn 2013). Moreover, 
the energy input required for capturing, transporting and storing might 
counterbalance the negative emission potential of BECCS. 
The mitigation potential is limited by other factors as well. As has been noted 
recently, BECCS might create a feedback on the carbon cycle. When carbon dioxide 
is removed form the atmosphere, the ocean might release CO2 in order to balance the 
artificial carbon loss (Chen and Tavoni 2013). Also, soil carbon emissions during and 
after the plantation of biomass may also reduce the net negative emissions of BECCS 
(Pourhashem et al. 2016).  
 
Effects on the environment 
Transport and storage safety. The gravest side effects of BECCS arguably occur 
during transport and storage (McNutt et al. 2015b). There are two kinds of harms 
associated with BECCS: Infliction on the local population near CCS sites due to 
exposure to CO2 during the injection, or long-term CO2 pollution by storage leakage 
(Medvecky, Lacey and Ashworth 2013). Leak pipelines might cause highly 
concentrated carbon dioxide pollution. On the other hand, if storage sites are not safe, 
for example due to seismic activity, leakage may contribute to severe CO2 pollution 
of land and sea habitats. A devastating, though natural example of what a CO2 
pollution looks like, gives the 1986 Lake Nyon disaster. Lake Nyon, located in the 
Northwest region of Cameroon, houses a magma chamber filled with carbon dioxide. 
In August 1986, the lake released a huge cloud of about 300 000 tons of CO2 which 
caused at least 1700 people and 3500 animals to suffocate. The eruption was 
probably caused by underground seismic activity (e.g. Kling 1987).!
Having said that, recent studies suggest that the probability of leakage is fairly low 
(Wennersten et al. 2015). If so, future decision makers could still decide upon carbon 
storage. !
Land competition and food security. Since BECCS relies on the availability of arable 
land, the transformation of woodland or grassland into biomass plantations might be 
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considered a side effect of BECCS. Primary forests or native grasslands have a high 
biodiversity and contribute to natural carbon sequestration. It is morally relevant 
which land is used for bioenergy production (Section 5.4). The ethical aspect of land-
use is especially important if biomass were to be produced in the global South, where 
arable land is scarce and the available cropland is essential for self-sufficient, small-
scale agriculture. Moreover, if animal rights and species conservation are considered, 
the conservation of wildlife habitat would influence the acceptability of biofuel 
plantations. 
Moreover, food prices may rise due to the increased demand of cropland. A recent 
study suggests, however that this effect is reversed, as soon as BECCS influences the 
carbon price. Subsequently, BECCS might even temper the rise in food prices 
(Muratori et al. 2016). Additionally, as stated above, if food choices were to change, 
some pressure on cropland could be reduced. Whether BECCS could be deployed 
beneficially, is influenced by land availability, food security and other choices 
regarding mitigation.  
 
2.7  Results  
This chapter has served to introduce the moral controversy on climate engineering 
and to depict two specific technologies that are of focus in the following 
investigation. Most notably, the moral obligation to engage in fast and far reaching 
mitigation has been established.  
 
(Mitigation Obligation) The current generation has the moral obligation to 
drastically reduce their CO2 emissions within the next few decades.  
 
The mitigation obligation influences the reconstruction of the BT-argument, as will 
be shown in the course of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, it is an independent obligation 
that ought to be met regardless of the possibility of CE deployment.  
The terminology as well as assessment patterns for CE in toto is debatable. The 
terminology under which a technology is framed has consequences down to its legal 
status. Regarding the moral controversy, some arguments of the ongoing debate do 
not necessarily apply to individual technologies or mask their singular features. 
Especially important seems the distinction between mitigation and CDR techniques 
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which is not always easy to draw. Taking those difficulties about classification into 
account, this thesis will argue technology-specific with the focus on two 
technologies: SAI and BECCS. Building onto the general physical background of 
those technologies, which has been given above, two specific deployment scenarios 
will be depicted in Chapter 4, enabling the scenario-specific evaluation of the BT-
argument in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3 The Buying Time Argument 
 
Are we running out of time? The effects of global climate change are palpable, yet 
CO2 emissions continue to rise globally. In order to launch an adequate mitigation 
program and to cope with further climatic changes, we arguably need more time. 
CE technologies are framed as an option to buy time, since they might be able to 
postpone some climate effects or to artificially remove excess CO2 from the 
atmosphere. This possibility gives rise to both approval and critique of CE. 
Advocates of future CE deployment believe it to be an adequate (if not plain 
necessary
16
) option to avoid harmful climatic effects. For critics, on the other hand, 
the vision of buying time via CE is just a way of delaying a real solution by means 
of a quick technical fix.  
This chapter is dedicated to the construction and the discussion of the BT-argument. 
First, the current discourse on the buying time idea is recapitulated by presenting a 
selected corpus of literature (Section 3.1). From those quotes, several implicit 
assumptions of the buying time argument are distilled and discussed. The metaphor 
of Ôbuying timeÕ is translated into the more tangible terms of pressure and reduction 
of pressure. That way, the pretentious use of time variables is avoided and the idea 
of the argument can be captured more directly.
17
  
The buying time argument is translated into a deductively valid premise-
conclusion-structure (Section 3.2). The central principle (buying time principle, 
BT-principle) is designed so as to capture the different implicit assumptions 
identified in the before section. The BT-principle works with two placeholders Ð 
climate goal G and policy option O. In section 3.3 I identify four climate goals that 
are associated with the buying time idea and discuss their desirability as secondary 
climate goals.  
 
######################################## ####################
16 Informal discussion in the geoengineering google-group demonstrates that some researchers 
believe CE to be the only option to avoid dangerous climate impacts, such as the melting of the 
polar ice caps. Latest call for actively deploying CE: Veli Albert Kallio, 6. Juni 2017 15:58 
(https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/geoengineering/vcNIf7EgIC4) 
17 I continue to call this specific argument the buying time argument, even though the wording no 
longer appears in the premises themselves. Resemblance and connection to the current discourse on 
the buying time argument seems important to me in order to enable further discussion. 
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3.1  Current state of research 
The idea to use CE deployment in order to Ôbuy timeÕ in face of hesitant mitigation 
efforts seems rather intuitive. If, however, the exact meaning is to be evaluated, 
Ôbuying timeÕ turns out to be a metaphor; a buzzword that promises a prudent, 
minimally invasive use of CE technologies. But what does it mean to Ôbuy timeÕ? 
From whom? How much? And at what price?  
It seems that those questions beg the definition of certain time concepts, like time 
span, or earlier-than relations. But trying to formulate such concepts, ironically, 
does not quite grasp the original idea of the buying time argument. It might be 
misleading for the understanding of the buying time framing to try pinpointing the 
exact amount and definition of time related concepts in the use of CE.
18
  
######################################## ####################
18 An earlier version of my BT-argument reconstruction was this:  
1. There will be a point in time t1, when the CO2 level in the atmosphere (CO2
+
) will lead to a 
climate situation Sit
+
.  
2. Policy mix P might stabilize the atmospheric CO2 concentration below CO2
+
 by t2. 
3. t1 might lie before t2.  
4. Policy mix P might not be able to prevent climate situation sit
+
 before t1  
5. It is mandatory to prevent a climate situation sit
+ 
and policy mix P is the preferred way to 
do so. 
6. If Policy mix P might not be able to prevent climate situation sit
+
 at t1, but it is mandatory 
to prevent a climate situation sit
+
 and policy mix P is the preferred way to do so, then it 
might be necessary to engage in different policy mix Q to prevent climate situation sit+ 
before t1, given that option is morally allowed.  
7. Policy mix Q is morally allowed only if: a. there are no moral restrains against it, b. the 
side-effects of this option do not overweight the benefit, c. there is no better alternative and 
d. Policy mix Q will end and be replaced by Policy mix P eventually.  
8. Between t1 and t2, the side effects of CE technology T are acceptable compared to the 
benefit.  
9. There are no moral constraints against CE technology T. 
10. Between t1 and t2, there is no better alternative to CE technology T. 
11. Policy mix Q will end and be replaced with Policy mix P eventually.  
12.  (CL) It might be necessary to deploy CE technology T between t1 and t2. 
The problem with those time related premises lies in the evaluation of the placeholders t1 and t2 and 
the subsequent determination of the time span of CE deployment. Should CE be deployed in t1 or 
before t1? If so, how much before t1? Also, what does it mean to assess the side effects of a CE 
technology only between t1 and t2 (premise 8, 10)? The argument is not deductively valid, because, 
among other things, the conclusion asks for temporally limited CE deployment between t1 and t2, but 
the principle in premise 6 does not include a time limit, but rather asks for deployment before t1. 
While it would certainly be possible to create a deductively valid reconstruction of the BT-argument 
in a similar vein as the argument above, I felt that further pursuing the reconstruction actually did 
not further specify the buying time idea, but instead led to side stages about what time concepts are 
needed to define a Ôprevent-relationÕ (premise 4), essentially creating a different argument. At this 
point, I refrained from further pursuing the idea of defining time-specific premises for the BT-
argument. Rather, I focused on the goals that are thought to be realized with the help of temporal CE 
deployment. This then led me to the formulation of the pressure terminology, which I deem to better 
represent the idea behind the BT-argument. The fuzzy notion of time-concepts is captured via the 
finitude thesis, that asks for limited, rather short and controllable CE deployment (Section 3.2, 
Section 5.). 
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Rather, since Ôbuying timeÕ is a metaphor, it makes sense to decipher it into more 
tangible terms. In order to achieve this, I will analyze a selected corpus of articles 
using the buying time metaphor. It will turn out that the buying time framing can be 
translated into a Ôreducing pressureÕ framing.  
While I wish to substantiate the BT-argument for two specific technologies, the 
quoted literature refers to different (groups of) CE technologies. So, in advancing 
the premises of the BT argument, I continue to refer to CE in general, and will cut 
the BT-argument for the specific technologies in Chapter 5.  
 
Ave t ng dange s cl mate mpacts 
The most prominent benefit of a future CE deployment is the prospect of avoiding 
dangerous climate impacts. In a climate emergency situation, CE might be able to 
help avert catastrophic climate effects, such as the reaching of tipping points (see 
Section 1.1). Having said this, the emergency framing of CE deployment has been 
criticized as of late (see Section 2.3). Recent literature argues to abandon the 
emergency framing altogether (Sillmann et al. 2015, Horton 2015). Instead, a peak 
shaving deployment to buy more time is outlined.  
 
ãThe most common alternative [to the emergency framing], known as Ôpeak shavingÕ, 
would entail application of SAI or some other type of solar geoengineering to reduce the 
worst effects of peak GHG emissions while implementing an ambitious program of 
mitigation and adaptation. One variant of peak shaving would involve a gradual ramp-
up of solar geoengineering until a modest plateau is reached; as emissions declined, so 
too would injections of stratospheric aerosols (É). Another potential approach would 
utilize SRM on a regional scale, for example in the Arctic, in order to address specific, 
localized damages from climate change.Ò  
(Horton 2015, p. 4f) 
 
With the help of a CE technology, the worst impacts of temperature rise could 
arguably be averted. CE technologies might  
 
ÒÉbe used as a stop-gap measure to buy time for a societal transformation to a carbon-
free economy, shaving off the worst effects of climate change along the wayÓ  
(Schfer et al. 2014, p. 5).  
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The peak-shaving framing assumes that the worst effects of the GHG-peak would 
indeed be catastrophic. Especially climate tipping points might have grave impacts 
on natural and human systems and ought to be avoided (see Section 2.2) Ð if need 
be with climate engineering: 
 
ãA popular framing is that sunlight reflection could Òbuy timeÓ for decarbonizing the 
economy and allowing greenhouse gas concentrations to stabilize and then come down.Ò  
(Lenton and Vaugham 2013, p. 2) 
 
ÒSome geoengineering measures appear to offer humanity the ability to shave the peaks 
off CO2 driven emissions and avoid tipping points. Wigley (2006) argues that sulphate 
particle injection might be used to Òbuy timeÓ in reducing CO2 emissions. This potential 
to shave peaks would go some way to addressing the concern voiced by some that 
temperature rises over the next century may exceed irreversible Òtipping elementsÓ in 
the climate system leading to drastic changes with potentially catastrophic impacts on 
human and natural systems.Ó  
(Rayner et al. 2013, p. 8) 
 
ãAn optimal outcome would seem to be that mitigation can be accomplished relatively 
rapidly and relatively easily, such that geoengineering might need to be implemented for 
only several decades in order to shave off the peak change in climate and increase the 
likelihood that the most adverse and irreversible environmental and societal 
consequences will not be triggered.Ò  
(MacCracken 2009, p. 11) 
 
This Ôpeak-shaving qualityÕ is found in many CE technologies, especially SAI; they 
are thought to be used temporarily in order to avert some serious effects. Those 
technologies then might represent a quick, easy-to-control tool that could be 
ramped up and down relatively simple.  
While the emergency framing assumes deployment only in case of devastating 
climate impacts, the buying time framing advocates a preventive deployment, as to 
avoid those impacts in the first place. Huttunen and Hildn (2013), who have also 
collected and analyzed publications about CE, have identified several frames for 
CE deployment. They especially distinguish the Ôtechnological fixÕ and the Ôlast 
resortÕ frames for CE, and indicate that a buying time deployment would be an 
alternative to a possible emergency deployment: 
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ÒIn the ÔTechnological fixÕ subframe, represented by 27 articles, geoengineering is 
presented as a possible third option beside mitigation and adaptation. It could be used to 
buy time for mitigation or used side by side with mitigation. None of the analyzed 
papers suggests that geoengineering should completely replace emission reductions. The 
key difference to the ÔLast resortÕ subframe is the argument that geoengineering could 
be used before any emergency situation arises, if justified by costs estimates.Ó  
(Huttunen and Hildn 2013, p. 13) 
 
Those quotes are paradigmatic for the discourse on CE as a means to buy time. The 
idea of a peak shaving deployment that those authors present, can be illustrated like 
this:  
 
#
Figure 5. Simplified peak shaving/ buying time deployment. The orange line indicates a temporary, 
modest deployment of CE that declines parallel to CO2 emissions.  
 
This simple idea and a fortiori the above figure are, however, spurious
19
. They 
assume that the worst climate impacts coincide with the peak of GHG emission: 
Òreduce the worst effects of peak GHG emissionsÓ (Horton 201, p. 5, emphasis 
added [FN]). But climate impacts result from the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere, not the act of emitting. Since the concentration of CO2 will not 
necessarily go down as soon as we stop emitting, dangerous climate impacts may 
occur even after we have stopped emitting CO2 (see Figure 6 below). 
 
######################################## ####################
19 I mean not to devalue the work of the cited authors in general, but rather wish to highlight the 
potential misconception underlying an advocacy of the BT-argument. 
!"#
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Figure 6. CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will remain near stable or even continue to grow, 
even if CO2 emissions are cut drastically within this century (source: Van Vuuren 2011). 
 
The notion to use CE until our CO2 emissions goes down is misleading Ð CE as a 
peak-shaving measure would have to be used until CO2 concentration goes down, 
which, as indicated, might considerably lag behind our mitigation efforts. 
It could be argued that this is a harmless misunderstanding and that one similarly 
could advance a peak-shaving argument that relates to peak concentration. 
However, I think that this is the first misconception about the BT-argument, which 
makes it so appealing. If the stopgap quality is associated with CO2 emissions, the 
time-span of CE deployment would arguably not surpass a few decades for all 
RCPs except RCP8.5. But if the argument was transparently related to the CO2 
concentration, the anticipated duration of CE deployment would rise significantly. 
In order to balance out high CO2 concentration, CE would have to be used well 
beyond of the end of the century for all RCPs except RCP2.6 Ð a fact that highly 
influences the moral, political and technical evaluation of the technology. 
But of course, the act of emitting carbon dioxide does influence the atmospheric 
concentration. Insufficient cuts in CO2 emission would inflate the time span even 
for a moderate buying time deployment (MacCracken 2009). In order to make the 
BT-argument as strong as possible (which is the aim of this investigation), the 
relation between CO2 emissions, CO2 concentration, mitigation efforts and 
temperature rise must be made as transparent as possible. I will attempt to do so by 
specifying the deployment scenarios with regard to different emission pathways 
(Chapter 4). 
But even this first plunge into the topic indicates that framing CE deployment as a 
means to buy time or to shave the peak, would still amount to a deployment for 
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several decades, possibly even beyond the end of the century nothing that can be 
controlled or implemented easily. 
 
Managing transition, Transition anyway 
When searching for buying time strategies in face of climate change, Nico Bauer 
(2005) has presented carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a possibility to buy time. 
His work is related to the thesis at hand, as it has a similar research stion Is 
CCS an option to buy time? and deals with a similar technology. In the 
introductory section of his work, Bauer defines his researc stion. 
 
Is CCS an option to buy time in order to shift the climate induced transition to a 
renewable based energy system  The uestion assumes that the shift towards 
renewables is inevitable in the long run, if fossil fuel scarcity induces this transition. 
The pressure from the climate system leads to a premature transition and CCS could 
defer this prematurity towards its natural timing. 
(Bauer 2005, p. , emphasis in original)  
 
Bauer enfolds the metaphor of buying time by highlighting the discrepancy in time 
between a prematureÓ
20
 and a naturalÓ transition of society. Nevertheless, Bauer 
assumes that there will be a transition of society away from fossil fuel  latest when 
fossil fuel reservoirs are exhausted. There is no alternative to transitioning towards 
a low-, and eventually no-carbon society. But how will this transition happe  Will 
it take place in a manner that is manageable and bearable for our society or will it 
happen abruptly and at high cost  CCS and mutatis mutandis some C  technologies 
like CCS might help to manage this transition.  
From an early stage on, several authors have stressed that a gradual mitigation 
program has many advantages (Wigley et al. 1996, Wigley 2006, Nordhaus 2008), 
and  might be able to help phase in ambitious mitigation. The Royal Society 
formulates the buying time argument similarly   
 
The length of time re uired to phase out fossil fuels, and to modify the various global 
human systems contributing to climate change, may be longer than the time available to 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
20 The word ÔprematureÕ suggests some sort of oblivion. Climate change seems to have stricken 
uite without warning, and society is now faced with the impossibility to change at short notice. 
This, however, is not the case. The danger of a rise in temperature has long been known, and 
transition now is by no means premature, but rather overdue. 
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avoid serious adverse impacts. In this case, SRM might have the potential to temporarily 
stabilize the global temperature and its associated effects, while providing time to 
reduce H  emissions.Ó 
(Royal Society 2011, p. 1 ) 
 
CE technologies (or SRM specifically) might help to phase in efficient mitigation 
by reducing the pressure of immediate action. In this sense, CE technologies are a 
way of managing the transition of society towards decarbonizati  CE is an 
auxiliary tool in climate politics. The BT-framing presupposes that decarbonization 
is indeed a political goal, moreover, a globally shared political goal 
 
Reducing pressure of mitigation and/or adaptation 
The inevitable transition towards carbon-free production and consumption should 
arguably come at the lowest possible social and economic costs. This is part of the 
rationale that David eith gives in his 2013 book eith 2013). eith argues 
prominently for a prudent SRM deployment, partially because of its cost-
effectiveness. In a similar vein, Wigley (2006) has offered a calculation of a policy 
mix consisting of mitigation and CE that proves to be less costly than rapid 
mitigation alone:  
 
A combined mitigation  geoengineering approach to climate stabilization has a number 
of advantages over either alternative used separately. A relatively modest 
geoengineering investment (É) could reduce the economic and technological burden on 
mitigation substantially, by deferring the need for immediate or near-future cuts in CO2 
emissions. More ambitious geoengineering, when combined with mitigation, could even 
lead to the stabilization of global mean temperature at near present levels and reduce 
future sea-level rise to a rate much less than that observed over the 20th century (É)Ó  
(Wigley 2006, p. 454)
21
 
 
As important as mitigation might be, an additional CE deployment could provide 
additional time to address the economic and technological challenges faced by a 
mitigation-only approachÓ (Wigley 2006, p. 452). Since some CE technologies 
could arguably be launched slowly and as easily be tapered off again, so the 
######################################## ####################
21 Note that Wigley assumes permanent low SRM. His results can still be used to illustrate how 
economic pressure of mitigation can be reduced via additional CE deployment. 
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argument goes, it could be a form of adjustment to correct and support the progress 
of Mitigation. 
 
ÒEven absent any climate emergency, CE can be used as part of a low-cost inter-
temporal climate response by deploying it incrementally to shave the near-term peak of 
global heating that would occur this century even with aggressive emission cuts. Such 
an incremental deployment, phased in then out over a century or so, could reduce near-
term climate disruption and associated risks, thereby buying time and allowing emission 
cuts and adaptation measures to be made in an orderly program of technology 
deployment and capital turnover, at much lower cost and disruption than under more 
rapid deployment.Ó  
(Parson and Ernst 2013, p. 318) 
 
It is the core assumption of the BT-argument that transition will happen anyway. 
How this transformation will come about, is left tacit. But it is mutually seen as a 
costly process, and CE deployment could help to minimizing the costs of transition.  
 
ãDue to the high costs arising from the necessary transition to a carbon neutral 
economy, all options that could contribute to reducing the costs of this transition should 
be explored.Ò  
(Zrn and Schfer 2013, p. 6) 
 
The buying time metaphor is used to describe a management of an inevitable 
decarbonization of society while reducing its costs. 
 
ÒCatastrophic climate change would likely unfold over a number of centuries, but 
avoiding it will require a technological revolution, and geoengineering might help to 
Òbuy timeÓ to develop and diffuse these new technologiesÓ  
(Barrett 2008, p. 50) 
 
In summary, this is what I deem to lie at the heart of the buying time idea: Shifting 
away from fossil fuels and towards a net-zero emission economy is challenging. CE 
technologies might render this transition easier, less costly or less abrupt, thereby 
taking some pressure off immediate choices of action. 
 
Temporal deployment only 
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One central assumption of the BT-argument is the prospect of society developing 
towards a low- or even no-carbon economy (see above). If production and 
consumption start being carbon neutral, CO2 emissions will eventually decline also. 
Then, the argument goes, CE deployment might no longer be needed. So, the 
assumption of the inevitable transition of society implies that CE deployment be 
only temporal. The whole idea of the BT-argument is that deployment of CE will be 
finite and purpose-bound:  
 
 geoengineering might need to be implemented for only several decades   
(MacCracken 2009, p. 11) 
 
 at least among policy makers, nobody believes that geoengineering offers anything 
but a relatively short stopgap to buy time for other action.   
(Bunzl 2009, p. 2) 
 
These quotes state explicitly that a BT deployment of CE would have to be limited 
in time. The authors seem to be quite optimistic about the relatively short  
deployment period, which, as indicated, might inflate when drastic emissions cuts 
are further delayed (see above). It is nevertheless salient to the BT-argument to 
assume that, at some point, CE deployment will no longer be needed. This is indeed 
the very meaning of a stopgap: being limited in time. 
 
Summary  
Four key elements of the buying time framing have been derived from the selected 
quotes of the ongoing discourse:  
 
Averting dangerous climate impacts 
Managing transition, Transition anyway 
Reducing pressure of mitigation and/or adaptation 
Temporal deployment only 
 
From those assumptions, two relate to potential climate goals that are to be realized 
with the help of CE: Averting dangerous climate impacts, Reducing pressure of 
mitigation and/or adaptation. One defines the envisaged mode of CE deployment: 
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Temporal deployment only, which is backed by assumptions about future political 
and social development: Transition anyway.  
The idea of the BT argument can be captured, when the desired outcome of CE 
deployment and its relation to other climate policy goals is at the center of the 
argument reconstruction. Two possible climate goals associated with a stopgap 
deployment of CE will be adopted for the further investigation:  
 
1. Avoiding dangerous climate impacts 
2. Reducing pressure  
 
Having those goals established, a comprehensive argument can now be formulated 
which includes prudent requirements for a goal-orientated buying time deployment. 
 
3.2  Establishing the buying time argument 
In essence, the BT argument is a consequentialist argument: A certain means should 
realize a certain end. For the BT argument, this consequentialist principle reads: A 
certain climate policy mix should be adopted in order to reach a pre-defined climate 
goal. However, there are some restrictions to the use of CE that originate from the 
buying time framing, as has been illustrated in the section above. The special 
buying time requirements shape the buying time principle, which underlies the 
buying time argument. If a climate policy mix incorporates the BT-requirements, it 
can be said to be a buying time deployment.  
For a comprehensive climate portfolio, placeholder O is introduced, while 
placeholder G denotes the desired climate goal. Both the placeholders and the 
requirements shape the form of the buying time principle. It can be formulated as 
follows:   
 
Buying Time Principle (BT-Principle) 
If: i. climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and is 
beneficial in so doing so, iii. option O only reckons with finite CE deployment, iv. 
CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O without CE, v. 
there is no option OÕ which is maximally finite and which leads to G and which is 
better than O, vi. there are no general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
 
The BT-argument, which incorporates the BT-principle, can be established: 
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Buying Time Argument (BT-Argument) 
BT1.  
 
If: i. climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and 
is beneficial in so doing so, iii. option O only reckons with finite CE 
deployment, iv. CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to 
mitigation in O without CE, v. there is no option OÕ which is maximally 
finite and which leads to G and which is better than O, vi. there are no 
general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
BT2. Climate goal G is desirable (desirability thesis). 
BT3. Option O leads to desirable climate goal G (effectiveness thesis). 
BT4. Option O only allows for finite CE deployment (finitude thesis). 
BT5. CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O 
without CE (no-impediment thesis). 
BT6. There is no option OÕ which is finite and which leads to G and which is 
better than O (no-better-option thesis). 
BT7. There are no general moral constraints on option O (morality thesis). 
BT8.  THUS: Option O should be adopted. 
 
The BT-principle consists in six requirements (i. Ð vi.), which seem essential to me 
when reconstructing the buying time idea. I will refer to them as theses, since they 
can be stated as complete, truth-apt sentences. Each thesis states a necessary 
condition; together they are sufficient for the BT-principle to be true. The 
characteristics of the buying time argument are captured quite adequately in this 
formulation of the argument, as will become clear in the following discussion of the 
BT-requirements.  
 
i. Climate goal G is desirable (desirability thesis). 
The desirability thesis states that climate goal G ought to be politically desirable. If 
the climate goal is not desirable, there is no point in implementing a process that 
realizes this goal. Instead, a different goal and hence a different policy mix would 
then be the better choice. Section 3.3 will further discuss this thesis along with the 
respective climate goals. 
 
ii. Option O leads to climate goal G and is beneficial in so doing so (effectiveness 
thesis). 
Once the desirability of climate goal G has been established, the effectiveness of 
climate option O must be guaranteed. Whether option O really leads to climate goal 
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G can only be decided via scientific research. CE research currently consists in 
computer-based model simulations, which aim at validating claims about efficiency 
and effectiveness, as well as taking some side effects into account. The kind of 
premises that one would expect in support of the effectiveness thesis are predictions 
about the future, obtained by computer-generated simulations.  
The validity and scope of those predictions are limited, though. For one, model 
simulations are only as good as their scenario assumptions. If implausible or 
incomplete assumptions enter the scenario, the results might also be dubitable 
(Dieckhoff and Leuschner 2016). Additionally, scenarios generated by simulations 
are only possible states of the world. The probability of those scenarios can only be 
estimated (Betz 2015). The question is, what degree of probability would suffice for 
a CE deployment to be called effective? Would we want a 99% probability or 
would we settle for 75%? And how could those numbers possibly be obtained? 
Here it is important to highlight the status such scenario assumptions have in the 
current discussion. Scientists engaging in CE research do not necessarily believe 
their assumptions to be the most realistic prognosis about future development in 
climate politics. In particular, those authors by no means propose SAI or BECCS as 
an alternative to mitigation efforts, even if they might calculate the effectiveness of 
those technologies for a business-as-usual scenario. #
Lastly, there might still be insurmountable uncertainties associated with CE 
deployment (Betz and Cacean 2012). There might be side effects that we simply 
cannot anticipate through model studies, and which might turn out to be disastrous. 
Those insurmountable uncertainties could be a reason not to engage in CE at all 
(see also discussion of the irreducible uncertainties argument in Section 6.2.1). 
The effectiveness thesis asks for option O to be beneficial as well. Option O is 
beneficial if the benefits of this option should outweigh its negative side effects. 
This simple request might prove to be the hardest as well as the most important to 
evaluate. The problem evidently lies in the formulation and evaluation of a cost-
benefit relation in case of CE, accompanied with the immediate critique as to 
whether such a narrow economic concept is the best measure to decide upon the 
desired outcome. Associated with it are many uncertainties: What parameters 
should be included in the research? What weighing should be attributed to the 
parameters? How to deal with uncertainties? How to deal with issues of justice?  
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In the course of this work, an evaluation of this requirement can only be touched 
upon. I do not attempt to come to a final conclusion. Rather, I wish to discuss the 
conditions for the possibility for a beneficial deployment (see also Section 5.1 and 
5.4). 
 
iii. Option O only reckons with finite CE deployment (finitude thesis). 
The finitude thesis, which only allows for temporally limited CE deployment, is 
especially important to the BT-argument. Of course, this makes the BT-principle 
rather strong. Incorporating the finitude requirement into the BT-principle can be 
justified through the following considerations:  
Many authors of the buying time discourse adhere to the temporal deployment only 
assumption (Section 3.1). Words like ÔpostponingÕ and Ôstopgap measureÕ are used 
frequently when relating to the buying time framing. The sheer meaning of the 
words implies some form of finitude Ð a stopgap is by definition only a bridge; the 
second best choice until a real solution is obtained. The meaning of the word 
ÔpostponingÕ also implies some form of temporal finitude. While it is in theory 
possible to infinitely postpone something, postponing, in practice, usually refers to 
some reasonable timeframe.  
Secondly, I would argue that any CE deployment which is not finite in concept is 
no buying time deployment, but instead amounts to a substitute for mitigation 
efforts. Successful decarbonization of society implies, that mitigation efforts show 
an effect. Under this assumption, BT-deployment would be used as an auxiliary 
measure to reduce pressure and buy time. Conversely, if the process of 
decarbonization is assumed to fail, CE deployment would have to be used 
continuously as a substitute for insufficient emission cuts. So, the finitude 
requirement only then is superfluous, if CE is anticipated to be a substitute for 
emission cuts. 
This leads to the third reason as to why the finitude requirement has been included 
in the BT-principle. The idea of CE being only a temporary stopgap measure is 
backed by the idea that the transition of society will happen anyway. Eventually, a 
low- or no-carbon society is thought to be inevitable, making artificial counter-
balances to the carbon circle (like BECCS) or the radiative forcing (like SAI) 
redundant. In this picture, CE is not structurally needed for the transition per se. It 
is only needed to manage the manner of transition. Once the necessary change 
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towards a low- or no-carbon economy has been achieved, CE is deemed to be 
superfluous. The transition anyway hypothesis that many authors silently adopt (see 
Section 3.1) is the main reason as to why CE can and should be finite. This line of 
thought will be deepened in Chapter 6 where the danger of CE undermining a 
transition of society is discussed (Section 6.2.2).  
So, I argue that only finite deployment schemes count as buying time scenarios. 
However, the concept of finitude must be specified somewhat. While a deployment 
of years (MacMartin 2014) is in theory finite, this would in practice surpass 
any reasonable policy making. Finitude as I wish to understand it not only refers to 
a pre-determined period of time, but also implicitly makes assumptions about 
controllability. If the time span in which any CE measure is deployed makes 
unrealistic assumptions about centuries to come, I will argue that this timespan is 
not finite in a practical sense.  
Specifying the concept of finitude might also capture the ambiguity that arises 
when the terms ÔshortÕ and ÔfiniteÕ are used synonymously: I understand finitude as 
a practically controllably timeframe that does not critically surpass the end of this 
century Ð a timeframe that correlates to the Õs prognostic realm (van uuren 
CC 2013), and in this sense is relatively short.
22
 
 
iv. CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O without CE 
(no-impediment thesis). 
The next requirement essentially demands that there is no or at least a controllable 
relation between mitigation and CE deployment. It requests that mitigation efforts 
remain constant, whether CE will be deployed or not. Underlying the no-
impediment requirement is the demand for CE deployment not to be used as a 
substitute for mitigation efforts. This requirement can be backed by the following 
considerations: 
In Section 2.2, I argued that there is a strong moral obligation to pursue mitigation 
efforts even in face of possible CE deployment. I have established this obligation as 
superior to CE deployment, because CE and mitigation essentially do not address 
######################################## ####################
22 Of course, this limitation can be criticized. Even potential infinite deployment of global 
technology has proven to be sustained by man: Global telephone and internet technologies are 
examples of technologies that are both global and potentially infinite. However, those technologies 
are not necessarily risk technologies. For CE technologies, the deployment span should be finite, 
short, and controllable due to of the potential hazardous side effects of those technologies. 
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the same issues. articularly if mitigation is understood in a broader sense as part of 
a sustainable transformation of society away from a fossil fuel-based economy, CE 
measures cannot substitute for that. In light of the mitigation obligation, CE and 
mitigation cannot serve as substitutes. Additionally, there are enhanced risks in CE 
deployment, and CE deployment might eventually lead to a dilemma for future 
generations. 
The no-impediment thesis serves two purposes: On the one hand, it stresses the 
importance of mitigation efforts; on the other hand, it connects the discussion to a 
broader context of transitioning society. Especially in connection with the transition 
anyway assumption, which has been identified in section 3.1 and which also serves 
to back the finitude thesis, the no-impediment thesis gains force for the social and 
political debate. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
v. There is no option OÕ which is maximally finite and which leads to G and which 
is better than O (no-better-option thesis) 
A full evaluation of this thesis goes far beyond the scope of this work, as potential 
harms and benefits would have to be compared comprehensively between different 
climate portfolios including CE. efining a better-than relation may be equally 
challenging as finding a reasonable cost-benefit relation. Rather, for the purpose of 
this work, the no-better-option thesis has the function of a safeguardÕ that helps to 
identify an inadmissible narrowing of options by presenting CE-deployment as the 
only or best option. In particular, this means that, if ambitious mitigation were to be 
seen as a realistic and viable approach, which did not inappropriately burden social 
and economic structures, this option should be preferred to a portfolio including 
CE. If two portfolios equally realize a desired climate goal G, the portfolio without 
CE should be adopted. If there is no immediate benefit gained from CE, it should 
not be part of a climate policy mix, due to its inherent uncertainty being a risk 
technology. 
While this may seem obvious, it might be hard to achieve. raming CE as a viable 
option might diminish the willingness to engage in equally viable, but potentially 
more difficult options (this is a version of the moral hazard argument, see Section 
2.3). The no-better-option thesis urges us to be very careful in ruling out other 
options, and not to pro ect a CE-portfolio prematurely.  
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vi. There are no general moral constraints on option O (morality thesis). 
inally, the morality thesis asks for option O to be generally morally acceptable. 
There are at least two drawbacks to putting the morality thesis separately at the end 
of the argument  Defining a beneficial deployment (effectiveness thesis) rests on 
normative assumptions (e.g. about fairness) and thus could also be dealt with in the 
context of the morality thesis. Secondly, if there is indication that a CE deployment 
scheme might be in general morally unacceptable, this might rule out the scenario 
to start with. After all, if CE deployment is inherently morally wrong, why bother 
exploring any other requirements like the effectiveness- or the finitude thesis   
Meanwhile, the work at hand has a different research questi  Are there possible 
BT-deployments absent any general moral constraints  So, for now, it is assumed 
that CE is not inherently morally wrong. Of course, the general moral status of CE 
is of importance, but will be discussed only after the compliance with the other 
central BT-requirements is assessed.  
 
The order of the BT-requirements determines the order in which the requirements 
are evaluated in the remainder of this thesis  At first, the rd factsÕ about the 
deployment scenario are given and the stage for any policy option O is set  Is the 
goal desirable, and does the portfolio reali e it in a (theoretically) beneficial 
manne  After this, the central BT-requirements are evaluate  Is option O finite  
Does it impair mitigation efforts  And could there be an alternative  inally, the 
general moral status of climate option O is assessed.  
 
3.3  Instantiations and desirability of climate goal G  
Only if placeholders G and O are instantiated do the premises become truth-apt and 
can the argument be evaluated for its validity. In this section, climate goal G is 
further subdivided into four climate goals and the desirability of each goal is 
established.  
Two broad climate goals at which CE deployment is aimed have already been 
introduced in Section 3.1  1) avoiding dangerous climate impacts, and 2) reducing 
pressure. Those two goals can now be further specified  
 
Ad 1. Avoiding dangerous climate impacts  
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In Section 2.2, the general obligation to avoid irreversible and dire climate impacts 
has been established in the context of the mitigation obligation. In particular, 
climate tipping points ought to be avoided. Reducing global warming to 2¡C above 
pre-industrial level generates a 66% chance of realizing this goal and avoiding 
temperature-dependent tipping points (IPCC 2013). 
Additionally, there are some tipping points that are affected by the rate of climate 
change, i.e. that are rate-dependent. A policy option that would aim at reducing the 
rate of temperature change would also address rate-dependent climate tipping 
points. So, the broad goal to avoid dangerous climate impacts can be divided into 
two sub-goals: 
 
Climate Goal 1 Avoiding temperature-dependent tipping points. 
Climate Goal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
 
Ad 2. Reducing pressure  
The notion of Ôreducing pressureÕ is what I deem to lie at the heart of the buying 
time framing. According to the authors using this framing, the time gained via a 
buying time deployment would be put to use as to manage mitigation and 
adaptation in an orderly fashion: More clear-headedly, less cost-intensively Ð in 
short, with less pressure.
23
  
The goal of reducing pressure is actually a compound goal. It focuses on stabilizing 
the global mean temperature at a certain degree, while at the same time asking for 
reduction in its social and economic costs. In the following, costs for mitigation are 
separated from costs for adaptation. This generates two additional climate goals:  
 
Climate Goal 3 Reducing adaptation costs and stabilizing temperature at 2¡C 
above pre-industrial level, compared to adaptation costs 
without CE. 
Climate Goal 4 Reducing mitigation costs and stabilizing temperature at 2¡C 
above pre-industrial level, compared to mitigation costs 
without CE. 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
23 Economic considerations may especially shape the understanding of the pressure terminology, 
e.g. when phasing out economic branches is compared to phasing in new ones. 
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or the sake of readability, I will use the short version reducing mitigation 
pressureÕ and reducing adaptation pressureÕ for the remainder of this work, while 
having in mind that those goals are actually compound
24
.  
 
The starting point of each argument is the stipulation that those goals are desirable. 
The first requirement of the BT-argument asks for any climate policy goal to be 
desirable (desirability thesis). Is this the case for each of the four goals  
 
Climate Goal 1: Avoiding temperature-dependent tipping points. 
Mitigation efforts essentially aim at realizing climate goal 1. Hence, the desirability 
of climate goal 1 has been established in Section 2.2 in the context of the mitigation 
obligation. A version of the BT-argument, which assumes any option O in order to 
achieve climate goal 1, amounts to the so-called two-degree argument that has 
already been introduced into the debate (Betz and Cacean . It assumes that the 
two-degree target can be realized only with the aid of CE (see also Section 5.2.2). 
Regardless of whether this argument turns out to be true, the anticipated climate 
goal is indeed desirable. 
 
Climate Goal 2: Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points. 
Given that tipping points might have irreversible and potentially negative 
consequences for both current and future generations, it is morally imperative to 
avoid them. The same holds consequently for rate-dependent tipping points. Hence, 
both voiding tipping pointÕ goals are prima facie morally desirable. Therefore, if 
at all possible, the current generation should aim at avoiding each sort of tipping 
points and the two respective climate goals can be said to be indeed desirable.  
 
Climate Goal 3: Reducing adaptation pressure 
The (moral) obligation to minimize or reduce costs, respectively, lies at the heart of 
the buying time argument. This obligation can be backed in two different ways: 
######################################## ####################
24 The goal of reducing pressure is not only compound, but also comparative: State of the world 1 
should be transformed (reduced) into state of the world 2 by means of policy option O. What 
reductionÕ would translate to in terms of policy pathways and what amount of reduction would be 
acceptable all things considered cannot be decided in the scope of this work. In this sense, some 
fuzziness of the BT-argument remains. Still, I believe the reducing-pressure terminology to be more 
accessible in terms of research and further policy choices. 
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Either with reference to economic rationality or via considerations about 
appropriateness when dealing with moral obligations.  
Economic rationality in a broad sense is a strategy that aims at reducing costs while 
maximizing utility, e.g. achieving a desired goal (e.g. Anand ). At first sight, 
this is by no means a problematic approach. In fact, this kind of thinking is involved 
in most of our day-to-day actions. If there are two ways in which a result can be 
obtained, it seems rational to choose the less cost-intensive way
25
. roblems only 
arise when minimizing costs leads to negative or even immoral behavior: If, for 
example, a third person or the environment is negatively affected. Other peopleÕs 
rights (and moral obligation towards the environment and animals) constitute the 
boundary at which cost-minimization should end. or the deployment of CE this 
means, if the negative side effects of the deployment impose risks on other people 
or the environment, this strategy is not morally acceptable, even if it might 
minimize mitigation or adaptation costs.  
Appropriateness on the other hand refers to the amount or degree of or 
acrificeÕ that can be expected from moral agents when carrying out their moral 
obligation. Minimizing adaptation costs (and mitigation cost, respectively) can be 
ustified by appropriateness-consideration, if it is assumed that the envisaged 
adaptation pathway is oo hardÕ on the moral agents. 
Regarding adaptation, it might very well be the case that the pace of climate change 
generates severe problems for societies and citizens seeking to adapt. Some 
adaptation measures might take considerable time to be realized CC  If it 
were possible to lessen the rate of climate change, adaptation measures could be 
installed in a timely manner and possibly at lower cost.  
That being said, there is a discrepancy between local burdens and global impacts of 
climate change. While adaptation costs are borne by single countries, climate 
change and CE technologies act on a global level with possible global side effects. 
While for some countries it would be desirable to reduce adaptation costs via SAI, 
other countries might be harmed by the side effects of such deployment. Thus, 
climate goals must be agreed upon internationally and in accordance with a 
mutually beneficial weighting of side effects. If those challenges are met, reduction 
of adaptation costs could be a desirable climate goal. 
 
######################################## ####################
25 Cost is a broad concept that also may include time, material, and also opportunity costs. 
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Climate Goal 4: Reducing mitigation pressure  
The same line of reasoning applies with respect to the reduction of mitigation cost. 
By both economic rationality as well as appropriateness considerations, reduction 
of mitigation costs can be justified (e.g. Hampicke 2000).  
Mitigation costs can be defined as the costs that result from engaging in carbon-
neutral behavior at both an economic as well as individual level. The simple 
assumption here is that an extended time frame in which those measures ought to be 
realized leads to less pressure and hence less costs. Riahi et al. (2015) suggest that 
this assumption might really turn out to be overly simplistic. They show that, on the 
contrary, postponed mitigation efforts even increase overall mitigation costs. If a 
certain emission budget is to be satisfied, diverting from the optimal emission curve 
Ð in the sense of there being a temporal emission overshoot Ð asks for future 
emissions to decrease rapidly, which is even more costly. Only if BECCS or other 
negative emission technologies are anticipated in such an overshoot scenario can 
mitigation costs be reduced Ð but, as Riahi et al. urgently argue (Riahi et al. 2015), 
this ÔbetÕ on future negative emissions is highly speculative and comes at the cost of 
possibly not complying with the two-degree target. Whether under these 
circumstances the reduction of mitigation costs is still desirable depends on a 
careful weighting of the different options and the consequences associated with 
realizing or not realizing certain political objectives.  
With regard to appropriateness, Baatz and Ott (2016) have argued recently that 
certain mitigation strategies are inappropriate if they push citizens beyond a 
sufficiency threshold. This will probably not be the case in certain energy-shift 
scenarios for Germany in the next couple of decades. There are, for example, 
energy-shift scenarios for Germany that would come at reasonable costs and would 
resonate with the mitigation goals of the German Government. So, at least for 
Germany, reduction of mitigation costs might turn out to be superfluous in light of 
appropriateness considerations. 
Another thing worth highlighting is that the obligation to mitigate is untouched by 
the desirability to minimize the costs of mitigation strategies. Minimizing 
mitigation costs should not be confused with minimizing mitigation efforts. 
Specifically, the reduction of mitigation costs ought not to be achieved by reducing 
mitigation altogether. This is why the mitigation obligation holds independently of 
the BT-argument. The no-impediment thesis in turn is influenced by the mitigation 
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obligation, forbidding inadmissible substitution between mitigation and CE. The 
evaluation of the no-impediment thesis turns out to be quite complex, though, 
especially in case of reducing mitigation pressure via BECCS (see Section 4.5.3 
and 4.5.4.)  
 
The discussion in the previous paragraphs suggest that the desirability of the two 
Ôreducing pressureÕ goals is highly dependent on the way they are brought about. 
They are susceptible to weighting with other goals or ethical obligations. In that 
sense, they might be called secondary climate goals (see 2.2). In particular, the 
reduction of mitigation costs can only be justified if it does not impede other, 
primary climate goals, such as the two-degree target. 
Nonetheless, ultimately decisive for those weighting issues is the actual, non-ideal 
situation decision makers are confronted with. So, while in theory those secondary 
climate goals should be renounced as soon as they are found to interfere with far-
reaching mitigation efforts, in reality, some sort of CE might turn out to be the only 
option for a 2¡, or even a 1.5¡ world.
26
 
 
3.4  Results  
In the above chapter, the central assumptions of the buying time framing have been 
sifted out so as to formulate the buying time principle underlying the BT-argument:  
 
Buying Time Principle (BT-Principle) 
If: i. Climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and is 
beneficial in so doing so, iii. option O only reckons with finite CE deployment, iv. 
CE in O does not lead to less mitigation compared to mitigation in O without CE, v. 
there is no option OÕ which is maximally finite and which leads to G and which is 
better than O, vi. there are no general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
 
According to this principle, a buying time deployment of CE needs to be desirable, 
effective, beneficial, finite, not in conflict with mitigation, the best available option 
and morally allowed.  
######################################## ####################
26 This limitation, however, is no drawback to my claim. My aim in this thesis is the thorough 
analysis of one specific argument in favor of CE in light of certain, to date plausible, assumptions. 
This is not diminished by the fact that some assumptions might turn out to no longer hold true.  
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The outstanding feature, which sets this argument apart from other consequentialist 
arguments about effective and beneficial CE-deployment, is arguably the 
incorporation of the finitude thesis and the no-impediment thesis. The assumptions 
backing the finitude thesis are: 
 
¥ (Transition Anyway) Successful decarbonization of society is anticipated. 
Eventually, a low- or no-carbon society is thought to be reality, making 
artificial counter-balances to the CO2 circle superfluous.  
¥ (No Substitute) If decarbonization is successful in the end, CE deployment 
will cease, since it will no longer be needed to counteract insufficient 
emission cuts. This means that CE of any kind would only be deployed 
additionally to a comprehensive mitigation pathway, not instead of one. A 
non-finite CE deployment would amount to a substitute for mitigation 
efforts which is not acceptable within the BT-framing. 
¥ (Controllability) Finitude can only be justified as a concept, if it 
incorporates some form of practical controllability. Deployment scenarios 
that point to well beyond the end of this century, may be finite in theory, but 
are not controllable in a practical sense.  
 
The assumptions that shape the formulation of the no-impediment thesis are: 
 
¥  (Mitigation Obligation) The current generation has the moral obligation to 
drastically reduce their CO2 emissions within the next few decades. This 
obligation holds even in face of possible CE deployment.  
¥ (No Substitute) If decarbonization is successful in the end, CE deployment 
will cease, since it will no longer be needed to counteract insufficient 
emission cuts. This means that CE of any kind would only be deployed 
additionally to a comprehensive mitigation pathway, not instead of one. A 
non-finite CE deployment would amount to a substitute for mitigation 
efforts, which is not acceptable within the BT-framing. 
The BT-principle and -argument respectively, include two placeholders: climate 
goal G and policy option O. Four climate goals have been identified: 
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Climate Goal G 
Climate Goal 1 Avoiding temperature-dependent tipping points. 
Climate Goal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
Climate Goal 3 Reducing adaptation pressure. 
Climate Goal 4 Reducing mitigation pressure. 
 
In Chapter 4, I will introduce four different deployment scenarios that serve as 
instantiations for policy option O, enabling in-depth evaluation of the BT-argument 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 Deployment Scenarios 
 
The buying time argument scheme is characterized by the use of two placeholders O 
and . Only if the placeholders are replaced with a concrete option and goal the 
argumentÕs plausibility can be evaluated. Instantiations for climate goal  have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. The guiding stion of the following two chapters 
is, whether there are climate policy options O that make the argument plausible. In 
other words  Is the proposed buying time idea compatible with concrete deployment 
scenarios   
To answer this stion, two deployment scenarios will be depicted in this chapter. 
There are deployment scenarios that resonate with the buying time idea, and may 
have, in fact, been created specifically for that purpose. Two such scenarios have 
come to my attenti  1. Reduced Warming Rate buying time for adaptation, and 2. 
Flexible mission Budget  reducing mitigation pressure.  
The first scenario is a SAI deployment that has been proposed by eith and 
MacMartin (2015) (Section The authors introduce a SAI scenario set-up 
designed to reduce the pace of the global warming rate for different emission 
trajectories (RCPs). The extraordinary feature of this scenario-bundle is the finitude 
of SAI deployment, which is present in at least two sub-cases. The authors do not 
argue that this deployment scenario should be adopted or that it is the best scenario 
conceivable. Rather, they demonstrate how a well-defined scenario can be shaped on 
base of guiding principles, and present a case study for the sake of advancing the 
discussion. 
The second scenario incorporates CCS deployment in light of current mitigation 
trends (van Vuuren et al. 2013). The authors demonstrate, how CCS might be 
used to artificially extend the remaining emission budget in order to realize the two-
degree target. Again, the authors of this scenario do not argue for its actual 
deployment, but rather use it to illustrate what a certain climate policy assuming 
CCS would amount to. 
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4.1  Reduced warming rate Ð buying time for adaptation 
One scenario for a sulfate aerosol in ection scheme (SAI, see also section 2.5) has 
been introduced by David eith and MacMartin and their colleagues (MacMartin et 
al. 2014, eith and MacMartin 2015). In their proposal, SAI is used in order to 
reduce the rate of global temperature change for a given emission tra ectory, rather 
than stop the temperature increase all together. This scenario is an excellent example 
for the BT-argument, for it is designed specifically in accordance with the buying 
time approach:  
 
At a minimum, introducing the proposed SAI scenario  would increase the amount of 
time to both learn and adapt  by reducing the needed rate for adaptation, it could reduce 
costs of adaptation É .  
(MacMartin at al. 2014, p. 2, emphasis added FN ) 
 
Additionally, the authors incorporate the idea to argue case-specific: One cannot 
meaningfully evaluate solar geoengineering without a scenario for its 
implementation.Ó ( eith and MacMartin 2015, p. 201). This resonates perfectly with 
the assumption of the work at hand, which asks for a case specific analysis of the 
empirical premises of the BT argument.  
Lastly, the authors assume (at least for some RCPs) the finitude of the SAI 
deployment. This scenario is, taken all things into consideration, the best candidate 
for a plausible instantiation of the BT argument that has come to my attention so far. 
Conse ntly, the SAI scenario of eith and his colleagues will function as one case 
study for the further evaluation of the BT argument.
2
  
Temperature increase in the next century, even under optimistic mitigation 
assumptions, will have severe influence on life on earth. It is not only the absolute 
change in global mean temperature, which catalyzes dangerous climate events, but 
also the rate of warming. The fre ncy and strength of some climate events are 
determined by the warming rate and a ck temperature rise will make adaptation to 
those climate threats even more difficult (MacMartin et al. 2014).  
SAI could limit the rate of global temperature rise. MacMartin, eith and their 
colleagues have proposed a modest, temporal deployment of SAI (the authors use the 
######################################## ####################
2  eith and MacMartin 2015 is a revised version of MacMartin et al. 2014. 
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acronym SRM synonymously). This way, the authors argue that SAI could buy time 
for adaptation measures.  
 
In particular, using SRM to limit the rate of temperature change would provide more 
time for both ecosystems and human systems to adapt to climate changes.   
(MacMartin et al. 20 , p. ) 
 
The scenario is designed to meet specific criteria: It has to be temporal, moderate and 
responsive. These are the normative principles that guide the scenario setup.  
The technology that the authors envisage is a sulfate aerosol solar radiation 
management (SAI). The physics behind this technology has been discussed in 
Section 2.5, and the authors specify the physical set-up only in certain details.  
They assume the radiative forcing of one million ton of sulfur (MtS) to be 0.6 Ð 
Wm
-2
. For a given , the scenario targets at cutting the rate of change of the 
respective radiative forcing in half. This suggests that the choice of a certain  is 
decisive for the scenario.  
 
The choice of emissions trajectory has a profound influence over the magnitude and 
duration of geoengineering required to limit the rate of change of global mean 
temperature.   
(MacMartin et al. 20 , p. 5) 
 
For the main part of their investigation and for illustrative purpose, the authors 
assume and calculate the amount of injected sulfur accordingly. In the 
pathway, injection would start with MtS per year and would increase 
steadily in the first decade by the same amount. After years, the yearly injection 
would amount to tS. The rate of injection would be adjusted in order to steady 
the rate of temperature change (picture below, second panel).  
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Figure 7. The top panel shows the total radiative forcing for RCP4.5, and a radiative forcing profile in 
which the rate of change is halved. The second panel indicates the suggested SAI (SRM) profile. Effect 
on global mean temperature is shown in the third panel, indicating the time benefit, and the corresponding 
injection rates per decade are shown in the last panel (source: Keith and MacMartin 2015). 
 
As the figure above shows, the point in time, at which temperature reaches a certain 
degree above pre-industrial level, is delayed for several years, if SAI is used to limit 
the rate of temperature change.  
Using a different approach, the authors determine the amount of SAI in accordance 
with a steady warming rate of 0.1¡C per decade (instead of cutting warming rate in 
half, as in Keith and MacMartin (2015)). For RCP4.5, the length of required SAI 
deployment would have to be 160 years, if SAI is used to limit temperature change to 
0.1¡C per decade. 
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Figure . The top panel (a) shows SAI (SRM) being used for either maintaining constant global mean 
temperature (Ô0¡C per decade) starting in 2020 or limiting the rate of change to 0.1¡C per decade for an 
RCP4.5 pathway. Panel (b) shows the corresponding solar reduction potential of SRM as well as the 
length of time over which SAI (SRM) would have to be deployed (source: MacMartin et al. 2014, online 
version in color). 
 
For other RCPs, the below picture indicates the required timeframe and intensity of 
SAI schemes for varying temperature goals. If SAI is used to constrain temperature 
rise to 0.0 ¡C, that is to maintain current temperature, for all RCPs but RCP2.6, the 
finitude of the CE scheme is not given.  
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Figure 9. The panels show the duration (a) and amount (b) of SAI that would be required to constrain the 
rate of temperature change for different CP pathways. or CP8.5, the amount and duration of SAI is 
significantly larger than for other pathways. If SAI (S M) is used to maintain a constant temperature 
( ero rate of change), the maximum solar reduction is finite for each CP, but duration is only finite for 
CP2.6 (indicated by xÕ for the other CPs). (MacMartin et al. 201 , online version in color.) 
 
Whether this scenario is optimal or even possible, is still not decided (as the authors 
state themselves). Instead, it presents itself as one first step towards a comprehensive 
analysis of purpose-bound and technology specific deployment scenarios. The 
authors use this case not to argue for its implementation, but rather to make 
discussion of the matter more transparent.  
It is important to repeat that SAI in this scenario would not be used to tackle absolute 
temperature change: ã(...) it emporary S  deployment would not address 
problems such as temperature-dependent tipping point thresholds (...)Ò (MacMartin 
et al. 201 , p. 2). SAI would only account for reducing the rate of change for a given 
temperature rise, not its magnitude. In this setup, the main driver to limit global 
temperature rise would remain to be mitigation. Accordingly, it is still and only 
mitigation which could possibly lead to the stabili ation of global mean temperature 
at C above pre-industrial level (given the assumptions of the respective ).  
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This scenario does not frame SAI as a substitute for mitigation efforts, since both 
SAI and mitigation are concerned with different aspects of global climate change. 
While the former addresses the rate of change, the latter influences its ntity. The 
absolute temperature change is still determined by mitigation efforts, and SAI would 
be used supplementary to reduce the rate at which this change is to come about. SAI 
in this scenario does not reduce the dire need for drastic emission cuts Ð it rather 
points out what additional help SAI could generate. This is a great advantage of the 
scenario, since it does not initially run afoul of being a Òcheap techno-fixÓ which 
supposedly makes mitigation obsolete. Moreover, the no-impediment thesis becomes 
at least plausible in this scenario, as shall be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2  Flexible Emission Budget Ð minimizing pressure for mitigation  
Another way in which CE could buy time relates to the emission budget. The budget 
approach to the two-degree target is a common method when evaluating necessary 
emission strategies (e.g. CC 2013, riegler et al. 2015). This approach rests on the 
observation that net cumulative emissions of anthropogenic G G are near linear to 
the change of global mean temperature.  Even if the specific emission tra ectory 
alters Ð CO2 emission reaches its peak early and decreases slowly or it peaks late and 
falls steeply Ð if the net cumulative emissions are roughly the same at the end of the 
century, absolute temperature change will be similar for those tra ectories. The 
budget approach usually embraces the period until the end of the century, at which 
time a net-zero economy is assumed. CO2 concentration of about ppm is assumed 
to realize the two-degree target with a probability of more tha l  2016).  
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Figure 10. Four CO2 emission pathways with identical cumulative carbon emissions over the twenty-first 
century (a) and their corresponding temperature pro ections (b). The grey area indicates the uncertainty 
range (source: Rogel  et al. 2016). 
Rogel  et al. (2016) have analyzed the varying methods, by which different carbon 
budgets were obtained. They conclude that if differentiated climate feedbacks are 
taken into account, the remaining carbon budget would be no more than Ð
GtCO2 between 2015 and 2100. The stion is, of course, how the remaining 
emissions are to be allocated and whether an overshoot can be balanced out via 
future negative emissions.  
an uuren et al. (2013) show how drastically emissions would have to be reduced 
in order to realize near-zero emissions in 2100. For example, assuming a 
reduction rate per year, emissions in 2020 must be similar to those in 2000 and must 
lie under the anticipated baseline scenario (Fig. 1, anel a) which assumes a 
business-as-usual economy. If a limited mitigation potential is assumed, reduction 
must happen even more ckly (Fi anel b).  
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Figure 11. Illustrative emission pathways based on carbon budget of 1600 GtCO2 and constant emission 
reduction rate. Panel (a) shows emission pathways going to zero emission with the respective reduction 
rate, panel (b) shows results if the emission reduction potential is limited, panel (c) shows the results if 
negative emissions via BECCS are assumed. Panel (d) summarizes the emission window for 2020, if 
emissions in 2100 are zero with a maximum reduction rate of 2-3% per year (source: Van Vuuren et al. 
2013). 
 
The authors now demonstrate how the pressure of immediate mitigation could be 
lessened when assuming future negative emissions obtained with bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage (BECCS).  
 
#
Figure 12. Emission trajectory of scenarios with and without BECCS leading to stabilization at 450 and 
480ppm CO2-eq (source: Van Vuuren et al. 2013). 
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It is obvious from the above figure, how BECCS can postpone the point of installing 
drastic emission reduction, thereby allowing an emission overshoot. The red graph, 
which indicates stabilization at 450 ppm by 2100 under the assumption of RCP2.6, 
demands a sharp decrease in carbon emission by 2020 latest. The blue graph, 
however which assumes BECCS and negative emissions in the future, delays this 
point by about 10 years. Also, the curve decreases much steeper than the red one, 
hence implicating a more powerful CO2 -reduction-potential of BECCS as compared 
to mitigation alone. This indeed could lessen the pressure of immediate mitigation 
and hence might be a means to buy time.  
On the other hand, if a more ambitious climate target is aimed at, BECCS might still 
be able to allow a temporary overshoot, but would demand emission reduction to be 
as immediate as the RCP2.6 suggests (black graph).  
It is worthwhile in this context to evaluate the intended national determined 
contribution (INDC), as have Riahi et al. (2015) done
28
. The authors distinguish two 
mitigation scenarios that have short-term targets for 2030: HST and LST. While LST 
(low short-term target) aims at emitting only 53 Gt of CO2-eq. by 2030, HST (high 
short-term target) settles at a mitigation effort of reaching 61 Gt of CO2-eq. In the 
HST pathway, already 70% of the two-degree emission budget is spent by 2030, 
creating an  Òemission gapÓ as compared to an optimal two-degree pathway.  
This of course puts a lot of pressure on the remaining decades to reduce emissions 
substantially. By 2050, the identified emission gap would have to be closed in order 
to reach stabilization at 450ppm or 550ppm resp. This Òleaves only 20 years (2030 to 
2050) for a fundamental transformation of the global energy-economic system.Ó 
(Riahi et al. 2015, p. 13).  
Depending on the assumptions about energy demand, energy transformation, 
technical feasibility and social and political behavior, this 20-year transformation is 
seen as either impossible or feasible. Notably the availability of negative emission 
technologies (NETs) influences the judgment.  
The authors now reach the important conclusion that  
 
######################################## ####################
28 More recently, the Paris pledges have been analyzed. At the time of writing, the latest INDCs also 
would not be compatible with a stabilization of temperature at below 2¡, and relying on negative 
emissions seems insufficient (Kartha and Dooley 2016).  
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É in particular the ST pathway, narrows policy choices and increases the risks that 
some of the currently optional technologies, such as the large-scale deployment of 
biomass or CCS, will become Òa mustÓ by 2030 in order to achieve low stabilization 
targets.Ò  
(Riahi et al. 2015, p. 20) 
 
In other words: The way short-term emission pathways are designed today highly 
influences the options available to the future.
29
 This highlights the interdependency 
of CE technologies and current emission strategies. If, for example, negative 
emission technologies like BECCS are anticipated, an emission overshoot is still 
consistent with the two-degree target. On the other hand, when high short-term 
emissions are agreed upon, BECCS seems to become inevitable. This self-enhancing 
process is morally relevant, and will be discussed in Section 5.4.  
 
4.3  Results and complete argument matrix 
This chapter has introduced two different scenarios that serve as the blue print 
against which the BT argument is evaluated. The first one is a well-defined SAI 
deployment scenario, which has been sketched out for different RCPs. The second 
scenario evaluates, how BECCS can be used to close the emission gap of current 
emission pledges. Both scenarios serve the same purpose for the upcoming chapters: 
Replacing placeholder O in the BT argument, thus enabling the evaluation of the 
premises.  
The SAI scenarios show how time span and intensity of the designed deployments 
would differ for each RCP. I will adopt a case-discrimination accordingly, with one 
case adopting a mitigation pathway related to RCP2.6, in which remaining within the 
two-degree emission budget is assumed to be more likely, and one case assuming an 
emission overshoot that exceeds the two-degree budget. The same case-
discrimination will be applied to the BECCS cases. 
However, even in an RCP2.6 scenario, there might be an emission overshoot, which 
could possibly be leveled out by future negative emissions (Section 4.2). That being 
######################################## ####################
29 From a policy perspective initial low pledges might be prudent: Because reduction targets under 
the Paris Agreement will increase over time, states will only pledge low INDC in the first period even 
if their energy policies are already more advanced. 
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said, the two-degree budget serves as the quantitative threshold defining emission 
efforts, while the RCPs indicate the likelihood of remaining within this budget.  
This generates four climate policy options O: 
 
Climate Policy Option O 
Climate Policy Option a SAI + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
Climate Policy Option A SAI + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget). 
Climate Policy Option b BECCS+ CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
Climate Policy Option B BECCS + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget). 
 
The lower case letters a and b indicate emissions remaining within the two-degree 
budget; the upper case letters A and B signify an overshoot scenario.   
An argument matrix, which plots O and G against each other, yields sixteen version 
of the BT-argument: 
 
 
Table 5. Argument matrix. The rows depict climate goals G, the columns depict portfolio options 
O. Each entry represents a version of the BT-argument 
Climate Goal G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Option O 
Preventing climate tipping 
points 
Reducing pressure 
Avoiding 
temperature
- dependent 
tipping 
points 
Avoiding 
rate-
dependent 
tipping 
points.  
Reducing 
adaptation 
pressure 
Reducing 
mitigation 
pressure. 
1 2 3 4 
S
A
I 
 
 
CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
a a1 a2 a3 a4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
A A1 A2 A3 A4 
B
E
C
C
S
 
CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
b b1 b2 b3 b4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
B B1 B2 B3 B4 
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As introduced in Chapter 2, a climate policy portfolio consists of at least three 
options: mitigation, adaptation and CE. For now, I will assume that there is no 
relation between these options
30
. Instead, I will incorporate two CE technologies, 
SAI and BECCS, and differentiate two sub-cases regarding mitigation efforts, as the 
above table illustrates. Those sub-cases are not determined by the compliance with 
the mitigation obligation. Rather, they are purely quantitative: Are emission cuts 
anticipated that would remain within the two-degree budget of CO2 emissions?  
By including the amount of mitigation as a background assumption of climate policy 
option O, the moral status of mitigation efforts is not decisive when evaluating the 
premises of the BT-argument. There is a clear strategic benefit in doing so: The 
premises of the buying time argument can be evaluated in light of the ÔempiricalÕ 
assumption about the climate portfolio, without having to decide about normative 
premises including a moral principle that asks for CE to be accompanied by fast and 
far reaching mitigation. This enables a rather analytical evaluation of the BT-
argument. 
This analysis, however, generates far-reaching results. Most notably, the sub-cases 
assuming an overshoot render at least one premises of the BT-argument implausible 
or at least undecided. I believe to be able to demonstrate that the BT argument only 
then has plausible premises, if emissions are assumed to remain within the two-
degree budget. This is indeed a great result, and a clear benefit as opposed to 
continuously emphasizing the moral obligation to engage in drastic mitigation efforts 
in face of CE Ð which already is obvious and still does not lead to more ambitious 
mitigation. 
The mitigation obligation is of course the moral epicenter of this work. It enters the 
BT-argument in two ways: As the no-impediment thesis, and later, as a general 
evaluation pattern in Chapter 6. Especially does the mitigation obligation hold 
independently of any assumed CE deployment. I deem this result to be a benefit of 
the argument reconstruction at hand. 
######################################## ####################
30 This assumption will be further scrutinized in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of the Arguments 
 
In Chapter 4, I have introduced two technology deployment scenarios, which I 
believe to resonate best with the buying time idea, thereby introducing four 
instantiations of placeholder O. In Chapter 3, different instantiations for climate goal 
G have been introduced, which combined result in a sixteen-field matrix for the BT-
argument. The aim of this chapter is now to evaluate for each combination of G and 
O, whether the respective argument generates plausible
31
 premises. Not all versions 
must or can be discussed in detail, however. If only one premise turns out to be 
implausible, the whole argument can be re ected (Section 5.2). Surprisingly, only two 
arguments can be said to be plausible (Section 5.1). oderate SAI plus sufficient 
mitigation could help avoid rate-dependent tipping points as well as help reduce 
adaptation pressure (argument a2 and a3). 
The remaining versions are neither obviously plausible nor obviously implausible. In 
most cases, I cannot decide upon the plausibility of a given scenario due to a lack of 
knowledge. Especially when scientific facts are at stake, which surpass the 
information of the two exemplary deployment scenarios introduced in Chapter 4, 
evaluation of the arguments must remain incomplete. I will label those arguments 
accordingly as being beyond the scope of this work, while at the same time urging 
for further research (Section 5.3).  
On the other hand, there are deployment-scenarios that seem in itself rational, but are 
at odds with the BT argument in its present form. ost notably, the prominently 
discussed case of BECCS as a means to buy time in face of less than sufficient 
mitigation turns out to obscure the dubitable status of at least two buying time 
requirements Ð the finitude of the deployment and the impact on mitigation efforts. In 
this situation, there are two possibilities: olding onto the strong version of the BT-
argument and re ecting the scenario, or reformulation the BT-requirements so that 
they incorporate the desired scenario. In this chapter, the first path is traced (Section 
5.4), while a reformulation of the BT-argument is sought in Chapte  
The discussion here serves two purposes: 1. on the methodological level, it shows 
how the buying time argument can be evaluated and 2. on the practical level, it might 
######################################## ####################
31 Plausibility, as well as likelihood is understood in a broad, every-day meaning. Plausibility in a 
argumentation-theoretical discourse is an elaborate concept (e.g. Walton 2 1), referring to which is 
not necessary for the current purpose.  
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give some insight on how to assess different deployment scenarios. This kind of 
argument-evaluation is a first step towards a comprehensive case study, which is 
necessary for assessing the moral status of any CE deployment. While I am aware 
that this can only be a first tentative judgment, this work serves as an example of 
how argument analysis can indeed be politically relevant.  
 
5.1  Plausible instantiations 
There are two combinations of G and O that yield arguments with plausible premises. 
The green areas signify those arguments. 
 
 
The two arguments a2 and a3 will be discussed in turn, starting with the strongest 
and most interesting case of SAI-deployment in order to reduce pressure for 
adaptation (argument a3, Section 5.1.2). The second argument a2 is very similar to 
a3, and will be discussed briefly. Both argument a2 and a3 assume mitigation efforts 
to remain within the two-degree budget, while the use of SAI addresses the rate of 
temperature change. 
In order to evaluate the plausibility of the arguments, each premise needs to be 
scrutinized and its plausibility needs to be shown. This will be done for those two 
arguments a2 and a3, with the exception of the morality thesis. As said before, the 
research question of the thesis at hand is, whether a BT-deployment is possible 
absent any general moral constraints about CE. This means that for the time being, it 
is assumed that neither SAI nor BECCS are inherently morally wrong. Whether this 
Climate Goal G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Option O 
Preventing climate tipping 
points 
Reducing pressure 
Avoiding 
temperature
- dependent 
tipping 
points 
Avoiding 
rate-
dependent 
tipping 
points.  
Reducing 
adaptation 
pressure 
Reducing 
mitigation 
pressure. 
1 2 3 4 
S
A
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CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
a a1 a2 a3 a4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
A A1 A2 A3 A4 
B
E
C
C
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CO2 < 2¡ 
budget 
b b1 b2 b3 b4 
CO2 > 2¡ 
budget 
B B1 B2 B3 B4 
Table 6. Plausible Instantiations of the BT-argument!"
CHAPTER 5 ÐEVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
!!"#
is true, will be subject of Chapter 6, when general moral constraints on plausible BT-
instantiations are discussed.  
 
5.1.2 Argument a3  
G Climate Goal 3 Reducing adaptation pressure. 
O Climate Policy Option a  SAI + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget) 
 
The first deployment scenario introduced in this chapter has clearly been designed to 
meet the climate goal identified as the Reducing Adaptation Costs Goal (Climate 
Goal 3). The climate portfolio in this scenario aims at stabilizing temperature at 2 ¡C, 
while on the other hand, lessening the rate of change in order to buy more time for 
adaptation. 
The envisage CE technique is a special version of SAI. The calculations are made Ð 
among others Ð for an RCP2.6 pathway, hence, for this version, mitigation in option 
O will be assumed to enable emissions to meet the two-degree target.  
It is essential to this scenario that SAI is not used to stabilize temperature, but only to 
lower the rate of temperature change. The stabilization of temperature in accordance 
with the specific RCP is achieved solely through cuts in CO2 emissions. 
Of the six BT-requirements, only the following theses need to be evaluated in the 
upcoming section: effectiveness thesis, finitude thesis, no-impediment thesis, and no-
better-option thesis. The desirability thesis has already been established for each 
climate goal G (Section 3.3), and the morality thesis will be focus of Chapter 6. As 
said before, the question of the work at hand is, whether a BT-deployment is possible 
absent any general moral constraints about CE. This means that, for the time being, 
SAI and BECCS are framed as not being inherently morally wrong.  
  
(Effectiveness Thesis) Option a leads to desirable climate goal G3 and is beneficial 
in so doing so.  
According to the scenario set-up, SAI will be successful in reducing the warming rate 
(MacMartin et al. 2014). The authors argue that SAI will thus be able to reduce 
adaptation pressure, by generation more time for learning and installing different 
adaptation measures. Furthermore, if the RCP2.6 mitigation pathway is assumed, the 
stabilization of temperature at 2¡C above pre-industrial level is likely to be 
guaranteed. Therefore, indeed, SAI deployment can be called effective.  
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The second part of the effectiveness premise asks for a beneficial deployment. The 
weighting of the benefits and the negative side effects in order to guarantess some 
form of beneficial deployment, is a matter of great dispute. It would be beyond the 
scope of this work to fully decide for the deployment scenarios at hand, if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. So, rather, some central and most discussed side effects 
of SAI deployment are isolated and presented here. 
Whether the scenario at hand eventually is beneficial or not, depends on model 
results I cannot provide. The question here is, if MacMartinÕs and KeithÕs 
deployment scenario has the theoretical conditions for the possibility of being 
beneficial. I will focus on three possible negative side effects associated with SAI: 
precipitation, methods of in ection and affiliation to the fossil fuel sector and 
procedural ustice. The guiding question is: Are there circumstances that would 
render this scenario beneficial  
Precipitation. Keith and MacMartin have specified some climate damages resulting 
from SAI, including the deviation of precipitation from pre-industrial level (Keith 
and MacMartin 2015). The authors suggest that the level of SAI, which maximizes 
climate benefits (namely the temperature stabilization), is much higher than the level 
that maximizes the sum of harms and benefits. In consequence, the level of beneficial 
SAI would always be less than the level of most effective SAI. iven that, is it 
possible that the moderate SAI approach could count as beneficial  What percentage 
of change in precipitation could still be ÔacceptableÕ   
Acceptable climate impacts generated by SAI deployment
32
 could, for example, be 
defined in accordance with basic human rights, such as access to food and clear 
water, and not infringing the sufficiency threshold of the affected (Shue 2010). 
If deviation from natural precipitation patterns violates human rights or makes self-
sufficient life in certain areas of the world difficult if not impossible, it surely would 
not be beneficial. uestions in this regard are, among others: What groups of people 
are affected by SAI impacts  In what climate and precipitation range can their 
lifestyles exist  Are there forms of compensation conceivable   
This very short discussion means to illustrate the theoretical possibility to shape a 
beneficial SAI deployment, if those questions can be answered satisfactorily.  
######################################## ####################
32 This supposes, that there are acceptable impacts of SAI, and that not simply all effects of SAI 
would count as inacceptable. This correlates with the notion of SAI not being inherently morally 
wrong. 
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Methods of Injection. The authors propose the use of aircraft to inject the sulfate 
eith and MacMartin Obviously, airplanes must be fueled. Hence, the use of 
SAI would, at least to some extend, require the use of fossil fuels and thus add to 
continued CO2 emission. This could only be acceptable, if the other benefits (such as 
prevention of climate tipping points) outweigh this challenge.  
However, it could be argued that the use of fossil fuel for aircraft is a contingent 
factor, and sustainable aviation fuel is underway. If this was a real possibility, not 
only would SAI injection cease to add to carbon emission, but would also lose its 
connection to the fossil fuel sector. 
Procedural justice. hile it is long and by argued that the use of SAI would be 
simple and cost-effective, even allowing for single states to undergo the deployment, 
it is still a technique that requires central control. Since it is a large-scale 
manipulation of a common good Ð the atmosphere Ð its deployment has to be 
subdued to common decision making. A global moratorium on SAI use might be 
hard to achieve, but at least it could be argued that common global agreements are 
possible and are in fact, presently installed in many different areas. Hence, global 
agreement on SAI deployment can be possible and is necessary for beneficial 
deployment.  
 
So, in conclusion there could be situations in which a BT-deployment of SAI could 
be more beneficial than harmful. However, this might be only the case for low-scale 
SAI deployment, or far less or far shorter deployment than might be desirable from a 
purely temperature-based assessment. As the authors of this scenario have stated: 
hatever the weighting of these benefits and cost functions, the ratio of benefits to 
costs will be largest for very small amounts of SRM  eith and MacMartin 
p. 204). They continue to observe: (One) must conclude that the optimal amount of 
SRM will always be less than the amount of SRM that maximizes benefits.  ( eith 
and MacMartin p. 204). This very important conclusion should be present for 
any possible framing of SAI deployment. It implies that beneficial SAI deployment 
might be possible, but only within clear-cut boundaries. Those boundaries might 
arguably be given in a RCP2.6 world, where emission are cut to remain within the 
two-degree budget and SAI would have to be deployed for a short period of time 
only. 
 
CHAPTER 5 ÐEVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
! "#
(Finitude Thesis) Option a only allows for finite SAI deployment.  
In their 2014 paper, MacMartin at al. determine the deployment time of SAI for 
different RCPs. In an RCP2.6 world, for example, SAI deployment would only be 
necessary for 40 years. However, the time frame increases sharply: For the RCP
the duration of deployment would be 160 years, culmination to roughly years for 
RCP .  
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of the solar reductions required to maintain a 0.1¡C per decade rate of 
temperature change for different emission pathways (source: MacMartin et al. 2014). See also Figure , 
Section 4.1. 
 
In Section 3.2 I have argued that finitude is a practical concept, which makes 
assumptions about controllability. Any time frame that clearly surpasses the end of 
the century, may in theory be finite, but cannot be handled practically. Additionally, 
it presents a huge risk transfer into the future. 
The authors also calculate the termination time for the RCPs, depending on the 
allowed rate of temperature change (see Section 4.1, Figure . Only if 0¡C change is 
allowed (i.e. if SAI is used to stabilize temperature at pre-industrial level 
indefinitely), the use of SAI in all RCPs but RCP2.6 is infinite. Under all other 
circumstances, both the intensity and the duration of the deployment is projected to 
be finite. But again, it must be stressed that some expected durations of SAI surpass 
any realistic timeframe on which policy decisions could rely on.  
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Assuming CO2 emissions to remain within the two-degree budget, and assuming that 
this might most likely be the case in 2.6, a duration of about years is indeed a 
manageable, finite timeframe.  
 
(No-impediment Thesis) SAI in option a does not lead to less mitigation compared to 
mitigation in option a without SAI.  
As illustrated before, MacMartin and his colleagues contrast the SAI deployment 
with different s. The s and with them, mitigation efforts, are the background 
assumptions that enter their model set-up. In this sense, they assume mitigation 
efforts staying constant for each . Thus, the scenario design aligns with the 
requirement that SAI deployment should not compromise mitigation efforts. Since 
the envisaged SAI deployment would only address the rate of temperature change 
and not the temperature change itself, it would not act as a substitute for mitigation. 
If, moreover, a mitigation pathway like the 2.6 is assumed, the two-degree target 
might be reached with mitigation efforts alone, while SAI would address the 
secondary climate goal of reducing adaptation pressure.  
However, there are some drawbacks to the evaluation of the no-impediment thesis. It 
might be difficult to attribute the increase in temperature and the change in the 
warming rate to SAI and mitigation separately. Since the effectiveness of a SAI 
scheme and of mitigation partly overlap, there might be no clear role-attribution to 
either of them. This problem is even more manifest in the BECCS-cases.  
Additionally, the likelihood of the scenario can be challenged. Even if the design of 
the scenario makes the no-impediment thesis true, there is no guarantee that this will 
be the case if implemented in real life  climate policy. This reality gap  will be 
focus of discussion in Chapter 6. Here, it needs to be stressed, that at least the 
assumptions of this deployment scenario presuppose constant, sufficient and 
eventually successful mitigation efforts.  
 
(No-better-option Thesis) There is no option OÕ which is finite and which leads to 
climate goal  and which is better than option a.  
As introduced above, the no-better-option thesis in my BT-argument reconstruction 
works as a afegua to make sure that no option not including SAI deployment, is 
ruled out prematurely. If two portfolios equally realize a desired climate goal , the 
portfolio without CE should be adopted. So, in context of this version of the BT-
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argument (Argument a3), it needs to be asked if there is a conceivable portfolio 
without SAI that is e ally powerful in reducing the rate of temperature change and 
thus in reducing pressure for adaptation.  
The temperature change can be influenced by ambitious mitigation strategies. But 
SAI is specifically designed to influence the rate of change on basis of those 
mitigation strategies. It is an additional climate strategy that serves a secondary 
purpose. Hence, a portfolio without SAI might be able to determine the temperature 
change, but would have no possibility to influence the rate of temperature change in 
this given setup
33
.  
So, regarding the specific climate goal to reduce adaptation pressure and assuming 
that even drastic mitigation primarily influence the absolute temperature change, SAI 
presents itself indeed as the best option for this purpose. 
 
5.1.2 Argument a2 
 Climate oal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
O Climate Policy Option a SAI  CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2  2  budget) 
 
In this version of the buying time argument, the same deployment scenario is taken 
into consideration as above: It is climate option a, (MacMartin et al. 2014, eith and 
MacMartin 2015) that introduces time limited and purpose bound SAI in order to 
reduce the warming rate. They calculate their deployment scheme in light of different 
RCPs, and as in the previous chapter, I will assume a scenario which ensures the 
two-degree target via mitigation efforts. For argument a2, the climate goal is to avoid 
rate-dependent tipping point, such as the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation 
(Stocker and Schmittner  Since the in-depth discussion of this specific policy 
mix has been given above, I will not discuss each premise individually, but rather 
discuss them together.  
At first glance, all BT-re rements can be said to be met the scenario was 
designed exactly for this purpose. SAI is effective, in that it would reduce the 
warming rate and hence prevent rate-dependent tipping points, it might also be 
beneficial in so doing so. Mitigation efforts would ensure the realization of the two-
######################################## ####################
33 Of course, if temperature would rise less sharply, the rate of change would also be influenced. But 
for a given pro ected temperature rise, only SAI could arguably influence the rate of change. There 
might be other CE strategies to also serve the purpose of influencing the changing rate. However, the 
uestion here is, whether there is a portfolio without any CE measure that realizes the same goal. 
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degree target. Also is SAI finite and the no-impediment thesis is true for the same 
reason as it was true in the previous argument: Since mitigation efforts are assumed 
to stay constantly high in the respective , they will not be affected by SAI. 
astly, the no-better-option thesis must be said to be plausible, too, since no climate 
strategy without SAI might address the rate of global temperature change.  
To conclude, this version of the BT-argument which aims at avoiding rate-dependent 
tipping points via SAI and which assumes a high level of mitigation in order to 
realize the two-degree target, is plausible. However, the discussion indicates quite 
clearly that the underlying emission pathway is the decisive element for the 
evaluation. Even when assuming SAI, emissions must be reduced massively, in order 
to reach the two-degree goal. 
 
5.2  Implausible instantiations 
The above section (Section  has introduced two instantiations of the BT-
argument with respect to one specific SAI deployment scenario. The premises 
resulting from this instantiations are prima facie plausible. In this section, I will 
discuss six versions of the BT-argument that I deem to be implausible, represented 
by the red areas (see table below). 
Table 7. lausible and implausible instantiations of the BT-argument. 
Climate oal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
olicy Option O 
reventing climate tipping 
points 
Reducing pressure 
Avoiding 
temperature
- dependent 
tipping 
points 
Avoiding 
rate-
dependent 
tipping 
points.  
Reducing 
adaptation 
pressure 
Reducing 
mitigation 
pressure. 
1 2 3 4 
S
A
I 
 
 
CO2  2  
budget 
a a  a2 a3 a  
CO2  2  
budget 
A A  A2 A3 A  
B
E
C
C
S
 
CO2  2  
budget 
b b  b2 b3 b  
CO2  2  
budget 
B B  B2 B3 B  
CHAPTER 5 ÐEVAL ATION O  THE ARG MENTS 
! !"#
In case of identifying implausible arguments, it suffices to point out only one 
implausible premise. I will discuss the implausible argument instantiations in groups 
of what climate goal they are supposed to reach (arguments a1 and b1) and what 
policy option they assume (arguments A1 Ð A4), respectively. One tentative 
conclusion of the table above is that an SAI-portfolio assuming CO2 emissions 
exceeding the two-degree budget results in an implausible instantiation of the BTA 
(arguments A1 Ð A4). If this is true, this result might influence the decision making-
process in case a buying time deployment via SAI is advocated in light of possible 
insufficient mitigation.  
 
5.2.1 Arguments a1 and b1 
Policy option a has already been discussed as a plausible instantiation of two BT-
versions (arguments a2 and a3, see Section 5.1). If the goal differs, however, the SAI 
deployment scenario leads to implausible premises of the respective argument.  
If climate goal 1 is stipulated, the BT-argument essentially amounts to the two-
degree target: It aims at preventing temperature-dependent tipping points. This is to 
be achieved via stabilization of global temperature rise to maximally 2¡C above pre-
industrial level (see Section 1.1, Section 2.1, Section 2.2, Section 3.3 and Section 
4.1).  
Climate portfolio a might be able to realize the two-degree target, since it assumes 
emissions to remain within the two-degree budget. This way, mitigation in option O 
guarantees the realization of climate goal 1. As said before, the SAI deployment in 
this set-up does not address the amount of temperature change, but the rate at which 
it happens. In argument a1, SAI deployment is superfluous for reaching the 
respective climate goal  
If the two-degree target would be reached with mitigation alone (which is the 
background assumption of this argument), then there is indeed a better option than 
mitigation plus SAI, and that is: mitigation alone. If mitigation alone would be 
effective in realizing the two-degree target, then SAI would be redundant. Hence a 
portfolio without SAI is a better option; the no-better option thesis would become 
implausible.  
The same reasoning applies to argument b1 and policy mix b, respectively, where 
BECCS is assumed additionally to already sufficient mitigation. That way, BECCS 
would also be superflous, and the better option as compared to BECCS combined 
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with mitigation would be: mitigation alone. In both arguments a2 and b1, the two-
degree target can be reached with mitigation alone and CE deployment is not needed. 
The no-better-option thesis becomes implausible in both cases.  
 
5.2.2 Arguments A1, A2, A3 and A4  
As indicated in Section 3.3, each of the four climate goals includes the stabilization 
of temperature rise at 2¡C above pre-industrial level. A mitigation trajectory which 
leads to a global temperature rise of more than 2¡C does not realize the two-degree 
target. Hence, climate option A which assumes CO2 emissions to exceed the two-
degree budget and which assumes SAI deployment not to address absolute 
temperature change, is not effective in reaching any of the relevant climate goals.  
Having said this, SAI deployment could still be used to achieve the two-degree target 
under insufficient mitigation efforts, if it is used to address temperature change 
directly. A lack of mitigation efforts could possibly be balanced by more SAI, if SAI 
is used as a substitute. The respective argument to support such SAI deployment is 
the so-called two-degree target argument that has been already been introduced by 
Betz and Cacean (2012) (see also Section 3.3). Such a deployment scheme, however, 
would deeply differ from the scenario introduced above in Section 4.1. In a 
temperature-stabilizing scenario, SAI would act as a substitute to mitigation. The no-
impediment thesis becomes at least questionable in such a set-up.  
Additionally, if mitigation efforts will not be able to stabilize temperature medium-
term, SAI deployment might have to be continued infinitely, or at least for a very 
long timespan (Section 4.1, also MacMartin et al. 2014). This violates one essential 
buying time requirement: the finitude thesis. In summary, a scenario that assumes 
SAI deployment in light of insufficient mitigation makes at least two premises of the 
corresponding argument implausible: the finitude thesis and the no-impediment 
thesis.  
The below table shows the implausible versions of the BT-argument and indicates 
the premises, that become implausible or at least questionable in the specific set-up.  
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5.3  Lack of knowledge 
In most cases, I simply do not have the expertise to judge the plausibility of a given 
scenario, especially when scientific facts are at stake that surpass the information of 
the two exemplary deployment scenarios introduced in Chapter 4.  
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Table 8. Implausible instantiations of the BT-argument. The implausible premises of the 
respective argument are shown in the fields. 
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Table 9. lausible, implausible and undecided arguments. Light blue indicates a lack of 
knowledge about the scenario, dark blue indicates two cases that are unclear with regard to 
the underlying BT-principle. 
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There are six arguments that I cannot fully evaluate in this work due to a lack of 
knowledge. Four of them are arguments assuming a BECCS-scenario (b2, B2, b3 and 
B3). Those arguments mean to realize the related climate goals 2 and 3: Reducing 
adaptation pressure and avoiding rate-dependent tipping points. Those arguments share 
the same uncertainty: It is unclear whether BECCS Ð a technology which primarily 
deals with the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and only secondarily with the 
pace this concentration comes about Ð can address any rate-dependent climate goals. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to judge the many ongoing model-runs for BECCS. 
Two other arguments containing uncertain premises are a4 and b4. They each assume a 
mitigation pathway, which realizes the two-degree target independently of additional 
CE deployment. The respective climate goal is a reduction in mitigation pressure 
(climate goal 4). While argument B4, which assumes BECCS in face of insufficient 
mitigation as a means to reduce further mitigation pressure, will be the focus of 
discussion in the next section (Section 5.4), the notion of reducing mitigation pressure 
for already successful mitigation might make no sense. Hence, arguments a4 and b4 are 
included in the group of indeterminable arguments. 
The first two arguments I will deal with are arguments b2 and B2:  
 
Argument b2: 
G Climate Goal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
O Climate Policy Option b  BECCS + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
 
Argument B3 
G Climate Goal 2 Avoiding rate-dependent tipping points.  
O Climate Policy Option B BECCS + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget) 
 
Whether BECCS is able to tackle the rate of temperature change is unclear. It might 
have some effect on the warming rate by manipulation the amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. This is not a direct adjustment of the warming rate as exemplified by the 
SAI scenario. It cannot be ruled out, however that BECCS might be able to realize 
climate goal 2. If, in addition, an emission overshoot is anticipated (argument B2), 
BECCS would arguably be used to both stabilize the absolute temperature change 
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and influence the pace of warming. The interdependency of those two aspects and the 
role BECS can play here, is opaque to me. The effectiveness thesis cannot be 
evaluated for both arguments in the given context.  
 
Argument b3: 
G Climate Goal 3 Reducing Adaptation pressure 
O Climate Policy Option b  BECCS + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
 
Argument B3 
G Climate Goal 3 Reducing Adaptation pressure 
O Climate Policy Option B BECCS + CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree  
budget (CO2 > 2¡ budget) 
 
or similar reasons, arguments b3 and B3 cannot be further evaluated. Since climate 
goal 3 is related to climate goal 2 Ð a reduction in the rate of climate change may 
allow for a reduction of adaptation pressure Ð the same uncertainties arise. The 
scenarios introduced in Chapter 4 do not give any insights on whether BECCS might 
be able to buy time for adaptation.
34
  
It is, again, not impossible to conceive a BECCS scenario, in which the point in time, 
at which adaptation measures would have to be installed, is postponed by the use of 
BECCS. Especially in addition to ambitious mitigation efforts (argument b3), 
deployment of BECCS could enhance an already effective mitigation pathway to 
give adaptation measures more time to be implemented. ustifying those arguments, 
however, is not possible in the scope of this work.  
The next two arguments both relate to climate goal 4: Reduction of mitigation costs.  
 
Argument a4: 
G Climate Goal 4 Reducing itigation pressure 
O Climate Policy Option a  SAI + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget) 
 
 
######################################## ####################
34 One may argue that time for adaptation follows from more time for mitigation (BECCS as a means 
to buy time for mitigation will be discussed in Section 5.2). At the same time that mitigation pressure 
is lessened, time for adaptation measures is also generated. owever, this claim also cannot be backed 
in the current investigation and is left for further research.  
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Argument b4 
G Climate Goal 4 Reducing Mitigation pressure 
O Climate Policy Option b  BECCS + CO2 emissions remaining within the two-
degree budget (CO2 < 2¡ budget). 
 
In case of argument a4, it needs to be pointed out that SAI deployment as introduced 
by MacMartin and eith (MacMartin et al. 2014, eith and MacMartin ) and 
his colleagues is calculated against the backdrop of a certain RCP trajectory. SAI in 
those scenarios works additionally to mitigation efforts and, at least theoretically, 
does not affect them (see Section . Since SAI is used only to reduce the rate of 
change, it does not relate primarily to mitigation costs. Whether there is a connection 
between mitigation costs and the lessening of the rate of temperature change, must be 
validated by further research. A preliminary assessment indicates that the 
effectiveness thesis is at least dubitable in case of argument a4.  
Of course, this result is obtained within the limitation to the SAI-scenario introduced 
above. Other SAI scenarios are imaginable that very well could aim at reducing 
mitigation costs. A very common perception of SAI deployment is as a limited 
substitute for mitigation in order to stabilize temperature, when mitigation alone 
would not be successful in doing so. In such a set up, however, the no-impediment 
thesis would be in jeopardy.  
Whether SAI as part of a policy mix, as introduced in section 4.1, will have any 
effect on mitigation costs, is at least debatable. Further research is needed for each of 
the unclear arguments, if they are to be established as plausible instances of the 
buying time argument.  
 
5.4  A special case: Argument B4 
There are deployment-scenarios that seem in itself rational, but are at odds with the 
BT-argument in its present form. Especially the prominently discussed case of 
BECCS as a means to buy time in face of less than sufficient mitigation (Section 
4.2), turns out to obscure the dubitable status of at least two buying time 
requirements: The finitude of the deployment and the impact on mitigation efforts. In 
this situation, there are two possibilities: Relying on the strong version of the BT-
argument and rejecting the BECCS scenario, or reformulation the BT-requirements 
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in a way that they incorporate the scenario. In this section, I will trace the first option 
and discuss climate policy option B as an implausible instance of the BT-argument. 
Argument B4 might be the most important one when discussing the buying time 
framing. Argument B1 is closely related to B4 and will be discussed simultaneously. 
Both arguments assume that mitigation efforts will not be able to stabilize 
temperature at C above pre-industrial level. The underlying idea of those argument 
versions then is that in light of insufficient mitigation, BECCS could close the 
emission gap and thus help reaching the two-degree target, even if emissions 
temporarily exceed the two-degree budget. It is this the scenario that has been 
introduced in Section 4.2. Additionally, if future negative emissions are anticipated, 
the timeframe for drastic emission cuts would broaden, thus buying time for further 
mitigation approaches. 
 
Argument B1: 
 Climate oal 1 Avoiding temperature-dependent tipping points 
O Climate Policy Option B BECCS  CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree  
budget (CO2  2  budget) 
 
Argument B4: 
 Climate oal 4 Reducing Mitigation pressure 
O Climate Policy Option B BECCS  CO2 emissions exceeding the two-degree 
budget (CO2  2  budget) 
 
Since both arguments assume insufficient mitigation, they will be discussed together. 
The BT-theses will be specified for argument B4, the validity of the according thesis 
in B1 follows from them
35
.  
As the discussion will reveal, a BECCS deployment to artificially enhance the 
emission budget violates at least two BT-re rements, the finitude- and the no-
impediment re rement, and it may very well also violate the morality re rement. 
That being said, this scenario may turn out to be actually necessary when tackling 
climate change. e may find ourselves in a situation, in which the scenario we 
propose violates our own normative standards. This te sobering thought will be 
further strengthened in Chapter 6. On the other hand, this fact might suggest that the 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
35 Since climate goal 4 includes climate goal 1, if a premise including goal 4 is valid, the same holds 
mutatis mutandis for a premise including goal 1.  
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BT-argument in its current form is too strong. A possible weak version of the BT-
argument will also be discussed in Chapter 6.  
I will discuss all BT-theses for argument B4 in detail. The main focus lies on the 
effectiveness thesis (including the beneficial requirement); the finitude- and the no-
better-option thesis will be discussed together. Especially the no-impediment thesis 
will pave the way for discussion in Chapter 6.
36
  
 
(Effectiveness Thesis) Option B leads to desirable climate goal 4 and is beneficial in 
so doing so.  
The idea of the emission budget is that temperature can be stabilized at a certain 
degree regardless of the concrete emission trajectory. The two-degree budget has 
been advised to be around at 950 GtCO2 highest, if CO2 concentration is to be 
stabilized at 480ppm (IPCC 2014). This means, an emission pathway assuming a 
short-term overshoot can still be consistent with the two-degree target, if it is 
balanced out with net negative emissions by the end of the century. 
While a substantial transformation in society would have to take place within the 
next decades or even years (see Section 4.2), with the assumption of future BECCS, 
the need for immediate and drastic emission cuts might be delayed. So, BECCS, as 
envisaged by the scenario introduced in 4.2, might indeed be effective in reducing 
mitigation pressure, because it might postpone the point in time, at which emissions 
have to go down, while at the same time minimizing the necessary amount of 
reduction.  
However, this assessment of BECCS is influenced by possibly utopic assumptions 
about the effectiveness and readiness of the technology. As has been suggested 
recently by Kartha and Dooley (2016), it might be risky to rely on future negative 
emissions with BECCS, because this option might turn out to involve unacceptable 
risks, or prove to be either not feasible or ineffective. The effectiveness of BECCS is 
severely limited by land availability and the readiness of capturing schemes. Betting 
on negative emission may turn out to be a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy (Fuss et 
al. 2014).  
The effectiveness thesis asks for BECCS to be beneficial as well. The point to be 
made here, again, cannot be to definitely decide whether the buying time deployment 
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36 The following discussion is partially adopted form Muraca and Neuber (2017). 
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of BECCS is beneficial or not. This would require more in-depth research than can 
be provided here. Rather, the question is, whether the proposed BECCS deployment 
may provide the conditions for the possibility of beneficial deployment.  
As with the SAI scenario, I will focus here on three exemplary side effects of 
BECCS: Land-use conflicts, transport and storage safety and procedural justice. The 
guiding question is: Are there circumstances that could render a BECCS scenario 
beneficial? 
Land-use conflicts. The potential of BECCS is restrained by many factors, such as 
land availability, freshwater for irrigation, food demand, and future climatic and 
social developments. Near-term, this potential is massively limited by the availability 
of arable land. The conversion of agricultural land into biomass plantations is 
determined by food demands, dietary choices and might include heavy fertilization 
(Schfer et al. 2015; McNutt et al. 2015b).  
If BECCS were to be used in a way consistent with RCP2.6, i.e. in order to reach the 
2-degree-target, the estimated land-use of food-production and biomass-production 
combined would amount to 2.1 billion hectares in 2100. To put this number into 
perspective, todayÕs cropland amount to 1.6 billion hectare (McNutt et al. 2015).  
The conversion of land into biomass plantations ought to suffice certain ethical 
criteria. One set of ethical principles is proposed by the Nuffield principles on 
Biofuel (Weale et al. 2011): 
 
i. Biofuel development should not be at the expense of peopleÕs essential rights 
(including access to sufficient food and water, health rights, work rights and land 
entitlements).  
 
ii. Biofuels should be environmentally sustainable.  
 
iii. Biofuels should contribute to a net reduction of total greenhouse gas emissions 
and not exacerbate global climate change.  
 
iv. Biofuels should develop in accordance with trade principles that are fair and 
recognize the rights of people to just reward (including labor rights and 
intellectual property rights).  
 
v. Costs and benefits of biofuels should be distributed in an equitable way.  
 
The first two principles refer to land-use problems. This is especially important if 
biomass were to be produced in the global South, where arable land is scarce and the 
available cropland is essential for self-sufficient, small-scale agriculture. Moreover, 
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if animal rights and species conservation are considered, the conversion of wildlife 
habitat would not be an option either.  
Land-use conflicts may be prevented partially, if food-production where to use less 
land. This might either happen via increased productivity or via a change in food 
choices. Increasing the productivity of food-production might be possible in some 
regions of the world, but mostly via drastic measures (such as the employment of 
chemical fertili ers).  
Highly speciali ed and fertili ed monocultures of biomass might arguably not be 
compatible with the Nuffield principles on Biofuel. oreover, the agricultural 
infrastructure needs to be augmented and needs constant care. The stream of 
maintenance might outweigh the benefit of BECCS, regarding both the increased 
cost and the energy needs. 
Transport and storage safety. The gravest side effects of BECCS arguably occur 
during transport and storage cNutt et al. . There are two kinds of harms 
associated with BECCS: Infliction of local population near CCS sites due to 
exposure to CO2 during the in ection, or long-term CO2 pollution by storage leakage 
edvecky, Lacey and Ashworth Leak pipelines might cause highly 
concentrated carbon dioxide pollution. On the other hand, if storage sites are not safe, 
for example due to seismic activity, leakage may contribute to severe CO2 pollution 
of land and sea habitats. The safety of those storing sites depends on further 
technological observation, like monitoring and early warning systems that would 
enable to evacuate the affected in time. But since both seismic and volcanic activity 
is still not sufficiently predictable, storage of CO2 can never be fully safe. This is true 
for both geological caverns as well as deep-sea storage. While the leakage of the 
former might affect land-animals and humans, the latter might affect sea-animals and 
even the ecosystem ocean as a whole. Having said that, recent studies suggest that 
the probability of leakage is fairly low (Wennersten, Sun and Li If so, future 
decision makers could still decide upon carbon storage. !
Procedural justice: inally, BECCS power plants require a huge amount of upfront 
investments. Controlling BECCS should suffice criteria of procedural ustice, which 
maximi es the right of co-determination of locals. ecisions about CO2 storing sites 
may prove to face similar difficulties as the search for nuclear repositories. At least, 
decisions about the site of growing, processing and storing should aim at being 
consensual, taking the special threat to locals into account.  
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In summary, CCS is prone to issues of both procedural and distributional ustice. 
nefits and side effects of CCS should be distributed fairly, and the governance 
of CCS needs to be democratic and transparent. This does not suggest that 
beneficial CCS deployment is impossible. Rather, the discussion above might 
indicate further research questions for beneficial CCS deployment.  
Recent examples of scholars exploring the possibility of beneficial (an morally 
sound) CCS deployment are her and ough (2012) and Medveky et al. (2014). 
her and ough (2012) introduce guidelines, by which the deployment of CCS 
technologies, and mutatis mutandis CCS, can be assessed. Those guidelines rest, 
among others, on central ethical principles about procedural and distribution ustice 
as well as human rights. Medveky et al. (2014) highlight central moral issues with 
CCS, and categorize them, especially with regard to transport and storage safety. 
Research in this direction could help to further strengthen the case for beneficial 
CCS deployment.  
 
(Finitude Thesis) Option B only allows for finite BECCS deployment;  
(No-better-option Thesis) There is no option OÕ which is finite and which leads to 
climate goal 4 and which is better than option B.  
In light of insufficient mitigation, there might be no other way than to deploy 
CCS (or other negative emission technologies) in order to reach the two-degree 
target. This complies with the results of a recent meta-study by uss et al. (2014). 
uss et al. shows, how many models consistent with the two-degree target assume 
future use of CC. The authors think this to be an alarming result, since both the 
effectiveness or even the readiness of the technology is not determined yet, hence 
relying on CCS as a potential way to reduce immediate mitigation pressure might 
be risky (also Kartha and Dooley 2016). The no-better-option thesis might turn out to 
be true, but only because CCS may present itself as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
With regard to finitude, there is no indication in the scenario introduced above 
(Section 4.2) (van Vuuren 2013 and 2016) that CCS will end before 2100. In 
accordance with my understanding of finitude, which also implies practical 
controllability, CCS in policy option is not finite. This alone should be reason 
to re ect the possibility of CCS as being a -deployment, since it violates at least 
one premise of the argument: the finitude thesis. 
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(No-Impediment Thesis) BECCS in option B does not lead to less mitigation 
compared to mitigation in option B without BECCS.  
The evaluation of this thesis is more difficult than the evaluation of the 
corresponding thesis in an SAI scenario. Because the design of the SAI scenarios was 
especially framed as to not interfere with mitigation efforts, the BECCS scenario at 
hand enables a lessening in mitigation efforts, or rather: It alleviates the negative side 
effects of insufficient mitigation efforts. It is only intuitive to assume BECCS and 
mitigation to be at least partially substitutes.  
The use of BECCS is designed to delay drastic mitigation strategies, hence it can be 
said to it indeed compromise mitigation efforts. To put it differently: The BECCS 
scenario at hand is designed to work under compromised mitigation efforts. On the 
other hand, once these studies are published, there might be a feedback loop that 
even diminishes existing pledges and seduce policy makers to rely even more heavily 
on future BECCS. Already most RCP2.6 projections assume future negative 
emission technologies, mostly BECCS (Fuss et al. 2014). So, by the same token, by 
which the no-better-option thesis becomes plausible, the no-impediment thesis 
becomes implausible.  
The difficulties in assessing the no-impediment thesis are connected to the ability of 
BECCS to serve as a substitute for mitigation. As stated initially (Section 2.2), small-
scale BECCS might be count as a perfect substitute for mitigation. What this could 
mean for the evaluation of the arguments at hand (B1 and B4) shall be further 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
5.5  Results 
In this chapter, four categories of instantiation of the BT-argument have been 
identified. 
 
Plausible Versions (green) 
I have identified two plausible versions of the BT-argument, arguments a2 and a3. In 
those cases, SAI is deemed to be finite, short, beneficial and effective, while not 
interfering with mitigation efforts. This form of moderate and strictly purpose-bound 
SAI may realize the BT-requirements. 
This result is somewhat surprising, because SAI especially has been criticized 
frequently on moral grounds. Nevertheless, a beneficial buying time deployment of 
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SAI might be conceivable, within the given boundaries. It is to be noted that the 
plausibility of this version prominently depends on the effectiveness of mitigation 
efforts. Only if emissions remain within the two-degree budget, a plausible SAI 
deployment is possible. Thus, in addition to the moral obligation to mitigate, it can 
be shown that CE deployment in a BT-framing is only plausible with sufficient 
mitigation.  
 
Implausible Versions (red) 
Five additional SAI-instantiations and one BECCS-instantiation have been identified 
as being implausible. When relating to Goal both SAI and BECCS turn out to be 
superfluous in the respective policy option a and b (argument a and b All other 
SAI-scenarios, which assume emissions to exceed the two-degree budget, become 
implausible (arguments A A2, A3 and A4) Ð they violate both the finitude- as well 
as the no impediment-re rement. If that is true, this result might influence the 
decision making-process, as soon as a time deployment  of SAI in light of 
insufficient mitigation is advocated.  
 
Undecided Versions (light blue) 
For several scenarios, I cannot provide further scientific back up. Those BT-versions 
must remain undecided in the work at hand. Out of six undecided scenarios, five 
belong to BECCS scenarios (arguments b2, B2, b3, B3 and b4). This might indicate 
that there is much more uncertainty regarding BECCS than there is regarding SAI
3
, 
and highlights the need for comprehensive research on BECCS, before it is mutually 
assumed as a potential future negative emission technology. Model-runs could be 
performed under further constraints, such as food security, property rights over land, 
and nature conservation targets (biodiversity). Without such morally relevant 
constraints BECCS modeling might remain abstract. 
 
 
 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
3  Of course, it might be an argumentative bypass to follow from my lack of knowledge that there is 
greater uncertainty with BECCS than with SAI. In this sense, all research is only possible in the 
personal boundaries of knowledge and might be biased. However, a comprehensive scenario analysis 
for BECCS, like the SAI-scenario by MacMartin et al. (2 4) and eith and MacMartin (2 5), has 
of yet not come to my attention. 
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The special case of BECCS (dark blue) 
A BECCS deployment to artificially enhance the emission budget turns out to violate 
at least two BT-requirements: the finitude- and the no-impediment requirement, and 
it may very well also violate the morality requirement. Exactly this case, though, is 
the raison d'tre for the contemplation and research of BECCS deployment 
scenarios. The above discussion has adhered to the strong BT-requirements, leading 
to a rejection of BECCS in light of insufficient mitigation efforts. Chapter 6 will 
trace another route by asking whether the BT-requirements might be too strong for 
the special case of BECCS. 
 
To sum up, there are possible deployment scenarios that resonate with the buying 
time framing. Especially the two SAI cases (argument a2 and a3) might count as 
reasonable instantiations of the BT-argument. However, those scenarios only work if 
(and only if) parallel mitigation efforts take place that themselves will be able to 
reach the two-degree target. As a result, beneficial CE deployment will have to be 
quite limited, purpose bound and finite. Climate option a seems to fulfill those 
criteria. In this portfolio, SAI deployment is an additional strategy to take some 
pressure off or to delay the point in time by which certain goals have to be achieved. 
And Ð going back to the quotes from the ongoing discourse (section 3.1) Ð this is all 
there is to the buying time idea.  
BECCS deployment, on the other hand, poses quite a riddle for the BT-argument, 
even if it seems to be a perfect instantiation at first sight. Especially the no-
impediment thesis might turn out to be too strict for a BECCS.  
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 reventing climate tipping points Reducing pressure 
Avoiding temperature dependent 
tipping points 
Avoiding rate-dependent 
tipping points. 
Reducing adaptation pressure Reducing mitigation pressure. 
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a o-better-option thesis. 
This climate goal amounts to the two-
degree target. If CO2 emissions 
remain within the two-degree budget, 
SAI deployment is superfluous in 
reaching the two-degree target. 
SAI might be able to prevent 
rate depended tipping points, 
while mitigation efforts serve 
to reali e the two-degree 
target. 
SAI might be able to reduce 
the pressure of adaptation, if it 
lessens the rate of temperature 
change, which could generate 
more time for ecosystems and 
human systems to adapt.   
Since mitigation is assumed to be 
ambitious in this case, it is 
unclear, in how far a lessening of 
the rate of temperature change 
might influence mitigation costs. 
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A o-impediment thesis.  
If carbon emissions exceed the two-degree budget, SAI would be used in order to stabili e temperature. It would then be used as a substitute for 
mitigation, impeding mitigation efforts.  
Finitude thesis. 
Because SAI would function as a substitute for mitigation efforts, it would have to be used continuously in order to stabili e temperature. Under the 
assumption of exceeding carbon emissions, SAI would not be finite.   
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b No-better-option thesis. 
This climate goal amounts to the two-
degree target. If CO2 emissions 
remain within the two-degree budget, 
BECCS deployment is superfluous in 
reaching the two-degree target. 
hether BECCCS can 
influence the rate of 
temperature change, cannot 
be decided within the scope 
of this work.  
If additional BECCS can 
influence the rate of change, it 
might also reduce adaptation 
pressure.   
hile emission would remain 
within the two-degree budget, 
BECCS could be used to further 
reduce the time pressure for 
mitigation. Research for BECCS 
together with sufficient mitigation 
has not been reviewed for this 
research thesis.  
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B The special case of BECCS.  
BECCS in light of insufficient 
mitigation might be used to stabili e 
temperature change. It might however 
violate several BT-requirements. A 
weak version of the BT-argument 
could incorporate this case.  
 
Especially in light of 
insufficient mitigation, it 
cannot be decided here, 
whether BECCCS can 
influence the rate of 
temperature change. 
Especially in light of 
insufficient mitigation, it is 
unclear, whether BECCS can 
reduce adaptation pressure.   
The special case of BECCS.  
BECCS in light of insufficient 
mitigation might be used to 
reduce mitigation pressure as it 
enhances the emission budget. It 
might however violate several 
BT-requirements. A weak version 
of the BT-argument could 
incorporate this case.  
Table 10 (same as Table 2). Full table of instantiation of the BT-argument.  
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Chapter 6 Deepened Analysis of the Buying Time 
Argument 
 
According to the analysis in Chapter there are two possible deployment scenarios 
that resonate with the buying time framing: A moderate, time limited SAI 
deployment in order to either reduce adaptation pressure (argument a3) or to reduce 
rate-induced climate impacts (argument a2). However, those scenarios are plausible 
only if parallel mitigation efforts take place that themselves will be able to reach the 
two-degree target. As a result, beneficial SAI deployment will have to be quite 
limited, purpose-bound and finite, as the authors of the scenario acknowledge 
(MacMartin et al. 2014). In this scenario, SAI deployment is viewed as an additional 
strategy to take some pressure off or to delay the point in time, by which certain 
climate goals, like adaptation measures, have to be realized. And Ð going back to the 
quotes from the ongoing discourse (Section 3.2) Ð this is all there is to the buying 
time idea.  
BECCS deployment, on the other hand, poses quite a challenge for the BT-argument. 
The hope that BECCS may be used to reach the two-degree target even in face of 
poor mitigation efforts (arguments B1 and B4), is essentially the raison d'tre for the 
contemplation and research of BECCS deployment scenarios. However, at least two 
BT-requirements are not plausible in those instantiations: the no-impediment thesis 
and the finitude thesis. As argued in Section 3.2, it is exactly those requirements that 
constitute the core of the BT-argument. This imposes a dilemmatic choice: Either the 
strong BT-requirements are maintained, leading to a rejection of the desired BECCS 
scenario(s), or the BT-requirements are watered down, establishing a ea  buying 
time argument, with the danger of allowing undesired scenarios to count as BT-
scenarios as well.  
The first horn of the dilemma Ð the rejection of the BECCS scenario(s) on grounds of 
the strong BT-requirements Ð has been traced in the previous section (Section 
The next section will try to reformulate the BT-argument so as to capture the BECCS 
scenario (Section 6.1). Especially the possibility of acceptable substitution between 
BECCS and mitigation will be further examined.  
Finally and lastly, the research thesis at hand scrutinizes general moral constraints on 
CE deployment. This will be discussed by means of the two plausible SAI-
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instantiations (argument a2 and a3). The question is  If every of the strong BT-
requirement is plausibly met, could CE deployment still be morally wrong? I will 
focus on two general moral objections to CE deployment  the hubris- and the techno-
fix argument (Section 6.2) and show how a moderate, finite SAI deployment might 
not be susceptible to those general moral concerns. 
 
6.1  Weak buying time argument 
The hope that BECCS may be used to realize the two-degree target even in face of 
poor mitigation efforts is eventually the raison d'tre for the contemplation and 
research of BECCS deployment scenarios. As discussion in Section has shown, 
however, if the strong BT-requirements are applied, such scenarios must be rejected. 
It might be argued, then, that in such cases the BT-argument is too strong and that the 
BT-argument should be reformulated in order to capture the BECCS scenarios. This 
would yield two respective versions  a strong BT-argument and a weak BT-
argument. In what follows, a weak version is established. Especially two BT-theses 
become implausible in arguments B1 and  the finitude thesis and the no-
impediment thesis. In order to establish a different version of those theses it is 
worthwhile to reconsider the assumptions, which shaped their formulation in the first 
place (Section 3.2). They can be called supporting theses, as they support the BT-
argument directly.  
The assumptions backing the finitude thesis are  
 
¥ (Transition Anyway) Successful decarbonization of society is anticipated. 
Eventually, a low- or no-carbon society is thought to be reality, making 
artificial counter-balances to the CO2 circle superfluous.  
¥ (No Substitute) If decarbonization is successful in the end, CE deployment 
will cease, since it will no longer be needed to counteract insufficient 
emission cuts. This means that CE of any kind would only be deployed 
additionally to a comprehensive mitigation pathway, not instead of one. A 
non-finite CE deployment would amount to a substitute for mitigation efforts, 
which is not acceptable within the BT-framing. 
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¥ (Controllability) Finitude implies some form of practical controllability. 
Deployment scenarios that point to well beyond the end of this century, may 
be finite in theory, but are not controllable in a practical sense.  
 
The assumptions that led to the formulation of the no-impediment thesis are: 
 
¥  (Mitigation Obligation) The current generation has the moral obligation to 
drastically reduce their CO2 emissions within the next few decades. This 
obligation holds even in face of possible CE deployment.  
¥ (No Substitute) If decarbonization is successful in the end, CE deployment 
will cease, since it will no longer be needed to counteract insufficient 
emission cuts. This means that CE of any kind would only be deployed 
additionally to a comprehensive mitigation pathway, not instead of one. A 
non-finite CE deployment would amount to a substitute for mitigation efforts, 
which is not acceptable within the BT-framing. 
 
Rejecting the strong version of the BT-argument and instead adopting a weak version 
would imply that at least one of the supporting theses is implausible. It seems to me 
that especially the no-substitute thesis may not hold in case of BECCS: BECCS 
might quite well function as an acceptable substitute for mitigation, as will be 
discussed below. 
A weak BT-principle could read like this: 
 
Buying Time*-Principle (BT*-Principle) 
If: i. Climate goal G is desirable, ii. option O leads to climate goal G and is beneficial 
in so doing so, iii. CE in O is a perfect substitute for mitigation in O, iv. there are no 
general moral constraints on option O; 
then: option O should be adopted.  
 
Most notably, the no-impediment thesis was replaced by the requirement to function 
as a perfect substitute (requirement iii):  
 
iii. CE in O is a perfect substitute for mitigation in O (substitute thesis). 
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Also, the finitude thesis and the no-better-option thesis have been removed. Both 
theses seem to be at odds with the notion of CE serving as a perfect substitute for 
mitigation. The no-better-option thesis implies that any option reaching goal G 
without CE should be preferred to an option including CE (Section 3.2). But if CE in 
portfolio O is used as a perfect substitute for some amount of mitigation, option O is 
as desirable as the possible option OÕ without CE. Similarly, the finitude thesis can 
be removed, if BECCS is a perfect substitute that can be carried out indefinitely. So, 
both theses have been declined for the sake of the substitute thesis.  
For the specification of what Ôperfect substituteÕ amounts to, I will recall the 
definition given in Section 2.2, by Baatz and Ott (2016): 
 
ÒStrategy Y is a perfect substitute for mitigation if it avoids all negative climatic effects 
resulting from GHG emissions, without thereby creating other harms or risks.Ó 
(Baatz and Ott 2016, p. 99f.) 
 
Does the BECCS overshoot-scenario (climate option B) resonate with the weak BT-
argument? Is the substitute thesis plausible? 
The BECCS scenario introduced in Section 4.2 (van Vuuren et al. 2013) was 
designed to close the emission gap current mitigation efforts seem to generate. It 
assumes the reduction potential of BECCS to be -6 Gt CO2/yr and -10 Gt CO2/yr, 
respectively (van Vuuren et al. 2013, p. 18). This is well below the maximum 
reduction potential, which other authors assume to be as high as 18 Gt CO2/yr 
(McNutt et al. 2015b). As mentioned before, the potential of BECCS is limited by 
the availability of arable land and by infrastructure including fresh water access and 
fertilization. In a recent study, Smith and Torn (2013) calculated a BECCS scenario 
with a specific type of plant (switchgrass) with focus on water and fertilizer-
requirement. In order to remove 3.7 Gt CO2/yr from the atmosphere (which is much 
less than the necessary 6Gt CO2/yr in the emission-gap scenario!), the magnitude of 
all three factors would be exorbitant: 200 million hectare of land which is 20 times 
the area currently used in the US for bioethanol production, 20% of the global 
production of fertilizer (20 Tg/yr of nitrogen) and 4% of global renewable water 
resources (4,000 km3/yr) (Smith and Torn 2013, McNutt et al. 2015b). 
Even a fraction of the assumed mitigation potential in van VuurenÕs scenario might 
turn out to be strenuous on the environment as well as competitive regarding land-
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availability and infrastructure. The side effects of such a scenario make it 
questionable, whether BECCS is effective and beneficial and could possibly count as 
a perfect substitute for mitigation.  
This does not rule out other, less strenuous BECCS scenarios. Those might be 
considerably downsized, and might have a significantly lower mitigation potential. 
So, in theory, beneficial BECCS is conceivable, that could also serve as a perfect 
substitute for mitigation. Yet, the mitigation potential of such deployment scheme 
might not be enough to close the emission gap, hence, it might not prove to be 
effective in a very basic sense. The BECCS-deployment in question, which is 
assumed to close the emission gap (option B, arguments B1 and B4), is due to its 
magnitude no perfect substitute. Even a weak version of the buying time argument 
does not render arguments B1 and B4 plausible. 
Additionally, I wish to argue that the rejection of the finitude thesis poses a serious 
problem for any anticipated deployment of CE as a means to buy time. As said 
before, the transition anyway thesis lies at the heart of the buying time argument: 
Only if the prospect of a decarbonized society is taken seriously, CE-deployment can 
be framed as being an auxiliary measure, a temporary stopgap to buy time. Climate 
goal 4 (reducing mitigation pressure) itself can only be formulated, if mitigation as 
part of decarbonizing the economy is seen as the primary political goal, of which the 
reduction of pressure is the secondary goal. If the finitude thesis is not taken into 
consideration, this supposed weak BT-framing might jeopardize a fundamental 
transition of society (see also Muraca and Neuber 2017). #
The weak version of the BT-argument allows for (some amount of) substitution 
between CE and mitigation. A rampant substitution, though, might negatively 
influence the pursuit of decarbonization. A trade-off between mitigation efforts and 
CE measures is at least a possibility (Baatz 2016, see also chapter 2.3). As soon as 
CE measures are framed as viable substitute for emission cuts, mitigation efforts 
might decline (Corner and Pidgeon 2010, Betz and Cacean 2012, Hale 2012, Baatz 
2016). If furthermore, CE measures are not required to be temporally limited, a 
fundamental transition of society might not be undertaken Ð indefinite and acceptable 
substitution via CE could enable current modes of production and consumption to 
persist. How true is the buying time framing under those assumptions?  
 
ãWould [CE technologies] be used as a stop-gap measure to buy time for a societal 
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transformation to a carbon-free economy, shaving off the worst effects of climate 
change along the way? Or as a substitute for this transformation, allowing for business 
as usual to continue?Ò  
(Schfer et al. 2014, p. 243) 
 
How these questions are answered, seems to be a question of faith. Bunzl (2009) for 
example argues very strongly against a moral hazard, i.e. the danger of diminishing 
mitigation efforts in light of CE.  
 
ÒMoral hazard only arises for geoengineering if you think that research or, if it came to 
it, implementation would undermine other actions and lead to more, not less 
greenhouse gas output. That seems far-fetched since, at least among policy makers, 
nobody believes that geoengineering offers anything but a relatively short stopgap to 
buy time for other action.Ó 
(Bunzl 2009, p. 2) 
 
The above quotes show, again, how dearly connected the idea of decarbonizing 
society is to the idea of a finite CE-deployment. It is the finitude of CE deployment 
that correlates to the transition of society Ð a transition that is deemed to be both 
necessary as well as inevitable by most authors. CE deployment beyond any 
practically controllable time frame (like the BECCS-scenario in option B) might 
equally push a decarbonization of society into a distant future.  
 
ÒThe transition to a low-carbon society must not be delayed any longer. The climate 
crisis is already here and considerable CO2 emission reductions must be made 
immediately. Developing and evaluating geoengineering will waste valuable time: this 
will not mean buying time, but rather spending or losing it. This is why the countries 
of the world cannot afford geoengineering. The discourse critical of geoengineering 
claims that geoengineering opportunities could result in the avoidance of CO2 
emission reductions and delay the necessary mitigation of climate change. 
Geoengineering is a way of postponing the unavoidable structural change of 
contemporary society.Ó  
(Anshelm and Hansson 2014, p. 142) 
 
The moral relevance of not imposing a dilemma on future generations has been 
established in light of the mitigation obligation (Section 2.2). Postponing the needed 
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decarboni ation of our society might constitute an equally inadmissible risk transfer 
to future generations.  
Another problem related to intergenerational ustice is connected to carbon storage in 
the BECCS scenario. Confronted with deep uncertainty, current decision-makers 
cannot oversee all possible incidents and side effects related to carbon storage. In this 
sense, BECCS passes down the buck to future generations. It defuses the current 
problem of CO2 emissions into a future problem of artificial carbon sinks.  
In this light, BECCS will only buy time in a very diffuse and speculative sense. In 
order to be more than a lip service, I urge that the BT-argument should include 
requirements about both finitude and controllability. 
This summari es the considerations about an alternative, weak version of the BT-
argument. A weak BT-argument would not incorporate any finitude requirement and 
would allow for (some form of) substitution. I have argued that the special case of 
BECCS as a means to close the emission gap, would not count as permissible 
substitution, due to its magnitude Ð it would not be plausible even under a weak BT-
argument. urthermore, I have argued that the finitude thesis is dearly connected to 
one crucial assumption of the BT-framing: the transition anyway thesis. Refraining 
from the finitude requirement might influence potential policy choices as to delay a 
needed decarboni ation of society. While a non-finite BECCS deployment might still 
be morally admissible, if not plain necessary, it is no buying time  deployment as of 
my understanding. The weak version of the buying time argument is not an 
alternative, but no buying time argument at all.  
 
6.2  General moral constraints 
Two plausible instantiations of the (strong) BT-argument have been identified: 
argument a2 and a3. Both arguments assume drastic mitigation ensuring CO2 
emissions to remain within the two-degree budget with additional SAI deployment to 
limit the rate of temperature change. The evaluation of the arguments, however, was 
not completed as to include the last thesis Ð the morality thesis. This shall be done in 
the next section. I will discuss two general moral arguments against CE-deployment 
specified for the SAI scenarios at hand: the hubris argument and the techno-fix 
argument.  
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6.2.1 Hubris argument 
One general moral argument against the deployment of CE has been brought forward 
from the viewpoint of virtue ethics. The hubris or playing-god argument states that 
we should not engage in any CE scheme, for the scope of the endeavor is just beyond 
our human understanding. Trying to control the climate system, even for a limited 
period of time, would be a sign of hubris, in that it ignores the role we humans play 
on this planet. The hubris-argument has been one of the earliest virtue ethical 
arguments against the deployment of CE (Jamieson 1996, Ott 2010, Gardiner 2010, 
Owen 2014).  
A common perception of the hubris framing is that man should not aim at interfering 
with a given natural order. Order in nature is more than arbitrary; it is in itself 
valuable and hence refers to Ð if not a divine being Ð a metaphysical system. Such a 
version of the hubris argument lacks an essential deductive step from any sort of 
metaphysical order to the fact that we as humans need to respect it (Levine 2014). 
While the accusation of hubris comes easy, only a handful of philosophers have 
advanced this argument to the full. A very recent exception is the work of Meyer and 
Uhle (2014), in which they try to justify the virtue ethical heuristic for the evaluation 
of CE. Their definition of hubris reads like this: 
 
ãPersons (or groups of persons) show hubris, if they act with a reprehensible 
overestimation of their abilities.Ò 
 (Meyer and Uhle 2015, p. 5) 
 
The authors suggest that this concept might serve as a heuristic for the topic of CE, 
in that is highlights certain aspects of technology deployment that otherwise would 
be hidden. Hubris as defined by Meyer and Uhle (2015) does not rely on any 
metaphysical order. Rather, it is connected to epistemic virtues of what we can 
possibly know. From this perspective, hubris ought to be avoided because it presents 
a failure and a vice: The failure lies in the misjudgment of the probability of CE 
research results, the vice lies in the recklessness of advocating controllability of CE 
despite the epistemic failure. 
Misjudgment about probabilities is in itself not reprehensible, but rather inevitable 
and quite common among human beings. Scientists know rather well that the scope 
of their models is limited, that the climate system is too complex to fully understand 
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and that there are still numerous unknown factors that may lead to unintended side-
effects when pursuing intentional climate manipulation.  
 as evine (2014) has stated recently, those concerns could be best described as a 
consequentialist argument. Such an argument would not rely on a virtue ethical 
heuristic, but rather would include precautionary thinking when irreducible 
uncertainties are at stake.  
Thusly understood, the argument reconstruction that has been proposed by tz and 
Cacean (2012, p. 120) could serve to capture the hubris-framing in a consequentialist 
manner: 
 
Irreducible Uncertainties 
1. There are ma or irreducible uncertainties regarding the effectiveness and side 
effects of CE deployment. 
2. Irreducible uncertainties cannot be reduced through furthe D
38
. 
3. If uncertainties regarding the effectiveness and side effects cannot be reduced, 
neither can effectiveness be guaranteed nor can catastrophic side effects be 
excluded. 
4. TH S: It is not true that: urther D into the CE technology T may (a) 
ensure its effectiveness and (b) exclude catastrophic side effects of its 
deployment. 
 
This argument can be used to ob ect the effectiveness thesis of the -argument. It 
shows, that the hubris argument can be re-formulated as a prudent consequentialist 
argument under uncertainty that asks us to obtain from any consequences that might 
have harmful consequences and that we cannot decide upon. Many scholars would 
either endorse this argument or criticize it on grounds of the empirical premises (1) 
and (2). Evaluation of those two premises then would constitute the main focus of 
future debate.  
Having said this, I wish to highlight a different aspect of the argument, which goes 
beyond the evaluation of its empirical premises and relates to the hubris heuristic 
proposed by Meyer and hle (2014). While the trouble with uncertainties 
surrounding CE can be captured via the consequentialist argument above, within the 
######################################## ####################
38 R D stands for research and development. 
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hubris framing, the mis udgment of the boundaries of our knowledge is not simply an 
epistemic failure, but a vice Ð it is reckless  
The recklessness lies in the fact that against better judgment the knowledge gap is 
ignored (Meyer and hle 2014, p. 6). The virtue ethical framing of the uncertainty 
argument urges us to be more moderate, even humble about our knowledge of the 
natural system and our ability to control it Ð and the lack thereof. It urges us to weigh 
our lack of knowledge in those delicate systems higher than the amount of what we 
actually do know Ð because it may be dangerous, if we donÕt. ossible dangerous 
side effect of CE deployment might arise because of a specific mind-set, which 
overestimates what we know and underestimates what we donÕt. So in essence, the 
hubris framing suggests a certain udgment about our gap of knowledge. This 
udgment, the internal assessment of the data we have, is determined by (epistemic) 
virtues. So, the virtue ethical argument of hubris asks us to udge our knowledge in a 
specific way. It hence is not an alternative to the consequentialist Ôirreducible 
uncertaintiesÕ argument above, which is based on a decision principle under 
uncertainty, but it asks us to weigh this uncertainty in a specific way. There is no 
need to appeal to a metaphysical preorder to make the hubris argument work.  
While there are rational decision principles for uncertain settings (like the 
precautionary principle), the hubris framing as a virtue ethical argument urges us to 
make those precautionary considerations a priority when weighting the arguments 
pro and con CE deployment. In this sense, it serves as a meta-argumentative 
guideline about the status of arguments, in that it weighs the argument about 
irreducible uncertainty stronger than other arguments, like arguments about 
effectiveness. 
A hubristic SAI deployment could be avoided, if the reckless ignorance of 
uncertainties is ruled out. MacMartin and Keith (2014), the authors of the SAI-
deployment scenario adopted in arguments a2 and a3, seem to think that they have 
done so. They include a learning curve and ask SAI deployment to be responsive, so 
that new information can lead to a modification or even the decline of SAI 
deployment
39
. While the hubris-argument has moral force in evaluating SAI 
deployment, it might arguably be met by a careful and modest deployment-scheme Ð 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
39 If SAI deployment was modified, because observation has suggested inacceptable impacts, the 
responsibility for those impacts of past deployment still remains. If liability is not determined, even a 
learning curve might not guarantee fair and beneficial SAI deployment. 
CHAPTER 6 ÐDEEPE ED A AL SIS OF THE BU I G TIME ARGUME T 
!!"!#
the hubris argument is not a general moral constraint to plausible BT-deployment 
scenarios. 
 
6.2.2 Techno-fix argument 
An alternative framing of the buying time idea refers to CE as the econd-best 
soluti  for climate change. It states that if there is a problem, but our first choice is 
not at our disposal (yet), we need to adopt another option, given that second solution 
has no moral restrictions. In our daily lives, we act on base of such a principle of the 
second-best choice frequently. In political contexts and collective decision-making, 
the same principle can and must apply. A special version of this principle arises in 
cases, where social issues cannot be settled by social means alone and a technical 
solution to those problems seems apt.  
Weinberg (1991) has concerned himself with those technological fixes  to social 
problems. His question was: ÒTo what extend can social problems be circumvented 
by reducing them to technological problems  (Weinberg 1991, p. 42).  
Weinberg deems the reframing or redefining of some social problems as technical 
ones to be very promising. Social problems tend to be very complex and solving 
them might require changes at the individual behavioral level of members of society, 
which is hard to achieve. On the other hand, technological fixes are clear cut, easy 
and seemingly effective solutions to some social problems. They can be applied 
independent of individuals. As an example for a beneficial technological fix, 
Weinberg mentions the introduction of the seat belt against car accident deaths.  
He is, however, very clear about the limitation of those technological fixes. Social 
problems need to be solved by social means eventually, and technological fixes are 
always a second best choice. 
 
ÒTechnology will never replace social engineering. But technology has provided and 
will continue to provide to the social engineer broader options, to make intractable 
social problems less intractable; perhaps, most of all, technology will buy time Ð that 
precious commodity that converts violent social revolution into acceptable social 
evolution.Ò  
(Weinberg 1991, p. 4 ) 
 
For Weinberg one of the most beneficial features of a technological fix is that it may 
buy more time for social transition. The time generating quality of technological 
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fixes lies at the heart of the BT-argument in favor of CE, as has been demonstrated 
thoroughly. So, the technological fix framing is related to the buying time argument. 
But it is also clear from the above quote that a technological fix cannot serve as a 
substitute for a social solution Ð the same has been shown for CE and mitigation. 
Scott has dubbed the fear associated with a misinterpreted technological fix the 
Ôtechno-fixÕ-objection (Scott 2012): The reckless use of CE, without dealing with the 
underlying social problem, or even worsening it. This is the danger that lies within 
the technological fix argument and arguably also with the buying time argument, if 
the BT-requirements are not met or watered down, and CE is used as a substitute for 
mitigation (Section 6.1). 
Some form of SAI deployment might be used as a stopgap measure to buy more time 
for social transition Ð this is what the BT-argument shows. But when does the BT-
argument support a Ôcheap techno-fixÕ? Techno-fixes are deemed to be a way of 
delaying the problem, not solving it, since they do not address the root cause of the 
problem, and advocates of the techno-fix framing would reject CE deployment as 
inherently flawed. 
 
Ò[Solutions] to environmental problems like climate change could never be powerful 
technologies like SRM. Western societies must challenge their fundamental values and 
worldview to find solution to climate change.Ó  
(Scott 2012, p. 161)  
 
This Ôwestern worldviewÕ that ought to be changed, arguably amounts to the notion 
that business as usual can be continued and that our modes of production and 
consumption can be upheld, though possibly by different means. Concepts like green 
growth or sustainable consumption are accompanied with the promise that a lifestyle 
change is not needed, but rather that economic, yet sustainable growth guarantees 
perpetual, environmental friendly wealth. The notion of Ôgreen growthÕ has been 
challenged frequently. Brand calls green growth the Ònext oxymoronÓ (Brand 2012), 
and Grunwald argues that sustainable consumerism is no silver bullet to Òsave the 
environmentÓ, but instead that the paradigm of consumption and growth has to be 
changed altogether by political and legal means (Grunwald 2015). A different 
economic setup like the degrowth framing could enable a comprehensive technology 
assessment of such technologies, in order to rule out the nave technophile believe 
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that technological progress can take center stage in solving the ecological crisis at 
hand (Grunwald 2016). 
This line of thought resonates with the idea of Section 6.1, which identified the 
transition anyway thesis to be essential to the buying time argument, in that a 
transition of society mustnÕt be delayed by possible CE deployment. Only if a 
fundamental transition of society is underway, CE-deployment might not be 
suspected to be a Ôtechno-fixÕ. The finitude requirement in the BT-argument serves to 
ensure this, as it both assumes and enables a general transition of modes of 
production and consumption. If it can be plausibly met, BT-deployment of CE might 
not be object to the general suspicion of Ôtechno-fixingÕ our way out of climate 
change
40
. 
The techno-fix objection is a general critique of the attitudes supposedly visible in 
CE deployment. In this view, CE deployment would in each case be an inadmissible 
delay of real solutions to climate change, namely fast and far reaching mitigation. If, 
on the other hand, it were possible to reach the two-degree target with mitigation 
alone, CE might indeed not be needed at all:   
 
 Ò(The discourse critical of CE) emphasizes that there is no need for geoengineering: 
existing technologies and renewables would surely be sufficient to considerably 
decrease CO2 emissions if they were deployed worldwide. However, this would 
require radical systemic change, which the governments of the world are unwilling or 
unable to accept. This is where geoengineering presents itself as a pseudo solution, 
maintaining the status quo or, in the long run, possibly even worsening the global 
climate crisisÓ  
(Anshelm 2014, p. 139) 
 
However, especially in light of sufficient mitigation, a buying time deployment can 
be justified. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the BT-argument also addresses the 
secondary climate goal of reducing pressure. Arguably, reducing the pressure for 
mitigation only then makes sense, when mitigation is indeed undertaken. 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
40 While I have frequently used the terms decarbonization, transition of society and the like, 
decarbonization arguably does not necessarily include a redistribution of wealth, or generate a just 
form of production. To further substantiate the techno-fix argument, different assessment patterns 
could be applied. The degrowth framing might be helpful, when evaluating CE in front of different 
social and economic assumptions (Muraca and Neuber 2017). 
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aradoxically, it might not be valid to re ect CE deployment in face of sufficient 
mitigation. 
To sum up, the techno-fix argument does not ob ect the plausible SAI-instantiations 
of the BT-argument (argument a2 and a3), because 1) the design of a plausible BT-
deployment incorporates a transformation towards decarbonization and 2) CE in this 
instantiation aims at realizing the secondary climate goal of reducing pressure. 
 
6.3  Results 
The possibility of acceptable substitution between BECCS and mitigation has been 
examined in Section 6.1. Due to the magnitude of BECCS deployment in order to 
close the emission gap visible in current mitigation pledges, BECCS would have to 
be deployed large-scale. The associated side effects, uncertainties and risks rule out 
that large-scale BECCS can count as a perfect substitute for mitigation. Even a weak 
version of the BT-argument, which would allow for some form of substitution, does 
not become plausible for climate option B (BECCS and insufficient mitigation).  
On the other hand, two general moral constraints, the hubris argument and the 
techno-fix argument, were shown to not automatically lead to a re ection of the 
plausible instantiations of the strong BT-argument. Regarding the plausible 
instantiations of the BT-argument, the Ôtechno-fixÕ ob ection can be met if it is made 
sure that: 
1. line in current mitigation efforts takes place  
2. Serious mitigation as part of a shift in society is already underwa  
3. The termination of CE at a defined point in time will be guaranteed. 
Those are arguably quite ambitious goals. But if the BT-argument is to work, it 
should not leave room for empty promises. This leads to the tentative conclusion: 
Beneficial and acceptable BT-deployment of CE technologies might theoretically be 
possible, but the practical limitations and the imperfect moral nature of our political 
decisions set the bar fairly high.$
Some form of negative emission technologies might be necessary to reach the two-
degree target. We might find ourselves in the situation where we might have to use 
BECCS (and even SAI) in order to manage climate change and avoid catastrophic 
impacts. This might even be done in a beneficial manner. But we shouldnÕt fool 
ourselves by calling it a buying time deployment. In this case, CE would no longer 
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serve as a stopgap measure, as so many authors would like to believe, but as a 
substitute for our failure to change our ways of production and consumption in time. 
The euphemism Ôbuying timeÕ might then only serve to make us feel better, but it 
should not deceive about the fact that we have existentially failed in our mission to 
live on this planet without Ôfouling our nestÕ. $
$ $
CHAPTER 6 ÐDEEPENED ANALYSIS OF THE BUYING TIME ARGUMENT 
! "#$
$ $
CHAPTER 7 ÐCONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
!!"#$
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In the research thesis at hand, I have evaluated the buying time argument in favor of 
CE-deployment. I was able to identify two plausible instantiations of the argument 
with respect to SAI deployment and have discussed the option of beneficial BECCS 
deployment as a means to buy time. The main results can be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
¥ Moderate, finite SAI can be a plausible instantiation of the BT-argument. 
¥ Only if mitigation efforts guarantee the realization of the two-degree target does 
the BT-argument become plausible. The BT-argument becomes implausible if its 
central assumption about decarbonization is dropped or watered down.  
¥ BECCS in order to reduce mitigation pressure in light of insufficient mitigation 
is not an instance of the BT-argument, as it violates the finitude requirement as 
well as the no-impediment requirement. 
¥ Such BECCS deployment could nevertheless be acceptable as well as plain 
necessary Ð it just will not be an instantiation of the BT-argument. 
¥ A weak version of the BT-argument is no BT-argument at all. The finitude 
requirement as well as the no-impediment requirement, which both depend on 
the assumption of decarbonizing society, are essential to the buying time idea.  
This brings us back to the initial research questions: Can climate engineering help 
provide more time for an ambitious mitigation program? And if so, is a buying time 
deployment of climate engineering morally acceptable? The answer to the first 
question must be no. A strong version of the buying time argument becomes 
plausible only if serious mitigation is already underway. CE cannot buy time for an 
ambitious mitigation program, as exactly this mitigation program must be 
presupposed for the BT-argument to become plausible. CE (SAI specifically) can 
merely help buy time for adaptation, as it might reduce the rate of global temperature 
change. This result indicates that the buying time framing of CE is overly optimistic 
and deceives about its underlying assumptions. While a nave BT-framing might 
make the evaluation of CE in general more positive (Section 1.1), a scrutinized BT-
argument is very clear about the limitations, difficulties and drawbacks of a possible 
BT-deployment. 
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The answer to the second question, however, is yes. There are at least two 
instantiations of the BT-argument that are both plausible and morally acceptable. 
This result should not be overstrained, though. The two plausible instantiations of the 
BT-argument (argument a2 and a3) are rather limited in their scope and length of 
time, and assume drastic emission cuts that remain within the two-degree budget 
(without an overshoot). 
A large number of questions still remain unresolved: 
¥ There is the need for further research into BECCS scenarios that fully resonate 
with the BT-approach. Under what circumstances can BECCS realize its 
associated goal to reduce mitigation pressure without turning into a mere 
substitute for mitigati  Under what circumstances is BECCS only a heap 
techno-fixÕ, and under what circumstances a helpful stopgap measure   
¥ Research on moderate and realistic SAI deployment should equally continue. 
articular attention should be given to the legal, including mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the no impediment-requirement (that is, continued mitigation 
efforts even in light of SAI). 
¥ Similarly, I have argued that the techno-fix-objection can be met, if mitigation 
efforts stay constantly high and the termination of CE is ensured. To guarantee 
this, certain legal and political measures ought to be established. A climate 
engineering treaty that involves conditions for CE deployment might be 
conceivable. 
¥ Establishing a strong mitigation obligation continues to be the focus of climate 
ethics. articularily in light of the BT-argument, the mitigation obligation can 
further be strengthened. A connection to the trade-off argument (see section 2.3.) 
in light of the BT-argument can also be drawn and should be further explored.  
¥ The virtue ethical stance and the weighting of arguments play an important role 
in assessing the BT-argument. Research here might prove to be of interest for 
argumentation theory in general as well as practical philosophy. 
There are numerous links to current philosophical research areas, which I will 
selectively highlight below: 
Argumentation theory. I have written above that the virtue ethical hubris argument 
against CE deployment urges us to be moderate, even humble about our knowledge of 
natural systems, and especially the lack thereof. The virtue ethical framing of the hubris 
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argument gives a special weight to the argument about irreducible uncertainties (Section 
6.2.1). In this sense, it might serve as a meta-ethical guideline about the status of 
arguments. This opens up a new line of thoughts: hich role do attitudes play in 
weighing reasons  
A meta-theoretical argument-principle to incorporate this idea could be established. 
It would be applicable to the theory of dialectical structures (Betz 2010). Such a 
principle could reside on the macro-level of the debate, as it would describe a 
weighting-relation between (groups of) arguments.  
 
(Weighting-principle) iven attitude H in debate !, argument a1 in ! is preferred 
to argument a2 in !. 
 
Attitude H is in essence a preference relation on a given dialectical structure ! (for 
the nomenclature see Section 1.2). It might go further than stance attribution (Betz 
2009), and might also give a different insight than the concept of degree of 
ustification (Betz 2012b). The degree of ustification is an internal assessment 
mechanism that yields a numerical result for given finite dialectical structure. The 
preference relation H, on the other hand, might serve as a alitative measure, taking 
the semantic structure of the arguments into account. H might then be further 
specified, determining its attributes like transitivity and completeness.  
Such research could be part of the ongoing extension of knowledge in argumentation 
theory.  
 
Virtue ethics. Naturally, such meta-arguments belong to the realm of virtue ethics. 
irtue ethics seem to play an important role in a number of fields of practical ethics, 
such as environmental ethics (Di Paola 2015).  
If what has been demonstrated in terms of the hubris argument is true, virtue ethical 
arguments might serve as meta-arguments that enable proponents of a debate to 
weight single arguments in a certain way. If the hubris-argument in its meta-
argumentative form is believed to be true, arguments about uncertainty gain prima 
facie more force, than, say, effectiveness considerations.  
However, when does a proponent adhere to such virtue ethical meta-considerations  
The problem about virtue ethical arguments is the stion of how convincing they 
are to a person who does not share the same virtue ethical intuitions as the person 
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advancing the respective virtue ethical argument evine ). Which virtue ethical 
argument a person finds compelling arguably depends on her attitude (hexis in 
Aristotelian terms). This does not mean that attitudes are arbitrary or that they belong 
to the realm of a kind of moral nything goes . How far one can argue in favor of 
certain attitudes has been of focus in recent philosophical research (e.g. urbacher 
 
Education. The discussion of attitudes, or of hexis, is part of current philosophical 
research. Attitudes shape our evaluation patterns, they influence our thinking at a 
very fundamental level, and eventually enable us to formulate a judgment. Certainly, 
attitudes are not arbitrary, and desirable attitudes ought to be identified. But how 
does one obtain one  attitude  How does one argue in favor of a certain attitude  
And lastly, if it is true that attitudes are rather subconscious, and in a way 
inaccessible to rational thinking, how can attitudes even be addressed through 
reasoni  Eventually, this might transgress the realm of philosophical research and 
might fall into the practical sphere of education. Successful education can enable the 
individual to formulate well-founded judgments developing her powers to decide on 
which attitudes she adopts. Hence, a virtue-ethical approach might also be concerned 
with the stion of education, both on the theoretical as well as on the practical 
level.  
 
Degrowth. One central assumption of the buying time argument is the inevitable 
decarbonization of society. However, in what terms this change in production and 
consumption is to come about is undetermined in this argument. In particular, further 
political implications of decarbonization are not addressed, such as the fair 
distribution of wealth. Shifting current economies towards net zero does not 
necessarily imply that such economies will be more just, for example regarding the 
standard of living, or that they will have a higher level of nature conservation or be 
more environmentally friendly. Pollution and exploitation of the vulnerable (the 
environment, animals, native people or people of the third world) might still occur in 
a global carbon-neutral economy. This gives rise to concern. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Muraca and Neuber a strong mitigation approach ought to be 
embedded in a comprehensive scheme of transforming society. uestions about 
distributional justice in mitigation ought to be addressed as well as environmental 
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issues. This also resonates with the techno-fix objection against CE (Section 6.2.2), 
which warns against a delayed shift in society, if CE is applied.  
A promising framework to address those issues is arguably the degrowth approach. 
Certain well-defined criteria can be established to assess the deployment of CE-
technologies, such as the viability-criteria and the conviviality-criteria (Muraca and 
Neuber 2017). An assessment of CE in light of an alternative social and economic 
background might prove to provide new insights. After all, it is conventional 
economic thinking which provokes a number of fundamental arguments against CE 
such as the techno-fix argument. The need for a shift in economic paradigms might 
be due in order to cope with the specific difficulties posed by CE. As the saying 
goes: Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them.  
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